Fred Feldman
Biographic Data
| ID | 968977 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fred Feldman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fred |
| FAMILY NAME | Feldman |
| SIGNATURE | FELDMAN F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Massachusetts Amherst |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6041-864X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 58 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 179 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 57 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1968 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Scanlon Against Desertist Theories of Justice
Unconscious Pleasures and Pains
Ben Bramble, Dan Haybron and others have endorsed the idea that there are unconscious, or unfelt, pleasures and pains. These would be sensory experiences that are genuine pleasures or pains, but experiences of which the subject is unaware. The idea that there are such things is worthy of attention in its own right; but I am interested in this alleged phenomenon for a further reason. I am attracted to an attitudinal theory of sensory pleasure and …
Political Economic Deserts and Desert Bases
According to the desertist theory of distributive justice defended in this book, there is perfect political economic distributive justice in a country if and only if the government of that country ensures that its citizens receive the political economic deserts that they deserve to receive in virtue of their possession of the relevant political economic desert bases. One aim of this chapter is to explain why these deserts and bases are the specif…
Distributive Justice
This volume presents and defends a novel theory of distributive justice, according to which political economic distributive justice reigns in a state if the government of that state ensures that citizens receive the benefits and burdens they deserve from it.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death
Death has long been a preoccupation of philosophers, and this is especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Death contains chapters that cover current philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics—such as the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think about death—as we…
The Oxford handbook of the philosophy of death
This handbook consists of 21 essays on the nature and value of death, the relevance of the metaphysics of time and personal identity for questions about death, the desirability of immortality, and the wrongness of killing
True and Useful
Act-utilitarianism and other theories in normative ethics confront the implementability problem: normal human agents, with normal human epistemic abilities, lack the information needed to use those theories directly for the selection of actions. Two Level Theories have been offered in reply. The theoretical level component states alleged necessary and sufficient conditions for moral rightness. That component is supposed to be true, but is not int…
The Cambridge Companion to Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) is recognised as a classic of modern political philosophy. Along with John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), it is widely credited with breathing new life into the discipline in the second half of the twentieth century. This Companion presents a balanced and comprehensive assessment of Nozick's contribution to political philosophy. In engaging and accessible chapters, the contributors analyse No…
What Is This Thing Called Happiness?
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness…
On the Philosophical Implications of Empirical Research on Happiness
The claim that Empirical Research has Philosophical Implications (or ERPI) is the thesis that empirical happiness research in psychology, economics, sociology, neuroscience, or some other similar field has direct implications for the truth of some philosophical theory about happiness. ERPI appears to be an unquestioned presupposition of some philosophers who write about happiness. Several psychologists seem to have endorsed ERPI. Other empirical …
Whole Life Satisfaction Concepts of Happiness
The most popular concepts of happiness among psychologists and philosophers nowadays are concepts of happiness according to which happiness is defined as “satisfaction with life as a whole”. Such concepts are “Whole Life Satisfaction” (WLS) concepts of happiness. I show that there are hundreds of non‐equivalent ways in which a WLS conception of happiness can be developed. However, every precise conception either requires actual satisfaction with …
Reply to Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross
In comments originally presented at the ISUS conference at Dartmouth College in 2005, Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross raised a number of objections to various things I said in Pleasure and the Good Life . One especially interesting objection concerns one of my central claims about the nature of pleasure. I distinguished between sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure . I said that a feeling counts as a sensory pleasure if the one who feels i…
What is the Rational Care Theory of Welfare?
Problems about Beauty and Justice
Contains the author's replies to the last remaining objections to hedonism—Moore's objection concerning ‘the heap of filth’ and Ross's objection concerning worlds in which pleasure is enjoyed by the undeserving. Points out that, strictly speaking, these objections do not bear on the forms of hedonism already discussed in the book. Extends the theories so as to make the objections apply and then tweaks the forms of hedonism so that they evade the …
Hedonism
Presents some typical textbook formulations of hedonism. Shows that they are unacceptable as formulations of the view—they fail to state the intended view in a coherent and consistent way. A simple form of sensory hedonism—‘Default Hedonism’—is then presented. This formulation does not have the defects of typical textbook formulations. Default Hedonism provides a starting point for all the other forms of hedonism to be discussed in the book. Conc…
Hedonism and the Shape of a Life
Many philosophers have claimed that the value of a life for the person who lives it is not simply a matter of total amounts of good and evil in that life; the pattern in which those goods are distributed within the life also matters. This objection, if it were sound, would refute any axiological theory that contained a purely additive principle for the evaluation of lives. The forms of hedonism discussed in the book are all understood to contain …
Attitudinal Hedonism
The distinction between sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure is drawn. Arguments are given to show that these are distinct kinds of pleasure. The concept of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure is introduced and explained. Making use of this concept, Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism is formulated and compared to Default Hedonism. An argument is presented to show that Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism is not refuted by the objection (described earlier) …
Classic Objections to Hedonism
Seven classic objections to hedonism are presented and explained. Each is carefully formulated as an objection to the Default Hedonism introduced in Ch. 2. The objections are based on (a) the idea that some pleasures are base, disgusting, and worthless; (b) the concept of ‘false pleasures’; (c) the alleged worthlessness of pleasure without knowledge; (d) difficulties in the measurement of pleasure and pain; (e) the idea that we can imagine a good…
The Quest for the Good Life
Attempts to explain more exactly how the author understands the question about ‘the Good Life’. Interprets this to mean something like ‘the life that is good in itself for the one who lives it’ or ‘the life high in individual welfare’. So the question is: what feature (or features) ultimately make a person's life go well for that person? Some popular views about the Good Life are discussed. These include eudaimonism, preferentism, perfectionism, …
Replies to Some Objections
The objection from false pleasures (introduced in Ch. 3) is reviewed. A version relevant to Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism is formulated and evaluated. A new form of hedonism making use of an adjustment for truth is introduced and explained. It is alleged that this form of hedonism (‘Truth Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism’) is not refuted by the objection from false pleasures. The Platonic objection based on pleasure without knowledge is r…
Themes and Puzzles
Contains a review of the main themes of the book and a description of my vision of the Good Life. It also contains an admission of some of the puzzles left unsolved here. Among the main themes are: the importance of being clear about what an axiological theory is supposed to tell us; the importance of formulating one's proposed axiological theory (hedonistic or not) in a coherent way; the importance of recognizing the distinction between forms of…
But is it Really “Hedonism”?
Curious readers might wonder if some of the axiological theories discussed in this book have been stretched so far that it is no longer appropriate to categorize them as forms of hedonism. This raises a deeper question: what in general makes it correct to categorize an axiological theory as a form of hedonism? Attempts to answer this question. Also attempts to answer it in such a way as to justify the classification of the alleged hedonisms in th…
G. E. Moore, Hedonist?
Hedonism's ‘plasticity’ is a major theme of the book. By this, the author means its capacity to take many forms. Pursues this theme by showing that it is possible to construct a form of hedonism that will generate life evaluations very similar to those generated by the non‐hedonistic axiology defended by Moore in Principia Ethica. To this end, formulates and explains a clear statement of the Moorean axiology. Discusses the claim that this axiolog…
Pleasure and the Good Life
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano,…
The Good Life
What makes a life go well for the one who lives it? Hedonists hold that pleasure enhances the value of a life; pain diminishes it. Hedonism has been subjected to a number of objections. Some are (a) based on the claim that hedonism is a form of “mental statism”. Others are (b) based on the claim that some pleasures are base or degrading. Yet others are (c) based on the claim that when a bad person enjoys a pleasure, his receipt of that pleasure s…
Pleasure and the Good Life
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano,…
Doing the Best We Can
Adjusting Utility for Justice
567-585
Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion
In Chapter 17 of his magnificent Reasons and Persons , Derek Parfit asks what he describes as an ‘awesome question’: ‘How many people should there ever be?’ For a utilitarian like me, the answer seems simple: there should be however many people it takes to make the world best. Unfortunately, if I answer Parfit's awesome question in this way, I may sink myself in a quagmire of axiological confusion. In this paper, I first describe certain aspects …
The Good Life
What makes a life go well for the one who lives it? Hedonists hold that pleasure enhances the value of a life; pain diminishes it. Hedonism has been subjected to a number of objections. Some are (a) based on the claim that hedonism is a form of “mental statism”. Others are (b) based on the claim that some pleasures are base or degrading. Yet others are (c) based on the claim that when a bad person enjoys a pleasure, his receipt of that pleasure s…
Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert
Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death
205-227
Hyperventilating about Intrinsic Value
True and Useful
Act-utilitarianism and other theories in normative ethics confront the implementability problem: normal human agents, with normal human epistemic abilities, lack the information needed to use those theories directly for the selection of actions. Two Level Theories have been offered in reply. The theoretical level component states alleged necessary and sufficient conditions for moral rightness. That component is supposed to be true, but is not int…
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
On the Performatory Interpretation of the Cogito
"Leibniz and "Leibniz' Law
Unconscious Pleasures and Pains
Ben Bramble, Dan Haybron and others have endorsed the idea that there are unconscious, or unfelt, pleasures and pains. These would be sensory experiences that are genuine pleasures or pains, but experiences of which the subject is unaware. The idea that there are such things is worthy of attention in its own right; but I am interested in this alleged phenomenon for a further reason. I am attracted to an attitudinal theory of sensory pleasure and …
On the Philosophical Implications of Empirical Research on Happiness
The claim that Empirical Research has Philosophical Implications (or ERPI) is the thesis that empirical happiness research in psychology, economics, sociology, neuroscience, or some other similar field has direct implications for the truth of some philosophical theory about happiness. ERPI appears to be an unquestioned presupposition of some philosophers who write about happiness. Several psychologists seem to have endorsed ERPI. Other empirical …
Confrontations with the Reaper
Presenting a clear and engaging discussion of classic philosophical questions surrounding death, Feldman investigates in a cohesive and comprehensive manner the great metaphysical and moral problems of death. In the first part, Feldman argues that a definition of life is necessary before death can be defined. He maintains that death is a conceptual mystery - it cannot be defined as the cessation of life, or in any other similar way. After an expl…
A Simpler Solution to the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic
Some of deontic logic's stickiest problems are revealed by the socalled paradoxes of deontic logic. None of these is, strictly speaking, a paradox-no one purports to derive a contradiction from a bunch of seemingly uncontroversial premises.' Instead, the general form is this: some system of deontic logic has been proposed. A critic then describes a possible situation and produces a set of ordinary language sentences. The sentences would presumabl…
Results of Psychoanalysis in Clinic Case Assignments
Results of Psychoanalysis in Clinic Case Assignments
"Leibniz and "Leibniz' Law
On the Performatory Interpretation of the Cogito
World Utilitarianism
On the analysis of warranting
Final comments on the analysis of Warranting
Ethics
This title presents an insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity
Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm
Moral Thinking
Hypothetical Imperatives
Utilitarian Foundations
Individual Obligation and Group Welfare
Defeasible Commitment and Prima Facie Obligation
Basic Iffy Oughts
Conflicts of Obligation
Moral Objections to MO
A Theory of Moral Obligation
Conclusions
What Ought to be
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Doing the Best We Can
On Dying as a Process
Winning' is ambiguous. In one sense, when we say that someone is winning a race, we mean roughly that he's just now being first to cross the finish line. If it's now correct to say that he's winning the race, then, at all times in the future, it will be correct to say that he won. This is the sense of 'winning'. The word has another sense. If a runner is leading the pack, and all the evidence suggests that he will win, we may say, even before he …
A Simpler Solution to the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic
Some of deontic logic's stickiest problems are revealed by the socalled paradoxes of deontic logic. None of these is, strictly speaking, a paradox-no one purports to derive a contradiction from a bunch of seemingly uncontroversial premises.' Instead, the general form is this: some system of deontic logic has been proposed. A critic then describes a possible situation and produces a set of ordinary language sentences. The sentences would presumabl…
Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death
205-227
Confrontations with the Reaper
Philosophy (46 works) · Epistemology (38 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (22 works) · Psychology (22 works) · Law (20 works) · Political science (20 works) · Sociology (15 works) · Computer Science (14 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (14 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (13 works)