Marco D Dozzi
Biographic Data
| ID | 9642256 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marco D Dozzi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marco D |
| FAMILY NAME | Dozzi |
| SIGNATURE | DOZZI M D |
| AFFILIATIONS | McGill University Montreal Quebec Canada |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7161-3328 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Is (self‐)reflection a form of intentionality? Sartre's dilemma
Sartre maintains that “all consciousness is consciousness of something.” Idiosyncratically, he also understands this “intentionality principle” to entail that what consciousness is “of” is necessarily distinct from it (or “outside of” it, or “transcendent to” it). Nonetheless, he also maintains that all consciousness is necessarily conscious of—or rather, “(of)”— itself in a non‐intentional (in his terms: “non‐positional/non‐thetic”) manner. Give…
Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge
This translation is of an article in the April–June 1948 issue of the Bulletin de la société française de philosophie (42, no. 3: 49–91). That article consists primarily of a lecture that Sartre had presented to La Société Française de Philosophie on 2 June 1947 in which he provided an overview of some of his main points in Being and Nothingness, with particular emphasis on its Introduction (especially its third section, ‘The Pre-Reflective Cogit…
No prominent works on this page.
Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge
This translation is of an article in the April–June 1948 issue of the Bulletin de la société française de philosophie (42, no. 3: 49–91). That article consists primarily of a lecture that Sartre had presented to La Société Française de Philosophie on 2 June 1947 in which he provided an overview of some of his main points in Being and Nothingness, with particular emphasis on its Introduction (especially its third section, ‘The Pre-Reflective Cogit…
Is (self‐)reflection a form of intentionality? Sartre's dilemma
Sartre maintains that “all consciousness is consciousness of something.” Idiosyncratically, he also understands this “intentionality principle” to entail that what consciousness is “of” is necessarily distinct from it (or “outside of” it, or “transcendent to” it). Nonetheless, he also maintains that all consciousness is necessarily conscious of—or rather, “(of)”— itself in a non‐intentional (in his terms: “non‐positional/non‐thetic”) manner. Give…
Computer Science (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · French Literature and Criticism (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre (2 works) · Cogito ergo sum (1 work) · Dilemma (1 work) · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy (1 work)