Murat Aydede
Biographic Data
| ID | 954322 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Murat Aydede |
| GIVEN NAMES | Murat |
| FAMILY NAME | Aydede |
| SIGNATURE | AYDEDE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of British Columbia |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7503-7885 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
What Constitutes Phenomenal Character
Is the experience of pain transparent
Pain
What does feeling a sharp pain in one's hand have in common with seeing a red apple on the table? Some say not much, apart from the fact that they are both conscious experiences. To see an object is to perceive an extramental reality—in this case, a red apple. To feel a pain, by contrast, is to undergo a conscious experience that doesn't necessarily relate the subject to an objective reality. Perceptualists, however, dispute this. They say that b…
Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain
This paper is an attempt to spell out what makes the scientific study of pain so distinctive from a philosophical perspective. Using the IASP definition of ‘pain’ (1986) as our guide, we raise a number of questions about the philosophical assumptions underlying the scientific study of pain. We argue that unlike the study of ordinary perception, the study of pain focuses from the very start on the experience itself and its qualities, without makin…
On the Type/Token Relation of Mental Representations
This paper is an investigation into this question and the issues that make the question relevant and important
An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain
I take up the issue of whether pleasure is a kind of sensation (in particular, a feeling episode) or not. This issue was much discussed by philosophers of the 1950's and 1960's, and apparently no resolution was reached. There were mainly two camps in the discussion: those who argued for a dispositional account, and those who favored an episodic feeling (sensational) view of pleasure. Here, relying on some recent scientific research I offer an acc…
Computation and Intentional Psychology
Le rapport entre une approche computationnelle et une approche intentionnelle en psychologie a toujours été une question difficile. La crainte est que si les processus mentaux sont computationnels, alors ces processus, définis sur des symboles, ne soient sensibles qu'aux propreétés non sémantiques des symboles. Stich, on le sait, a fait grand cas de cette tension et défendu une psychologie purement «syntaxique», en traçant une distinction tranché…
An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain
I take up the issue of whether pleasure is a kind of sensation (in particular, a feeling episode) or not. This issue was much discussed by philosophers of the 1950's and 1960's, and apparently no resolution was reached. There were mainly two camps in the discussion: those who argued for a dispositional account, and those who favored an episodic feeling (sensational) view of pleasure. Here, relying on some recent scientific research I offer an acc…
Computation and Intentional Psychology
Le rapport entre une approche computationnelle et une approche intentionnelle en psychologie a toujours été une question difficile. La crainte est que si les processus mentaux sont computationnels, alors ces processus, définis sur des symboles, ne soient sensibles qu'aux propreétés non sémantiques des symboles. Stich, on le sait, a fait grand cas de cette tension et défendu une psychologie purement «syntaxique», en traçant une distinction tranché…
Is the experience of pain transparent
Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain
This paper is an attempt to spell out what makes the scientific study of pain so distinctive from a philosophical perspective. Using the IASP definition of ‘pain’ (1986) as our guide, we raise a number of questions about the philosophical assumptions underlying the scientific study of pain. We argue that unlike the study of ordinary perception, the study of pain focuses from the very start on the experience itself and its qualities, without makin…
On the Type/Token Relation of Mental Representations
This paper is an investigation into this question and the issues that make the question relevant and important
An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain
I take up the issue of whether pleasure is a kind of sensation (in particular, a feeling episode) or not. This issue was much discussed by philosophers of the 1950's and 1960's, and apparently no resolution was reached. There were mainly two camps in the discussion: those who argued for a dispositional account, and those who favored an episodic feeling (sensational) view of pleasure. Here, relying on some recent scientific research I offer an acc…
Computation and Intentional Psychology
Le rapport entre une approche computationnelle et une approche intentionnelle en psychologie a toujours été une question difficile. La crainte est que si les processus mentaux sont computationnels, alors ces processus, définis sur des symboles, ne soient sensibles qu'aux propreétés non sémantiques des symboles. Stich, on le sait, a fait grand cas de cette tension et défendu une psychologie purement «syntaxique», en traçant une distinction tranché…
Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain
This paper is an attempt to spell out what makes the scientific study of pain so distinctive from a philosophical perspective. Using the IASP definition of ‘pain’ (1986) as our guide, we raise a number of questions about the philosophical assumptions underlying the scientific study of pain. We argue that unlike the study of ordinary perception, the study of pain focuses from the very start on the experience itself and its qualities, without makin…
Pain
What does feeling a sharp pain in one's hand have in common with seeing a red apple on the table? Some say not much, apart from the fact that they are both conscious experiences. To see an object is to perceive an extramental reality—in this case, a red apple. To feel a pain, by contrast, is to undergo a conscious experience that doesn't necessarily relate the subject to an objective reality. Perceptualists, however, dispute this. They say that b…
Is the experience of pain transparent
What Constitutes Phenomenal Character
Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Mental Health and Psychiatry (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Pain Management and Placebo Effect (2 works)