Ali Yousefi Heris
Biographic Data
| ID | 9566829 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ali Yousefi Heris |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ali Yousefi |
| FAMILY NAME | Heris |
| SIGNATURE | HERIS A Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | Shahid Beheshti University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8563-5501 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
All simulation is structural
Simulation is widely invoked in cognitive science, yet the criterion that distinguishes it from modeling or inference remains unclear. The dominant replication assumption holds that simulation requires concrete resemblance: the simulating system works by the same principles or undergoes the same kinds of states as its target. I argue that this assumption can neither demarcate simulation nor fix simulation content. Neural reuse shows why: the same…
Mental Simulation
Emotions and two senses of simulation
Some simulationists have argued that the information obtained during the perceptual process of facial expression (the geometric features) is sufficient for recognition of the emotion intended by that expression. Drawing on evidence from cross-cultural studies, with particular attention to conceptual act theories, I show that both emotion expression and recognition are top-down modulated by expressivity norms, observer-specific internal representa…
No prominent works on this page.
Emotions and two senses of simulation
Some simulationists have argued that the information obtained during the perceptual process of facial expression (the geometric features) is sufficient for recognition of the emotion intended by that expression. Drawing on evidence from cross-cultural studies, with particular attention to conceptual act theories, I show that both emotion expression and recognition are top-down modulated by expressivity norms, observer-specific internal representa…
Mental Simulation
All simulation is structural
Simulation is widely invoked in cognitive science, yet the criterion that distinguishes it from modeling or inference remains unclear. The dominant replication assumption holds that simulation requires concrete resemblance: the simulating system works by the same principles or undergoes the same kinds of states as its target. I argue that this assumption can neither demarcate simulation nor fix simulation content. Neural reuse shows why: the same…
Action Observation and Synchronization (2 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Biotechnology and Related Fields (1 work) · Cardiomyopathy and Myosin Studies (1 work) · Categorical variable (1 work)