Carl Ginet
Biographic Data
| ID | 963229 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Carl Ginet |
| GIVEN NAMES | Carl |
| FAMILY NAME | Ginet |
| SIGNATURE | GINET C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Cornell University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 26 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 26 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1962 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Réplica a Hetherington
.
Réplica a Comesaña
.
On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case
Self-Evidence
Este estudo desenvolve uma abordagem do que significa para uma proposição ser autoevidente para alguém, baseado na ideia de que certas proposições são tais que plenamente entendê-las significa crer nelas. Argumenta-se que, quando uma proposição p é autoevidente para alguém, tem-se justificação a priori não-inferencial para crer que p e, eis um traço bem-vindo, uma justificação que não envolve exercer qualquer tipo especial de faculdade intuitiva;…
Teleological Realism
Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts
Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing
The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom
Book Review| October 01 2000 The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom THE WORKS OF AGENCY: ON HUMAN ACTION, WILL, AND FREEDOM. By Hugh J. McCann. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Pp. x, 238. Carl Ginet Carl Ginet Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 632–635. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-632 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site…
The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom
In these essays, McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of 25 years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action; the foundations of action; intention, will and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action; explores the …
The Significance of Free Will
On Action
On Action
On Action
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access On Action. By Carl Ginet. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Price £8.95.)Explaining Human Action. By Kathleen Lennon. (London: Duckworth. Price £16.95.)The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction. By Carlos J. Moya. (Oxford: Polity Press. Price £8.95.) Jennifer Hornsby Jennifer Hornsby Corpus Christ College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophica…
On Action
This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible wit…
Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account
Incompatibilism is the thesis that any free action must be an undetermined event. By a free action I mean one such that until the time of its occurrence the agent had it in her power to perform some alternative action (or to be inactive) instead. By an undetermined event I mean one that was not nomically necessitated by the antecedent state of the world. (Hence, a determined event is one that was nomically necessitated by its antecedents.) By say…
An Essay on Human Action
Actions
Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology
Knowledge, Perception and Memory
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Knowledge, Perception and Memory. By Ginet Carl. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 1975. Pp. viii+212) Don Locke Don Locke Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 26, Issue 104, July 1976, Pages 279–280, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219028 Published: 01 July 1976
Knowledge, perception, and memory
Metaphysics and Explanation
What must be added to knowing to obtain knowing that one knows
How Words Mean Kinds of Sensations
IT sometimes seems to me that what makes one of my * sensations of the kind it is is something that only who have the sensation can know. Then it seems conceivable that, no matter what evidence might think have to the contrary, the kind of sensation that mean by, for example, the term itch is not in the least like the kind that other people mean by that term. Then it seems impossible to find out for certain, really to know, whether or not and oth…
Freedom and the Will
Choice and Chance: A Libertarian Analysis
Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing
What must be added to knowing to obtain knowing that one knows
Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account
Incompatibilism is the thesis that any free action must be an undetermined event. By a free action I mean one such that until the time of its occurrence the agent had it in her power to perform some alternative action (or to be inactive) instead. By an undetermined event I mean one that was not nomically necessitated by the antecedent state of the world. (Hence, a determined event is one that was nomically necessitated by its antecedents.) By say…
Can the Will be Caused
T WO views of the problem about freedom of the will that occur frequently in philosophical literature, and elsewhere, can be stated in terms of their questions about the two propositions: (I) The will is caused. (II) The will is free.' One view naively assumes that these propositions are logical contradictories and that there is no important difficulty about the meaning of either. It simply raises the question: Which is true? A familiar argument …
Réplica a Hetherington
.
On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case
Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts
On Action
Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology
Can the Will be Caused
T WO views of the problem about freedom of the will that occur frequently in philosophical literature, and elsewhere, can be stated in terms of their questions about the two propositions: (I) The will is caused. (II) The will is free.' One view naively assumes that these propositions are logical contradictories and that there is no important difficulty about the meaning of either. It simply raises the question: Which is true? A familiar argument …
Choice and Chance: A Libertarian Analysis
Freedom and the Will
How Words Mean Kinds of Sensations
IT sometimes seems to me that what makes one of my * sensations of the kind it is is something that only who have the sensation can know. Then it seems conceivable that, no matter what evidence might think have to the contrary, the kind of sensation that mean by, for example, the term itch is not in the least like the kind that other people mean by that term. Then it seems impossible to find out for certain, really to know, whether or not and oth…
What must be added to knowing to obtain knowing that one knows
Metaphysics and Explanation
Knowledge, perception, and memory
Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology
Knowledge, Perception and Memory
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Knowledge, Perception and Memory. By Ginet Carl. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 1975. Pp. viii+212) Don Locke Don Locke Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 26, Issue 104, July 1976, Pages 279–280, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219028 Published: 01 July 1976
Actions
An Essay on Human Action
Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account
Incompatibilism is the thesis that any free action must be an undetermined event. By a free action I mean one such that until the time of its occurrence the agent had it in her power to perform some alternative action (or to be inactive) instead. By an undetermined event I mean one that was not nomically necessitated by the antecedent state of the world. (Hence, a determined event is one that was nomically necessitated by its antecedents.) By say…
On Action
This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible wit…
On Action
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access On Action. By Carl Ginet. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Price £8.95.)Explaining Human Action. By Kathleen Lennon. (London: Duckworth. Price £16.95.)The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction. By Carlos J. Moya. (Oxford: Polity Press. Price £8.95.) Jennifer Hornsby Jennifer Hornsby Corpus Christ College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophica…
On Action
On Action
The Significance of Free Will
The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom
Book Review| October 01 2000 The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom THE WORKS OF AGENCY: ON HUMAN ACTION, WILL, AND FREEDOM. By Hugh J. McCann. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Pp. x, 238. Carl Ginet Carl Ginet Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 632–635. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-632 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site…
The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom
In these essays, McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of 25 years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action; the foundations of action; intention, will and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action; explores the …
Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing
Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts
Teleological Realism
Self-Evidence
Este estudo desenvolve uma abordagem do que significa para uma proposição ser autoevidente para alguém, baseado na ideia de que certas proposições são tais que plenamente entendê-las significa crer nelas. Argumenta-se que, quando uma proposição p é autoevidente para alguém, tem-se justificação a priori não-inferencial para crer que p e, eis um traço bem-vindo, uma justificação que não envolve exercer qualquer tipo especial de faculdade intuitiva;…
Réplica a Hetherington
.
Réplica a Comesaña
.
Philosophy (21 works) · Epistemology (18 works) · Contemporary philosophy (10 works) · General interest (10 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (10 works) · Analytic philosophy (9 works) · Physics (8 works) · Free Will and Agency (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Psychology (7 works)