Carlos Rafels
Biographic Data
| ID | 9573231 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Carlos Rafels |
| GIVEN NAMES | Carlos |
| FAMILY NAME | Rafels |
| SIGNATURE | RAFELS C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat de Barcelona |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6804-9538 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Egalitarian-in-deviation rules relative to a reference system for resolving conflicting claims problems
We study claims problems in which agents may also have reference points. We show first that many classical rules satisfy an egalitarian property in this setting; namely, the differences between each agents’ payoff and the corresponding reference value are as equal as possible. We also introduce a broad class of rules that satisfy a generalized condition, dubbed egalitarian-in-deviation relative to a reference system. For each problem, the system …
Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games
Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990) introduces population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) and proves that every assignment game with at least two sellers and two buyers, where each buyer-seller pair derives a positive gain from trade, lacks a PMAS. In particular glove games lacks PMAS. We propose a new cooperative TU-game concept, population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes (PLMAS), which relaxes some population monotonicity condit…
Core Allocations in Co-investment Problems
No prominent works on this page.
Core Allocations in Co-investment Problems
Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games
Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990) introduces population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) and proves that every assignment game with at least two sellers and two buyers, where each buyer-seller pair derives a positive gain from trade, lacks a PMAS. In particular glove games lacks PMAS. We propose a new cooperative TU-game concept, population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes (PLMAS), which relaxes some population monotonicity condit…
Egalitarian-in-deviation rules relative to a reference system for resolving conflicting claims problems
We study claims problems in which agents may also have reference points. We show first that many classical rules satisfy an egalitarian property in this setting; namely, the differences between each agents’ payoff and the corresponding reference value are as equal as possible. We also introduce a broad class of rules that satisfy a generalized condition, dubbed egalitarian-in-deviation relative to a reference system. For each problem, the system …
Economics (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Mathematical optimization (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Converse (1 work) · Convexity (1 work) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (1 work)