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E Glen Weyl

Biographic Data

ID961969
NAMEE Glen Weyl
GIVEN NAMESE Glen
FAMILY NAMEWeyl
SIGNATUREWEYL E G
AFFILIATIONSMicrosoft Research (United Kingdom)
ORCID0000-0001-8824-6977
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS14
TOTAL CITATIONS68
AUTHOR COUNT14
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2009
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX4
  • The Real Dangers of Generative AI

    Open Access•Danielle Allen, D B Allen et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of democracy•2024•Cited by: 7

    As perhaps the most consequential technology of our time, Generative Foundation Models (GFMs) present unprecedented challenges for democratic institutions. By allowing deception and de-contextualized information sharing at a previously unimaginable scale and pace, GFMs could undermine the foundations of democracy. At the same time, the investment scale required to develop the models and the race dynamics around that development threaten to enable…

  • A/B Testing with Fat Tails

    Eduardo M Azevedo, Alex Deng et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 2

    We propose a new framework for optimal experimentation, which we term the “A/B testing problem.” Our model departs from the existing literature by allowing for fat tails. Our key insight is that the optimal strategy depends on whether most gains accrue from typical innovations or from rare, unpredictable large successes. If the tails of the unobserved distribution of innovation quality are not too fat, the standard approach of using a few high-po…

  • Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society

    Open Access•Eric A Posner, E Glen Weyl et al.•BOOK•Radical Markets•2019

  • Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society

    Open Access•Eric A Posner, Eric Posner et al.•BOOK•Radical Markets•2018•Cited by: 10

    Revolutionary ideas on how to use markets to bring about fairness and prosperity for all Many blame today's economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? Radical Markets turns this thinking--and pretty much all conventional thinking about markets, both for and against—on its head. The book reveals bold new ways to organize markets for the good of everyone. It shows how…

  • Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power

    Open Access•Naidu, Suresh Naidu et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2018•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition in labor markets like in product markets, the government does little to address the labor market problem and private litigation has been rare and mostly unsuccessful. The reason is that the analytic methods for evaluating labor market power in antitrust contexts are p…

  • The Openness‐equality Trade‐off in Global Redistribution

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2018•Cited by: 4•References: 64

    The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries accept massive numbers of migrants from poor countries and pay wages that dramatically improve over outside options but are meagre by the standards of natives. As such they do dramatically more per capita to reduce global inequality than do the 'fortress welfare states' of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. If OECD countries were to imitate the GCC it would redu…

  • Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets

    Neale Mahoney, E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2017

    Policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these forces coexist. We build a model of symmetric imperfect competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of market power and selection. We use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to characterize the interaction between these forces. Using a calibrated model of health insurance, we show that the risk adjustment commonly used to offset adverse selection can red…

  • The robustness of quadratic voting

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2017•Cited by: 4•References: 34

  • Quadratic voting and the public good: Introduction

    Open Access•Eric A Posner, E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2017•Cited by: 2•References: 23

  • Taxation and the Allocation of Talent

    Benjamin B Lockwood, Benjamin Lockwood et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•Cited by: 3•References: 11

    Taxation affects the allocation of talented individuals across professions by blunting material incentives and thus magnifying nonpecuniary incentives of pursuing a "calling." Estimates from the literature suggest that high-paying professions have negative externalities, whereas low-paying professions have positive externalities. A calibrated model therefore prescribes negative marginal tax rates on middle-class incomes and positive rates on the …

  • The Openness-Equality Trade-Off in Global Redistribution

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2014

  • Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition

    E Glen Weyl, Michal Fabinger•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2013•Cited by: 31•References: 7

    We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of imperfect competition. The principles cover (1) the independence of physical and economic incidence, the (2) qualitative and (3) quantitative manner in which taxes are split between consumers and producers, (4) the determinants of tax pass-through, and (5) the integration of local incidence to determine the overall division of surplus. We show how these pri…

  • Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl, Jean Tirole•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2012

  • Whose rights? A critique of individual agency as the basis of rights

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Politics Philosophy & Economics•2009•Cited by: 2

    I argue that individuals may be as problematic political agents as groups are. In doing so, I draw on theory from economics, philosophy, and computer science and evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and biology. If successful, this argument undermines agency-based justifications for embracing strong notions of individual rights while rejecting the possibility of similar rights for groups. For concreteness, I critique these mistaken views by re…

  • Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition

    E Glen Weyl, Michal Fabinger•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2013•Cited by: 31•References: 7

    We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of imperfect competition. The principles cover (1) the independence of physical and economic incidence, the (2) qualitative and (3) quantitative manner in which taxes are split between consumers and producers, (4) the determinants of tax pass-through, and (5) the integration of local incidence to determine the overall division of surplus. We show how these pri…

  • Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society

    Open Access•Eric A Posner, Eric Posner et al.•BOOK•Radical Markets•2018•Cited by: 10

    Revolutionary ideas on how to use markets to bring about fairness and prosperity for all Many blame today's economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? Radical Markets turns this thinking--and pretty much all conventional thinking about markets, both for and against—on its head. The book reveals bold new ways to organize markets for the good of everyone. It shows how…

  • The Real Dangers of Generative AI

    Open Access•Danielle Allen, D B Allen et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of democracy•2024•Cited by: 7

    As perhaps the most consequential technology of our time, Generative Foundation Models (GFMs) present unprecedented challenges for democratic institutions. By allowing deception and de-contextualized information sharing at a previously unimaginable scale and pace, GFMs could undermine the foundations of democracy. At the same time, the investment scale required to develop the models and the race dynamics around that development threaten to enable…

  • The Openness‐equality Trade‐off in Global Redistribution

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2018•Cited by: 4•References: 64

    The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries accept massive numbers of migrants from poor countries and pay wages that dramatically improve over outside options but are meagre by the standards of natives. As such they do dramatically more per capita to reduce global inequality than do the 'fortress welfare states' of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. If OECD countries were to imitate the GCC it would redu…

  • The robustness of quadratic voting

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2017•Cited by: 4•References: 34

  • Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power

    Open Access•Naidu, Suresh Naidu et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2018•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition in labor markets like in product markets, the government does little to address the labor market problem and private litigation has been rare and mostly unsuccessful. The reason is that the analytic methods for evaluating labor market power in antitrust contexts are p…

  • Taxation and the Allocation of Talent

    Benjamin B Lockwood, Benjamin Lockwood et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•Cited by: 3•References: 11

    Taxation affects the allocation of talented individuals across professions by blunting material incentives and thus magnifying nonpecuniary incentives of pursuing a "calling." Estimates from the literature suggest that high-paying professions have negative externalities, whereas low-paying professions have positive externalities. A calibrated model therefore prescribes negative marginal tax rates on middle-class incomes and positive rates on the …

  • A/B Testing with Fat Tails

    Eduardo M Azevedo, Alex Deng et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 2

    We propose a new framework for optimal experimentation, which we term the “A/B testing problem.” Our model departs from the existing literature by allowing for fat tails. Our key insight is that the optimal strategy depends on whether most gains accrue from typical innovations or from rare, unpredictable large successes. If the tails of the unobserved distribution of innovation quality are not too fat, the standard approach of using a few high-po…

  • Quadratic voting and the public good: Introduction

    Open Access•Eric A Posner, E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2017•Cited by: 2•References: 23

  • Whose rights? A critique of individual agency as the basis of rights

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Politics Philosophy & Economics•2009•Cited by: 2

    I argue that individuals may be as problematic political agents as groups are. In doing so, I draw on theory from economics, philosophy, and computer science and evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and biology. If successful, this argument undermines agency-based justifications for embracing strong notions of individual rights while rejecting the possibility of similar rights for groups. For concreteness, I critique these mistaken views by re…

  • Whose rights? A critique of individual agency as the basis of rights

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Politics Philosophy & Economics•2009•Cited by: 2

    I argue that individuals may be as problematic political agents as groups are. In doing so, I draw on theory from economics, philosophy, and computer science and evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and biology. If successful, this argument undermines agency-based justifications for embracing strong notions of individual rights while rejecting the possibility of similar rights for groups. For concreteness, I critique these mistaken views by re…

  • Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl, Jean Tirole•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2012

  • Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition

    E Glen Weyl, Michal Fabinger•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2013•Cited by: 31•References: 7

    We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of imperfect competition. The principles cover (1) the independence of physical and economic incidence, the (2) qualitative and (3) quantitative manner in which taxes are split between consumers and producers, (4) the determinants of tax pass-through, and (5) the integration of local incidence to determine the overall division of surplus. We show how these pri…

  • The Openness-Equality Trade-Off in Global Redistribution

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2014

  • Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets

    Neale Mahoney, E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2017

    Policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these forces coexist. We build a model of symmetric imperfect competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of market power and selection. We use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to characterize the interaction between these forces. Using a calibrated model of health insurance, we show that the risk adjustment commonly used to offset adverse selection can red…

  • The robustness of quadratic voting

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2017•Cited by: 4•References: 34

  • Quadratic voting and the public good: Introduction

    Open Access•Eric A Posner, E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2017•Cited by: 2•References: 23

  • Taxation and the Allocation of Talent

    Benjamin B Lockwood, Benjamin Lockwood et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•Cited by: 3•References: 11

    Taxation affects the allocation of talented individuals across professions by blunting material incentives and thus magnifying nonpecuniary incentives of pursuing a "calling." Estimates from the literature suggest that high-paying professions have negative externalities, whereas low-paying professions have positive externalities. A calibrated model therefore prescribes negative marginal tax rates on middle-class incomes and positive rates on the …

  • Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society

    Open Access•Eric A Posner, Eric Posner et al.•BOOK•Radical Markets•2018•Cited by: 10

    Revolutionary ideas on how to use markets to bring about fairness and prosperity for all Many blame today's economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? Radical Markets turns this thinking--and pretty much all conventional thinking about markets, both for and against—on its head. The book reveals bold new ways to organize markets for the good of everyone. It shows how…

  • Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power

    Open Access•Naidu, Suresh Naidu et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2018•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition in labor markets like in product markets, the government does little to address the labor market problem and private litigation has been rare and mostly unsuccessful. The reason is that the analytic methods for evaluating labor market power in antitrust contexts are p…

  • The Openness‐equality Trade‐off in Global Redistribution

    Open Access•E Glen Weyl•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2018•Cited by: 4•References: 64

    The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries accept massive numbers of migrants from poor countries and pay wages that dramatically improve over outside options but are meagre by the standards of natives. As such they do dramatically more per capita to reduce global inequality than do the 'fortress welfare states' of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. If OECD countries were to imitate the GCC it would redu…

  • Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society

    Open Access•Eric A Posner, E Glen Weyl et al.•BOOK•Radical Markets•2019

  • A/B Testing with Fat Tails

    Eduardo M Azevedo, Alex Deng et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 2

    We propose a new framework for optimal experimentation, which we term the “A/B testing problem.” Our model departs from the existing literature by allowing for fat tails. Our key insight is that the optimal strategy depends on whether most gains accrue from typical innovations or from rare, unpredictable large successes. If the tails of the unobserved distribution of innovation quality are not too fat, the standard approach of using a few high-po…

  • The Real Dangers of Generative AI

    Open Access•Danielle Allen, D B Allen et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of democracy•2024•Cited by: 7

    As perhaps the most consequential technology of our time, Generative Foundation Models (GFMs) present unprecedented challenges for democratic institutions. By allowing deception and de-contextualized information sharing at a previously unimaginable scale and pace, GFMs could undermine the foundations of democracy. At the same time, the investment scale required to develop the models and the race dynamics around that development threaten to enable…

Economics (12 works) · Microeconomics (7 works) · Political science (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Market economy (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works)

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