Katherine Hawley
Biographic Data
| ID | 958979 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Katherine Hawley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Katherine |
| FAMILY NAME | Hawley |
| SIGNATURE | HAWLEY K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of St Andrews |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8179-2550 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 54 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
How To Be Trustworthy
The book articulates and defends a core notion of trustworthiness as avoiding unfulfilled commitments. This is motivated via accounts of both trust and distrust in terms of perceived commitment. Avoiding unfufilled commitments is crucial both to practical trustworthiness, and to trustworthiness in speech; on this picture, assertion involves promising to speak truthfully, and simultaneously either keeping that promise or breaking it. Both assertio…
Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics
Work on this paper was supported by a Major Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust
The Logical Structure of Kinds
Do crimson, scarlet, and maroon stand to red as various brain states stand to the mental state of pain? No, says Eric Funkhouser, who sharply distinguishes the determinate–determinable relation from the realizer–realized relation, arguing that they are mutually exclusive. Red is a determinable, with crimson, scarlet, and maroon amongst its determinates. Pain is multiply realizable, by a range of brain states. Or so it seems; Funkhouser is relucta…
Partiality and prejudice in trusting
The Admissible Contents of Experience
Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael…
Admissible Contents of Experience
What Are Natural Kinds?1
Trivial Truthmaking Matters
Testimony and knowing how
Science as a Guide to Metaphysics
Pumped up Physicalism
Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts
Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it is hard to say why. the standard criticism is that such accounts violate the 'only a and b' rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, …
VII-Vagueness and Existence
Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation.
VII-Vagueness and Existence
Thomas S. Kuhn's mysterious worlds
What Are Natural Kinds?1
Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics
Work on this paper was supported by a Major Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust
Science as a Guide to Metaphysics
Partiality and prejudice in trusting
Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts
Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it is hard to say why. the standard criticism is that such accounts violate the 'only a and b' rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, …
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Testimony and knowing how
Thomas S. Kuhn's mysterious worlds
Thomas S. Kuhn's mysterious worlds
VII-Vagueness and Existence
Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation.
VII-Vagueness and Existence
Pumped up Physicalism
Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts
Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it is hard to say why. the standard criticism is that such accounts violate the 'only a and b' rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, …
Science as a Guide to Metaphysics
Testimony and knowing how
The Admissible Contents of Experience
Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael…
Admissible Contents of Experience
What Are Natural Kinds?1
Trivial Truthmaking Matters
Partiality and prejudice in trusting
The Logical Structure of Kinds
Do crimson, scarlet, and maroon stand to red as various brain states stand to the mental state of pain? No, says Eric Funkhouser, who sharply distinguishes the determinate–determinable relation from the realizer–realized relation, arguing that they are mutually exclusive. Red is a determinable, with crimson, scarlet, and maroon amongst its determinates. Pain is multiply realizable, by a range of brain states. Or so it seems; Funkhouser is relucta…
Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics
Work on this paper was supported by a Major Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust
How To Be Trustworthy
The book articulates and defends a core notion of trustworthiness as avoiding unfulfilled commitments. This is motivated via accounts of both trust and distrust in terms of perceived commitment. Avoiding unfufilled commitments is crucial both to practical trustworthiness, and to trustworthiness in speech; on this picture, assertion involves promising to speak truthfully, and simultaneously either keeping that promise or breaking it. Both assertio…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Metaphysics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works)