Samuel Asarnow
Biographic Data
| ID | 961910 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Samuel Asarnow |
| GIVEN NAMES | Samuel |
| FAMILY NAME | Asarnow |
| SIGNATURE | ASARNOW S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Macalester College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6977-2960 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action
Action and Rationalization
According to the ‘standard story’ in the philosophy of action, actions are those movements of a creature’s body that are caused and rationalized by the creature’s mental states. The attractions of the causal condition have been widely discussed. The rationalization condition is nearly ubiquitous, but it is notoriously obscure, and its motivation has rarely been made explicit. This paper presents a new argument for including the rationalization co…
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention
The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of…
From Valuing to Value
From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism collects fifteen of David Sobel's papers on normative reasons, welfare, and ethics, many of which are contemporary classics. New here are a unifying introduction and the paper “Subjectivism and Reasons to Be Moral.” The volume would make a useful centerpiece to a graduate seminar focused on reasons, welfare, or consequentialism. And the new essay will be of great interest to anyone interested in no…
The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning
According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I…
The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning
According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I…
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention
The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of…
The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning
According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I…
From Valuing to Value
From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism collects fifteen of David Sobel's papers on normative reasons, welfare, and ethics, many of which are contemporary classics. New here are a unifying introduction and the paper “Subjectivism and Reasons to Be Moral.” The volume would make a useful centerpiece to a graduate seminar focused on reasons, welfare, or consequentialism. And the new essay will be of great interest to anyone interested in no…
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention
The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of…
Action and Rationalization
According to the ‘standard story’ in the philosophy of action, actions are those movements of a creature’s body that are caused and rationalized by the creature’s mental states. The attractions of the causal condition have been widely discussed. The rationalization condition is nearly ubiquitous, but it is notoriously obscure, and its motivation has rarely been made explicit. This paper presents a new argument for including the rationalization co…
Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action
Epistemology (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Normative (2 works)