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H P Young

Biographic Data

ID963892
NAMEH P Young
GIVEN NAMESH P
FAMILY NAMEYoung
SIGNATUREYOUNG H P
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Maryland, College Park
ORCID0000-0002-0879-8120
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS107
AUTHOR COUNT7
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1974
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1988
H-INDEX2
  • Condorcet's Theory of Voting

    Open Access•H P Young•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1988•Cited by: 89•References: 16

    Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the "best" decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule giv…

  • Rupert Murdoch and the Sunday Times

    Open Access•H P Young, Hugo Young•ARTICLE•The Political Quarterly•1984•Cited by: 1

  • Fair Representation in the European Parliament

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•1982•Cited by: 2

  • Parliamentary Representation and the Amalgam Method

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•Canadian Journal of Political…•1981•Cited by: 2•References: 1

    Cet article explique en termes strictement opératoires la méthode dite de » l'amalgame « prévue par la loi pour répartir entre les provinces les sièges au Parlement canadien.L'histoire politique canadienne et le sens commun suggèrent quelques principes fondamentaux d'équité qui devraient s'appliquer à toute méthode de répartition des sièges an Parlement. Malheureusement, le méthode de l'amalgame ne répond à aucun de ces principes.Il y a une seule…

  • Replies

    Open Access•Steven J Bram, Steven J Brams et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1979•References: 1

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Stability, Coalitions and Schisms in Proportional Representation Systems

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1978•Cited by: 13•References: 8

    Methods to allocate seats in proportional representation systems are investigated in terms of underlying common-sense properties. Important among these are concepts of stability, coalition encouragement and schism encouragement. In addition, a new concept of uniformity is introduced which seems inherent in the very idea of the word "method, " and it is shown that this concept is essentially equivalent to a previously investigated property called …

  • An axiomatization of Borda's rule

    Open Access•H P Young•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•1974

  • Condorcet's Theory of Voting

    Open Access•H P Young•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1988•Cited by: 89•References: 16

    Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the "best" decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule giv…

  • Stability, Coalitions and Schisms in Proportional Representation Systems

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1978•Cited by: 13•References: 8

    Methods to allocate seats in proportional representation systems are investigated in terms of underlying common-sense properties. Important among these are concepts of stability, coalition encouragement and schism encouragement. In addition, a new concept of uniformity is introduced which seems inherent in the very idea of the word "method, " and it is shown that this concept is essentially equivalent to a previously investigated property called …

  • Fair Representation in the European Parliament

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•1982•Cited by: 2

  • Parliamentary Representation and the Amalgam Method

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•Canadian Journal of Political…•1981•Cited by: 2•References: 1

    Cet article explique en termes strictement opératoires la méthode dite de » l'amalgame « prévue par la loi pour répartir entre les provinces les sièges au Parlement canadien.L'histoire politique canadienne et le sens commun suggèrent quelques principes fondamentaux d'équité qui devraient s'appliquer à toute méthode de répartition des sièges an Parlement. Malheureusement, le méthode de l'amalgame ne répond à aucun de ces principes.Il y a une seule…

  • Rupert Murdoch and the Sunday Times

    Open Access•H P Young, Hugo Young•ARTICLE•The Political Quarterly•1984•Cited by: 1

  • An axiomatization of Borda's rule

    Open Access•H P Young•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•1974

  • Stability, Coalitions and Schisms in Proportional Representation Systems

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1978•Cited by: 13•References: 8

    Methods to allocate seats in proportional representation systems are investigated in terms of underlying common-sense properties. Important among these are concepts of stability, coalition encouragement and schism encouragement. In addition, a new concept of uniformity is introduced which seems inherent in the very idea of the word "method, " and it is shown that this concept is essentially equivalent to a previously investigated property called …

  • Replies

    Open Access•Steven J Bram, Steven J Brams et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1979•References: 1

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Parliamentary Representation and the Amalgam Method

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•Canadian Journal of Political…•1981•Cited by: 2•References: 1

    Cet article explique en termes strictement opératoires la méthode dite de » l'amalgame « prévue par la loi pour répartir entre les provinces les sièges au Parlement canadien.L'histoire politique canadienne et le sens commun suggèrent quelques principes fondamentaux d'équité qui devraient s'appliquer à toute méthode de répartition des sièges an Parlement. Malheureusement, le méthode de l'amalgame ne répond à aucun de ces principes.Il y a une seule…

  • Fair Representation in the European Parliament

    Open Access•M L Balinski, Michel Balinski et al.•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•1982•Cited by: 2

  • Rupert Murdoch and the Sunday Times

    Open Access•H P Young, Hugo Young•ARTICLE•The Political Quarterly•1984•Cited by: 1

  • Condorcet's Theory of Voting

    Open Access•H P Young•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1988•Cited by: 89•References: 16

    Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the "best" decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule giv…

Computer Science (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Citation (2 works) · Condorcet method (2 works)

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