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Conor Mayo-Wilson

Biographic Data

ID967133
NAMEConor Mayo-Wilson
GIVEN NAMESConor
FAMILY NAMEMayo-Wilson
SIGNATUREMAYO-WILSON C
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Washington
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS12
TOTAL CITATIONS48
AUTHOR COUNT11
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX4
  • Measured Inference

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2025

    Despite the recent “epistemic turn” in the philosophy of measurement, philosophers have ignored a nearly 80 year controversy about the relationship between statistical inference and measurement theory. Some scholars maintain that measurement theory places no constraints on statistics, whereas others argue that the measurement scale (e.g., ordinal or interval) of one’s data determines which statistical methods are “permissible.” I defend an interm…

  • Bamboozled by Bonferroni

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2024•References: 17

    When many statistical hypotheses are evaluated simultaneously, statisticians often recommend adjusting (or “correcting”) standard hypothesis tests. In this article, I (1) distinguish two senses of adjustment, (2) investigate the prudential and epistemic goals that adjustment might achieve, and (3) identify conditions under which a researcher should not adjust for multiplicity in the two senses I identify. I tentatively conclude that the goals of …

  • The computational philosophy

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, J Mevel et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 7•References: 74

    Modeling and computer simulations, we claim, should be considered core philosophical methods. More precisely, we will defend two theses. First, philosophers should use simulations for many of the same reasons we currently use thought experiments. In fact, simulations are superior to thought experiments in achieving some philosophical goals. Second, devising and coding computational models instill good philosophical habits of mind. Throughout the …

  • Statistical Inference as Severe Testing

    Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2021

    For more than three decades, Deborah Mayo has defended severe testing, a framework for evaluating the strength of scientific evidence that provides philosophical foundations for (variants of) classical statistical methods. In her newest book, Statistical Inference as Severe Testing, Mayo (1) extends and refines her views on severe testing, (2) takes aim at researchers who claim that the reproducibility crisis is a result of the use of classical s…

  • Causal identifiability and piecemeal experimentation

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Synthese•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 15

  • Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge

    Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson et al.•BOOK•Scientific Collaboration and…•2018

  • Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge

    Thomas Boyer‐Kassem, Thomas Boyer-Kassem et al.•BOOK•Scientific Collaboration and…•2017

    Descartes once argued that, with sufficient effort and skill, a single scientist could uncover fundamental truths about our world. Contemporary science proves the limits of this claim. From synthesizing the human genome to predicting the effects of climate change, some current scientific research requires the collaboration of hundreds (if not thousands) of scientists with various specializations. Additionally, the majority of published scientific…

  • Structural Chaos

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2015•References: 6

    A dynamical system is called chaotic if small changes to its initial conditions can create large changes in its behavior. By analogy, we call a dynamical system structurally chaotic if small changes to the equations describing the evolution of the system produce large changes in its behavior. Although there are many definitions of “chaos,” there are few mathematically precise candidate definitions of “structural chaos.” I propose a definition, an…

  • Reliability of testimonial norms in scientific communities

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Synthese•2014•Cited by: 5•References: 8

  • The Limits of Piecemeal Causal Inference

    Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2014•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    In medicine and the social sciences, researchers must frequently integrate the findings of many observational studies, which measure overlapping collections of variables. For instance, learning how to prevent obesity requires combining studies that investigate obesity and diet with others that investigate obesity and exercise. Recently developed causal discovery algorithms provide techniques for integrating many studies, but little is known about…

  • The Independence Thesis

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2011•Cited by: 28•References: 16

    Several philosophers of science have argued that epistemically rational individuals might form epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, rational groups might be composed of irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they entail that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists are logically independent. We defend the inconsistency thes…

  • The Problem of Piecemeal Induction

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    I argue that, in causal inference from many observational studies, the piecemeal collection of data can cause underdetermination, even if arbitrarily large amounts of reliable data are available. Two theorems reveal that, for any variable set V , there are causal theories over V that can be distinguished if and only if all variables are simultaneously measured. These results entail that, a priori, one cannot know which observational studies will …

  • The Independence Thesis

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2011•Cited by: 28•References: 16

    Several philosophers of science have argued that epistemically rational individuals might form epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, rational groups might be composed of irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they entail that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists are logically independent. We defend the inconsistency thes…

  • The computational philosophy

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, J Mevel et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 7•References: 74

    Modeling and computer simulations, we claim, should be considered core philosophical methods. More precisely, we will defend two theses. First, philosophers should use simulations for many of the same reasons we currently use thought experiments. In fact, simulations are superior to thought experiments in achieving some philosophical goals. Second, devising and coding computational models instill good philosophical habits of mind. Throughout the …

  • Reliability of testimonial norms in scientific communities

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Synthese•2014•Cited by: 5•References: 8

  • The Limits of Piecemeal Causal Inference

    Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2014•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    In medicine and the social sciences, researchers must frequently integrate the findings of many observational studies, which measure overlapping collections of variables. For instance, learning how to prevent obesity requires combining studies that investigate obesity and diet with others that investigate obesity and exercise. Recently developed causal discovery algorithms provide techniques for integrating many studies, but little is known about…

  • The Problem of Piecemeal Induction

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    I argue that, in causal inference from many observational studies, the piecemeal collection of data can cause underdetermination, even if arbitrarily large amounts of reliable data are available. Two theorems reveal that, for any variable set V , there are causal theories over V that can be distinguished if and only if all variables are simultaneously measured. These results entail that, a priori, one cannot know which observational studies will …

  • Causal identifiability and piecemeal experimentation

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Synthese•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 15

  • The Independence Thesis

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2011•Cited by: 28•References: 16

    Several philosophers of science have argued that epistemically rational individuals might form epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, rational groups might be composed of irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they entail that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists are logically independent. We defend the inconsistency thes…

  • The Problem of Piecemeal Induction

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    I argue that, in causal inference from many observational studies, the piecemeal collection of data can cause underdetermination, even if arbitrarily large amounts of reliable data are available. Two theorems reveal that, for any variable set V , there are causal theories over V that can be distinguished if and only if all variables are simultaneously measured. These results entail that, a priori, one cannot know which observational studies will …

  • Reliability of testimonial norms in scientific communities

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Synthese•2014•Cited by: 5•References: 8

  • The Limits of Piecemeal Causal Inference

    Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2014•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    In medicine and the social sciences, researchers must frequently integrate the findings of many observational studies, which measure overlapping collections of variables. For instance, learning how to prevent obesity requires combining studies that investigate obesity and diet with others that investigate obesity and exercise. Recently developed causal discovery algorithms provide techniques for integrating many studies, but little is known about…

  • Structural Chaos

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2015•References: 6

    A dynamical system is called chaotic if small changes to its initial conditions can create large changes in its behavior. By analogy, we call a dynamical system structurally chaotic if small changes to the equations describing the evolution of the system produce large changes in its behavior. Although there are many definitions of “chaos,” there are few mathematically precise candidate definitions of “structural chaos.” I propose a definition, an…

  • Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge

    Thomas Boyer‐Kassem, Thomas Boyer-Kassem et al.•BOOK•Scientific Collaboration and…•2017

    Descartes once argued that, with sufficient effort and skill, a single scientist could uncover fundamental truths about our world. Contemporary science proves the limits of this claim. From synthesizing the human genome to predicting the effects of climate change, some current scientific research requires the collaboration of hundreds (if not thousands) of scientists with various specializations. Additionally, the majority of published scientific…

  • Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge

    Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson et al.•BOOK•Scientific Collaboration and…•2018

  • Causal identifiability and piecemeal experimentation

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Synthese•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 15

  • The computational philosophy

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, J Mevel et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 7•References: 74

    Modeling and computer simulations, we claim, should be considered core philosophical methods. More precisely, we will defend two theses. First, philosophers should use simulations for many of the same reasons we currently use thought experiments. In fact, simulations are superior to thought experiments in achieving some philosophical goals. Second, devising and coding computational models instill good philosophical habits of mind. Throughout the …

  • Statistical Inference as Severe Testing

    Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2021

    For more than three decades, Deborah Mayo has defended severe testing, a framework for evaluating the strength of scientific evidence that provides philosophical foundations for (variants of) classical statistical methods. In her newest book, Statistical Inference as Severe Testing, Mayo (1) extends and refines her views on severe testing, (2) takes aim at researchers who claim that the reproducibility crisis is a result of the use of classical s…

  • Bamboozled by Bonferroni

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2024•References: 17

    When many statistical hypotheses are evaluated simultaneously, statisticians often recommend adjusting (or “correcting”) standard hypothesis tests. In this article, I (1) distinguish two senses of adjustment, (2) investigate the prudential and epistemic goals that adjustment might achieve, and (3) identify conditions under which a researcher should not adjust for multiplicity in the two senses I identify. I tentatively conclude that the goals of …

  • Measured Inference

    Open Access•Conor Mayo-Wilson, Conor Mayo‐Wilson•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2025

    Despite the recent “epistemic turn” in the philosophy of measurement, philosophers have ignored a nearly 80 year controversy about the relationship between statistical inference and measurement theory. Some scholars maintain that measurement theory places no constraints on statistics, whereas others argue that the measurement scale (e.g., ordinal or interval) of one’s data determines which statistical methods are “permissible.” I defend an interm…

Mathematics (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Statistics (6 works) · Econometrics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Physics (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Inference (4 works) · Psychology (4 works)

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