Suthan Krishnarajan
Biographic Data
| ID | 968954 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Suthan Krishnarajan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Suthan |
| FAMILY NAME | Krishnarajan |
| SIGNATURE | KRISHNARAJAN S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8171-5558 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 144 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Turning a Blind Eye to Repression
Research on the dissent–repression nexus assumes that repression of non-violent protesters undermines popular support for the regime. We challenge this assumption, arguing that coercion does not automatically generate legitimacy costs as bystanders’ pre-existing beliefs about targeted socio-political groups condition how repression is evaluated. While we expect bystanders to disapprove of and sanction repression of liked protester groups, we hypo…
Early-Adulthood Economic Experiences and the Formation of Democratic Support
Do economic experiences early in life affect regime support later in life? Effects of recent economic performance on regime support are extensively studied, but lasting effects of individual-level economic experiences across the lifespan remain unexplored. We argue that in democracies and autocracies alike, economic experiences in early adulthood (that is, age eighteen to twenty-eight) are wired into people's memories and become important cues fo…
Rationalizing Democracy
Democracy often confronts citizens with a dilemma: stand firm on democracy while losing out on policy or accept undemocratic behavior and gain politically. Existing literature demonstrates that citizens generally choose the latter-and that they do so deliberately. Yet there is an alternative possibility. Citizens can avoid this uncomfortable dilemma altogether by rationalizing their understandings of democracy. When a politician advances undesire…
The democratic paradox
This article challenges the widespread notion that national elections are unequivocally good for people’s satisfaction with democracy. Instead, it argues that elections have enduring and disparate effects on democratic satisfaction, depending on the economic situation in which they take place; that is the election economy. When held during economic upturns, national elections increase subsequent satisfaction with democracy during most of the foll…
The Morning After
All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely cabinet ministers. Using a new global dataset, our analysis …
When Is A Pledge A Pledge
Despite the central role of election pledges in modern representative democracy, it remains uncertain how voters define pledges. We examine this by focusing on four rhetorical dimensions of political statements: the pledge giver, the formulation of commitment, the policy content and quantification. In three conjoint experiments on representative samples totalling around 6,000 respondents in the United States, Britain and Denmark, we find remarkab…
Blood Is Thicker than Water
Are large families a liability or an asset for an autocratic ruler? In this article, we show that in medieval and early modern Europe, relatives protected monarchs from challenges from their elite groups, thus reducing their risk of being deposed. Women reduced the risk of both depositions from outside and from within the family, whereas men primarily reduced the risk of outside depositions (as well as the risk of civil wars breaking out). This i…
The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts
In this article, we investigate the relationship between elections and coup attempts. We argue that elections have opposing effects on the risk of coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy in which they are held. Elections occurring in conditions of economic crisis spur anti-government mobilization and high levels of state repression. This increases the subsequent risk of coup attempts. Conversely, elections held during economic expans…
Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies
Why do autocratic leaders escape revolution, coups, and assassination during times of economic crisis? I argue that the spike in natural resource revenues since the 1960s has increased autocratic crisis resilience. The availability of this alternative revenue stream provides autocratic leaders with a constant inflow of money, increases their ability to repress dissent, and improves their access to international credit. Extending the analysis back…
Economic Crisis, Bureaucratic Quality and Democratic Breakdown
Why do economic crises sometimes lead to democratic breakdown and sometimes not? To answer this question, we bring in a new conditioning factor. We propose that bureaucracies of higher quality – implying more competent, efficient and autonomous employees – to a greater extent shield the masses from impoverishment and unjust distribution of resources. This dampens anti-regime mass mobilization, which decreases elite incentives and opportunities fo…
Rationalizing Democracy
Democracy often confronts citizens with a dilemma: stand firm on democracy while losing out on policy or accept undemocratic behavior and gain politically. Existing literature demonstrates that citizens generally choose the latter-and that they do so deliberately. Yet there is an alternative possibility. Citizens can avoid this uncomfortable dilemma altogether by rationalizing their understandings of democracy. When a politician advances undesire…
The Morning After
All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely cabinet ministers. Using a new global dataset, our analysis …
Early-Adulthood Economic Experiences and the Formation of Democratic Support
Do economic experiences early in life affect regime support later in life? Effects of recent economic performance on regime support are extensively studied, but lasting effects of individual-level economic experiences across the lifespan remain unexplored. We argue that in democracies and autocracies alike, economic experiences in early adulthood (that is, age eighteen to twenty-eight) are wired into people's memories and become important cues fo…
Economic Crisis, Bureaucratic Quality and Democratic Breakdown
Why do economic crises sometimes lead to democratic breakdown and sometimes not? To answer this question, we bring in a new conditioning factor. We propose that bureaucracies of higher quality – implying more competent, efficient and autonomous employees – to a greater extent shield the masses from impoverishment and unjust distribution of resources. This dampens anti-regime mass mobilization, which decreases elite incentives and opportunities fo…
When Is A Pledge A Pledge
Despite the central role of election pledges in modern representative democracy, it remains uncertain how voters define pledges. We examine this by focusing on four rhetorical dimensions of political statements: the pledge giver, the formulation of commitment, the policy content and quantification. In three conjoint experiments on representative samples totalling around 6,000 respondents in the United States, Britain and Denmark, we find remarkab…
The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts
In this article, we investigate the relationship between elections and coup attempts. We argue that elections have opposing effects on the risk of coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy in which they are held. Elections occurring in conditions of economic crisis spur anti-government mobilization and high levels of state repression. This increases the subsequent risk of coup attempts. Conversely, elections held during economic expans…
Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies
Why do autocratic leaders escape revolution, coups, and assassination during times of economic crisis? I argue that the spike in natural resource revenues since the 1960s has increased autocratic crisis resilience. The availability of this alternative revenue stream provides autocratic leaders with a constant inflow of money, increases their ability to repress dissent, and improves their access to international credit. Extending the analysis back…
The democratic paradox
This article challenges the widespread notion that national elections are unequivocally good for people’s satisfaction with democracy. Instead, it argues that elections have enduring and disparate effects on democratic satisfaction, depending on the economic situation in which they take place; that is the election economy. When held during economic upturns, national elections increase subsequent satisfaction with democracy during most of the foll…
Blood Is Thicker than Water
Are large families a liability or an asset for an autocratic ruler? In this article, we show that in medieval and early modern Europe, relatives protected monarchs from challenges from their elite groups, thus reducing their risk of being deposed. Women reduced the risk of both depositions from outside and from within the family, whereas men primarily reduced the risk of outside depositions (as well as the risk of civil wars breaking out). This i…
Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies
Why do autocratic leaders escape revolution, coups, and assassination during times of economic crisis? I argue that the spike in natural resource revenues since the 1960s has increased autocratic crisis resilience. The availability of this alternative revenue stream provides autocratic leaders with a constant inflow of money, increases their ability to repress dissent, and improves their access to international credit. Extending the analysis back…
Economic Crisis, Bureaucratic Quality and Democratic Breakdown
Why do economic crises sometimes lead to democratic breakdown and sometimes not? To answer this question, we bring in a new conditioning factor. We propose that bureaucracies of higher quality – implying more competent, efficient and autonomous employees – to a greater extent shield the masses from impoverishment and unjust distribution of resources. This dampens anti-regime mass mobilization, which decreases elite incentives and opportunities fo…
The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts
In this article, we investigate the relationship between elections and coup attempts. We argue that elections have opposing effects on the risk of coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy in which they are held. Elections occurring in conditions of economic crisis spur anti-government mobilization and high levels of state repression. This increases the subsequent risk of coup attempts. Conversely, elections held during economic expans…
Blood Is Thicker than Water
Are large families a liability or an asset for an autocratic ruler? In this article, we show that in medieval and early modern Europe, relatives protected monarchs from challenges from their elite groups, thus reducing their risk of being deposed. Women reduced the risk of both depositions from outside and from within the family, whereas men primarily reduced the risk of outside depositions (as well as the risk of civil wars breaking out). This i…
The democratic paradox
This article challenges the widespread notion that national elections are unequivocally good for people’s satisfaction with democracy. Instead, it argues that elections have enduring and disparate effects on democratic satisfaction, depending on the economic situation in which they take place; that is the election economy. When held during economic upturns, national elections increase subsequent satisfaction with democracy during most of the foll…
The Morning After
All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely cabinet ministers. Using a new global dataset, our analysis …
When Is A Pledge A Pledge
Despite the central role of election pledges in modern representative democracy, it remains uncertain how voters define pledges. We examine this by focusing on four rhetorical dimensions of political statements: the pledge giver, the formulation of commitment, the policy content and quantification. In three conjoint experiments on representative samples totalling around 6,000 respondents in the United States, Britain and Denmark, we find remarkab…
Early-Adulthood Economic Experiences and the Formation of Democratic Support
Do economic experiences early in life affect regime support later in life? Effects of recent economic performance on regime support are extensively studied, but lasting effects of individual-level economic experiences across the lifespan remain unexplored. We argue that in democracies and autocracies alike, economic experiences in early adulthood (that is, age eighteen to twenty-eight) are wired into people's memories and become important cues fo…
Rationalizing Democracy
Democracy often confronts citizens with a dilemma: stand firm on democracy while losing out on policy or accept undemocratic behavior and gain politically. Existing literature demonstrates that citizens generally choose the latter-and that they do so deliberately. Yet there is an alternative possibility. Citizens can avoid this uncomfortable dilemma altogether by rationalizing their understandings of democracy. When a politician advances undesire…
Turning a Blind Eye to Repression
Research on the dissent–repression nexus assumes that repression of non-violent protesters undermines popular support for the regime. We challenge this assumption, arguing that coercion does not automatically generate legitimacy costs as bystanders’ pre-existing beliefs about targeted socio-political groups condition how repression is evaluated. While we expect bystanders to disapprove of and sanction repression of liked protester groups, we hypo…
Political science (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Democracy (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Autocracy (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (4 works)