Marina Moreno
Biographic Data
| ID | 9566837 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marina Moreno |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marina |
| FAMILY NAME | Moreno |
| SIGNATURE | MORENO M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
| ORCID | 0009-0009-6986-7212 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Subtracting Self-Selection Bias from Scientific Inquiry
In this paper, I examine the impact of self-selection bias on expert consensus in fields driven by constructed arguments, such as philosophy. Through an agent-based model, I explore how pre-existing beliefs influence researchers' decisions to enter specific fields and how these dynamics contribute to distorted epistemic outcomes, particularly when the questions investigated are complex and argument construction plays a central role. The model rev…
Diachronic or Counterfactual? Temporal Well-Being and Changing Attitudes
In his paper “Wellbeing and Changing Attitudes Across Time”, Krister Bykvist investigates the challenge that changing attitudes pose for attitude-sensitive theories of well-being in determining temporal wellbeing. He offers both a useful tool to investigate the conceptual space of possible answers, namely an attitudinal matrix, as well as a seemingly plausible constraint on such an answer, which he terms ‘diagonalism’. This paper draws on his mat…
The Epistemic Value of Travel
There is a debate between Proponents and Skeptics about the epistemic value of travel. Proponents argue that there are normative reasons that speak in favour of travel based on the kinds of knowledge, beliefs, or other epistemically relevant features that we might acquire through travelling recreationally. Skeptics deny that travel provides distinctive epistemic value such as to give us normative reasons that speak in favour of it. In this paper …
The (im)possibility of prudence
This paper develops a parallel between prudence and population ethics. I argue that developing a standard guiding the evaluation of the comparative prudential value of different lives is challenging because it shares a similarity with population ethics: In both contexts, we assess the comparative value of populations of person-stages/people, which may vary in number and level of well-being. Based on this analogy, I show that Arrhenius’ fifth impo…
No prominent works on this page.
Diachronic or Counterfactual? Temporal Well-Being and Changing Attitudes
In his paper “Wellbeing and Changing Attitudes Across Time”, Krister Bykvist investigates the challenge that changing attitudes pose for attitude-sensitive theories of well-being in determining temporal wellbeing. He offers both a useful tool to investigate the conceptual space of possible answers, namely an attitudinal matrix, as well as a seemingly plausible constraint on such an answer, which he terms ‘diagonalism’. This paper draws on his mat…
The Epistemic Value of Travel
There is a debate between Proponents and Skeptics about the epistemic value of travel. Proponents argue that there are normative reasons that speak in favour of travel based on the kinds of knowledge, beliefs, or other epistemically relevant features that we might acquire through travelling recreationally. Skeptics deny that travel provides distinctive epistemic value such as to give us normative reasons that speak in favour of it. In this paper …
The (im)possibility of prudence
This paper develops a parallel between prudence and population ethics. I argue that developing a standard guiding the evaluation of the comparative prudential value of different lives is challenging because it shares a similarity with population ethics: In both contexts, we assess the comparative value of populations of person-stages/people, which may vary in number and level of well-being. Based on this analogy, I show that Arrhenius’ fifth impo…
Subtracting Self-Selection Bias from Scientific Inquiry
In this paper, I examine the impact of self-selection bias on expert consensus in fields driven by constructed arguments, such as philosophy. Through an agent-based model, I explore how pre-existing beliefs influence researchers' decisions to enter specific fields and how these dynamics contribute to distorted epistemic outcomes, particularly when the questions investigated are complex and argument construction plays a central role. The model rev…
Ontology (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works) · Algorithm (1 work) · Cognitive psychology (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Counterfactual conditional (1 work) · Counterfactual thinking (1 work) · Critical Realism in Sociology (1 work) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (1 work)