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Yoram Barzel

Biographic Data

ID958113
NAMEYoram Barzel
GIVEN NAMESYoram
FAMILY NAMEBarzel
SIGNATUREBARZEL Y
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Washington
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS23
TOTAL CITATIONS131
AUTHOR COUNT23
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1962
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2005
H-INDEX6
  • Organizational Forms and Measurement Costs

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2005

    Under caveat emptor, buyers effect their measurements prior to exchange. Long-term relations and contracts allow buyers to measure commodities at consumption. Buyers use subjective measurements in long-term relations. Contractual guarantees shift enforcement to the state, but require objective, verifiable measurements. Most exchange agreements combine the two forms and benefit from the comparative advantage that each provides. Vertical integratio…

  • Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Edgar Kiser•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•2002•Cited by: 8•References: 21

    We explore the relationship between voting rights and taxation in medieval England and France. We hypothesize that voting was a wealth-enhancing institution formed by the ruler in order to facilitate profitable joint projects with subjects. We predict when voting rights and tax payments will be linked to each other, as well as to the projects inducing them, and when they will become separated. We classify taxes into three types: customary, consen…

  • A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•BOOK•Theory of the State•2001

    This book models the emergence of the state, and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals will install a ruler only after they create a mechanism to control him. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial 'state of nature' may gradually evolve into a r…

  • Economic Analysis of Property Rights

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•BOOK•Economic Analysis of Property…•1997

    This is a study of the way individuals organise the use of resources in order to maximise the value of their economic rights over these resources. Property rights and all forms of organisation result from people's deliberate actions. In the tradition of Coase, this study offers a unified theoretical structure to deal with exchange, rights formation and organisation which traditional economic theory assumes away. A person's economic property right…

  • The Demand Curves for Giffen Goods are Downward Sloping

    Yoram Barzel, Wing Suen•PREPRINT•The Economic Journal•1992

    Consumers' optimal consumption strategy in anticipation of price variations is to equalize the marginal utility of income across different price regimes. Since the marginal utility of income is positively related to the price of a Giffen good, consumers will adopt a consumption plan (through saving and borrowing, insurance, or an appropriate choice of portfolio) that allows them to increase total expenditure when the Giffen good is relatively exp…

  • Economic Analysis of Property Rights

    Timothy M Swanson, Yoram Barzel et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1992•Cited by: 7

  • The Origins of Democracy in England

    Open Access•Edgar Kiser, Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•1991•Cited by: 18•References: 26

    This article uses a rational choice model of the origins of democracy to analyze the political history of medieval England from the Norman conquest to the Hundred Years War. Why did a country just taken over by a ruler more autocratic than his predecessors develop a political system increasingly dominated by the rule of law and protodemocratic institutions? The authors argue that protodemocratic institutions such as the Magna Carta, Parliament, a…

  • The Political Economy of the Oil Import Quota

    Edward L Morse, Yoram Barzel et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1978•Cited by: 3

  • An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1976•Cited by: 12•References: 4

    Because commodities as transacted are complex, tax statutes could not cover all margins subject to optimization. A tax will induce, then, substitution within the commodity away from the taxed attributes and into the others. The results of a test on cigarettes are consistent with our prediction that the effects of unit and ad valorem taxes will differ both from each other and from those predicted by the conventional model. It is shown that, althou…

  • Voting behavior, efficiency, and equity

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Robert T Deacon•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1975•Cited by: 3•References: 6

  • Is the act of voting rational

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Eugene Silberberg•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1973•Cited by: 62•References: 3

  • Private Schools and Public School Finance

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1973•Cited by: 10

  • Investment, Scale, and Growth

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1971•References: 1

    There are many economic activities where the cost function can be approximated by a fixed initial cost and a constant (sometimes zero) marginal cost as with book publishing, public utilities, and innovations. In the absence of technical advance, an economy that grows in scale could nevertheless exhibit growth in per capita income by taking advantage of the economies of scale afforded. To the extent, however, that these production processes are in…

  • Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1970•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Two propositions on the optimum level of producing collective goods

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1969•Cited by: 4•References: 1

  • Productivity and the Price of Medical Services

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1969

  • Economic Analysis for Health Service Efficiency . Martin S. Feldstein

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1969

  • Optimal Timing of Innovations

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1968

    The article shows that innovations are induced, since they become more profitable with the expansion of output. The amount of resources devoted to innovating activity, however, is in general not the optimal one because of the pressure of two opposing forces. On the one hand, competition between potential innovators tends to make this amount too large, on the other, the inability of innovators to capture all the benefits tends to make the amount t…

  • Invention and Economic Growth . Jacob Schmookler

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1967

  • The Production Function and Technical Change in the Steam-Power Industry

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1964•Cited by: 3

  • Capital Stock Growth: A Micro-econometric Approach . Edwin Kuh

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1964

  • Productivity in the Electric Power Industry, 1929-1955

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1963

  • Electric Utilities--Costs and Performance . William Iulo

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1962

  • Is the act of voting rational

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Eugene Silberberg•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1973•Cited by: 62•References: 3

  • The Origins of Democracy in England

    Open Access•Edgar Kiser, Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•1991•Cited by: 18•References: 26

    This article uses a rational choice model of the origins of democracy to analyze the political history of medieval England from the Norman conquest to the Hundred Years War. Why did a country just taken over by a ruler more autocratic than his predecessors develop a political system increasingly dominated by the rule of law and protodemocratic institutions? The authors argue that protodemocratic institutions such as the Magna Carta, Parliament, a…

  • An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1976•Cited by: 12•References: 4

    Because commodities as transacted are complex, tax statutes could not cover all margins subject to optimization. A tax will induce, then, substitution within the commodity away from the taxed attributes and into the others. The results of a test on cigarettes are consistent with our prediction that the effects of unit and ad valorem taxes will differ both from each other and from those predicted by the conventional model. It is shown that, althou…

  • Private Schools and Public School Finance

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1973•Cited by: 10

  • Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Edgar Kiser•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•2002•Cited by: 8•References: 21

    We explore the relationship between voting rights and taxation in medieval England and France. We hypothesize that voting was a wealth-enhancing institution formed by the ruler in order to facilitate profitable joint projects with subjects. We predict when voting rights and tax payments will be linked to each other, as well as to the projects inducing them, and when they will become separated. We classify taxes into three types: customary, consen…

  • Economic Analysis of Property Rights

    Timothy M Swanson, Yoram Barzel et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1992•Cited by: 7

  • Two propositions on the optimum level of producing collective goods

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1969•Cited by: 4•References: 1

  • The Political Economy of the Oil Import Quota

    Edward L Morse, Yoram Barzel et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1978•Cited by: 3

  • Voting behavior, efficiency, and equity

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Robert T Deacon•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1975•Cited by: 3•References: 6

  • The Production Function and Technical Change in the Steam-Power Industry

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1964•Cited by: 3

  • Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1970•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Electric Utilities--Costs and Performance . William Iulo

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1962

  • Productivity in the Electric Power Industry, 1929-1955

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1963

  • The Production Function and Technical Change in the Steam-Power Industry

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1964•Cited by: 3

  • Capital Stock Growth: A Micro-econometric Approach . Edwin Kuh

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1964

  • Invention and Economic Growth . Jacob Schmookler

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1967

  • Optimal Timing of Innovations

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1968

    The article shows that innovations are induced, since they become more profitable with the expansion of output. The amount of resources devoted to innovating activity, however, is in general not the optimal one because of the pressure of two opposing forces. On the one hand, competition between potential innovators tends to make this amount too large, on the other, the inability of innovators to capture all the benefits tends to make the amount t…

  • Two propositions on the optimum level of producing collective goods

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1969•Cited by: 4•References: 1

  • Productivity and the Price of Medical Services

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1969

  • Economic Analysis for Health Service Efficiency . Martin S. Feldstein

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1969

  • Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1970•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Investment, Scale, and Growth

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1971•References: 1

    There are many economic activities where the cost function can be approximated by a fixed initial cost and a constant (sometimes zero) marginal cost as with book publishing, public utilities, and innovations. In the absence of technical advance, an economy that grows in scale could nevertheless exhibit growth in per capita income by taking advantage of the economies of scale afforded. To the extent, however, that these production processes are in…

  • Is the act of voting rational

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Eugene Silberberg•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1973•Cited by: 62•References: 3

  • Private Schools and Public School Finance

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1973•Cited by: 10

  • Voting behavior, efficiency, and equity

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Robert T Deacon•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1975•Cited by: 3•References: 6

  • An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1976•Cited by: 12•References: 4

    Because commodities as transacted are complex, tax statutes could not cover all margins subject to optimization. A tax will induce, then, substitution within the commodity away from the taxed attributes and into the others. The results of a test on cigarettes are consistent with our prediction that the effects of unit and ad valorem taxes will differ both from each other and from those predicted by the conventional model. It is shown that, althou…

  • The Political Economy of the Oil Import Quota

    Edward L Morse, Yoram Barzel et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1978•Cited by: 3

  • The Origins of Democracy in England

    Open Access•Edgar Kiser, Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•1991•Cited by: 18•References: 26

    This article uses a rational choice model of the origins of democracy to analyze the political history of medieval England from the Norman conquest to the Hundred Years War. Why did a country just taken over by a ruler more autocratic than his predecessors develop a political system increasingly dominated by the rule of law and protodemocratic institutions? The authors argue that protodemocratic institutions such as the Magna Carta, Parliament, a…

  • The Demand Curves for Giffen Goods are Downward Sloping

    Yoram Barzel, Wing Suen•PREPRINT•The Economic Journal•1992

    Consumers' optimal consumption strategy in anticipation of price variations is to equalize the marginal utility of income across different price regimes. Since the marginal utility of income is positively related to the price of a Giffen good, consumers will adopt a consumption plan (through saving and borrowing, insurance, or an appropriate choice of portfolio) that allows them to increase total expenditure when the Giffen good is relatively exp…

  • Economic Analysis of Property Rights

    Timothy M Swanson, Yoram Barzel et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1992•Cited by: 7

  • Economic Analysis of Property Rights

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•BOOK•Economic Analysis of Property…•1997

    This is a study of the way individuals organise the use of resources in order to maximise the value of their economic rights over these resources. Property rights and all forms of organisation result from people's deliberate actions. In the tradition of Coase, this study offers a unified theoretical structure to deal with exchange, rights formation and organisation which traditional economic theory assumes away. A person's economic property right…

  • A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel•BOOK•Theory of the State•2001

    This book models the emergence of the state, and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals will install a ruler only after they create a mechanism to control him. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial 'state of nature' may gradually evolve into a r…

  • Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France

    Open Access•Yoram Barzel, Edgar Kiser•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•2002•Cited by: 8•References: 21

    We explore the relationship between voting rights and taxation in medieval England and France. We hypothesize that voting was a wealth-enhancing institution formed by the ruler in order to facilitate profitable joint projects with subjects. We predict when voting rights and tax payments will be linked to each other, as well as to the projects inducing them, and when they will become separated. We classify taxes into three types: customary, consen…

  • Organizational Forms and Measurement Costs

    Yoram Barzel•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2005

    Under caveat emptor, buyers effect their measurements prior to exchange. Long-term relations and contracts allow buyers to measure commodities at consumption. Buyers use subjective measurements in long-term relations. Contractual guarantees shift enforcement to the state, but require objective, verifiable measurements. Most exchange agreements combine the two forms and benefit from the comparative advantage that each provides. Vertical integratio…

Economics (22 works) · Law (15 works) · Political science (15 works) · Law (11 works) · Microeconomics (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Download (6 works)

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