Konstantinos Protopappas
Biographic Data
| ID | 9573117 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Konstantinos Protopappas |
| GIVEN NAMES | Konstantinos |
| FAMILY NAME | Protopappas |
| SIGNATURE | PROTOPAPPAS K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universität Innsbruck |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6044-7259 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Manipulation of moves in sequential contests
In two-player Tullock contests with endogenous timing of moves, the weak player moves early and the strong player follows. This order of moves is the third-best outcome for a contest organiser as it leads to a contest with lower aggregate effort compared to a contest where the players move in reverse order (first best) or simultaneously (second best). We propose that if the contest organiser—who does not know ex ante which player is the strong an…
Optimal lobbying pricing
We study a game with two candidates and two interest groups. The groups offer two kinds of costly contributions to achieve political influence: (a) pre-election campaign contributions to their favourite candidates that increase their probability of winning the election and (b) post-election lobbying contributions to the winning candidate to affect the implemented policy. The candidates are the first to act by strategically choosing the lobbying p…
No prominent works on this page.
Optimal lobbying pricing
We study a game with two candidates and two interest groups. The groups offer two kinds of costly contributions to achieve political influence: (a) pre-election campaign contributions to their favourite candidates that increase their probability of winning the election and (b) post-election lobbying contributions to the winning candidate to affect the implemented policy. The candidates are the first to act by strategically choosing the lobbying p…
Manipulation of moves in sequential contests
In two-player Tullock contests with endogenous timing of moves, the weak player moves early and the strong player follows. This order of moves is the third-best outcome for a contest organiser as it leads to a contest with lower aggregate effort compared to a contest where the players move in reverse order (first best) or simultaneously (second best). We propose that if the contest organiser—who does not know ex ante which player is the strong an…
Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Public finance (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Campaign finance (1 work) · Commit (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · CONTEST (1 work)