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Jean-Marie Baland

Biographic Data

ID969232
NAMEJean-Marie Baland
GIVEN NAMESJean-Marie
FAMILY NAMEBaland
SIGNATUREBALAND J
AFFILIATIONSMinisterio de Defensa
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS28
TOTAL CITATIONS378
AUTHOR COUNT27
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1991
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX7
  • Made in Dignity’: The redistributive impact of Fair Trade

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2026•References: 3

  • Sharing norm, household efficiency and female demand for agency in the Philippines

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2023•References: 8

  • Child Labor and Schooling Decisions among Self-Help Group Members in Rural India

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 30

    This paper investigates the impact of informal microfinance groups (self-help groups, or SHGs) on children’s education and work in rural India. In 2002, 24 eligible villages were randomly selected for opening SHGs, and 12 others were randomly selected as a control group. Households were surveyed three times over a 5-year period, allowing for the study of medium-term outcomes. We find a robust and strong increase in secondary school enrollment rat…

  • Now or later? The allocation of the pot and the insurance motive in fixed roscas

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2019•Cited by: 2•References: 3

  • Socially Disadvantaged Groups and Microfinance in India

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2019•Cited by: 4•References: 20

    About two-thirds of microfinance clients in India are reported to be in self-help groups (SHGs). We study the survival of members and groups and their differential access to credit using a census of SHGs created between 1998 and 2006 in 386 villages in eastern India. Households without land and those from disadvantaged castes exhibit higher attrition rates and smaller loans, but the main predictor of differential outcomes is education. Members wi…

  • The economic consequences of mutual help in extended families

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2016•Cited by: 14•References: 7

  • Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2013•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • Pretending to Be Poor: Borrowing to Escape Forced Solidarity in Cameroon

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2011•Cited by: 18•References: 5

    From field observations of credit cooperatives in Cameroon, we find that 19% of the loans taken are fully collateralized by savings held in the same institutions. This behavior is costly to the borrower, as it represents a net interest payment of about 24% per year. While traditional explanations may partly explain this behavior, interviews with members of the cooperatives suggest the following new rationale: members resort to borrowing to signal…

  • Governance and Development

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•CHAPTER•Development Economics•2010

  • Forests to the People: Decentralization and Forest Degradation in the Indian Himalayas

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2010•Cited by: 18•References: 6

  • Dégradation forestière himalayenne: Quel rôle des pouvoirs publics

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland•ARTICLE•Afrique contemporaine•2009•References: 16

    Cet article s’intéresse à la dégradation des forêts dans l’Himalaya indien, qui a pour conséquences une érosion des sols spectaculaire et l’enlisement des grands fleuves de la région. Sur la base d’un ensemble d’études de terrains, cet article analyse les causes de ce phénomène et la nécessité d’une intervention publique pour réduire la pression humaine sur les forêts, et principalement celle qui s’exerce à travers la collecte de bois de chauffe.…

  • Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2008

    Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relati…

  • Enforcement in informal saving groups

    Open Access•Anderson, Siwan Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2008•Cited by: 14•References: 2

  • Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability

    Jean‐marie Baland, Samuel Bowle et al.•BOOK•Inequality, Cooperation, and…•2007

    Does inequality exacerbate environmental problems?Would an equal ization of wealth, social status, and political power contribute to environ mental sustainability?Or is environmental degradation a likely byproduct of efforts to advance the economic, social, and political interests of the less well-off?In this book, we investigate the impact of inequality on envi ronmental sustainability.We focus on local commons as they are essential to the livel…

  • CHAPTER 2. Collective Action on the Commons: The Role of Inequality

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•CHAPTER•Inequality, Cooperation, and…•2007

  • Mortality risks, education and child labor

    Open Access•Fernanda Estevan, Jean-Marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2007•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•BOOK•Halting Degradation of Natural…•2000•Cited by: 178

    This book focuses on the efficient and equitable management of local or village-level natural resources. It is divided into two parts. Part 1 provides an in-depth analysis on the optimal use of natural resources. It dwells on the “tragedy of the commons”, which attributes inefficient resource use to the absence of well-defined property rights. Non-cooperative game theory is used to examine the impact of human interactions on resource management, …

  • Rent-seeking and resource booms

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2000•Cited by: 37•References: 1

  • The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•1999•Cited by: 75•References: 13

  • Daily wages and piece rates in agrarian economies

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1999•Cited by: 2

  • The political economy of underinvestment in agriculture

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1998•References: 4

  • Coordination problems in local-level resource management

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1997•Cited by: 7•References: 2

  • Innovation, monopolies and the poverty trap

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 10

  • Peasants versus City-Dwellers: Taxation and the Burden of Economic Development . Raaj K. Sah , Joseph E. Stiglitz

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•1995

  • Foodgrain stocks and macrodynamic adjustment mechanisms in a dual semi-industrialized economy

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1993•References: 2

Next
  • Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•BOOK•Halting Degradation of Natural…•2000•Cited by: 178

    This book focuses on the efficient and equitable management of local or village-level natural resources. It is divided into two parts. Part 1 provides an in-depth analysis on the optimal use of natural resources. It dwells on the “tragedy of the commons”, which attributes inefficient resource use to the absence of well-defined property rights. Non-cooperative game theory is used to examine the impact of human interactions on resource management, …

  • The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•1999•Cited by: 75•References: 13

  • Rent-seeking and resource booms

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2000•Cited by: 37•References: 1

  • Pretending to Be Poor: Borrowing to Escape Forced Solidarity in Cameroon

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2011•Cited by: 18•References: 5

    From field observations of credit cooperatives in Cameroon, we find that 19% of the loans taken are fully collateralized by savings held in the same institutions. This behavior is costly to the borrower, as it represents a net interest payment of about 24% per year. While traditional explanations may partly explain this behavior, interviews with members of the cooperatives suggest the following new rationale: members resort to borrowing to signal…

  • Forests to the People: Decentralization and Forest Degradation in the Indian Himalayas

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2010•Cited by: 18•References: 6

  • The economic consequences of mutual help in extended families

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2016•Cited by: 14•References: 7

  • Enforcement in informal saving groups

    Open Access•Anderson, Siwan Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2008•Cited by: 14•References: 2

  • Coordination problems in local-level resource management

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1997•Cited by: 7•References: 2

  • Socially Disadvantaged Groups and Microfinance in India

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2019•Cited by: 4•References: 20

    About two-thirds of microfinance clients in India are reported to be in self-help groups (SHGs). We study the survival of members and groups and their differential access to credit using a census of SHGs created between 1998 and 2006 in 386 villages in eastern India. Households without land and those from disadvantaged castes exhibit higher attrition rates and smaller loans, but the main predictor of differential outcomes is education. Members wi…

  • Now or later? The allocation of the pot and the insurance motive in fixed roscas

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2019•Cited by: 2•References: 3

  • Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2013•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • Mortality risks, education and child labor

    Open Access•Fernanda Estevan, Jean-Marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2007•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • Daily wages and piece rates in agrarian economies

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1999•Cited by: 2

  • Why does asset inequality affect unemployment? A study of the demand composition problem

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1991•Cited by: 2•References: 7

  • Child Labor and Schooling Decisions among Self-Help Group Members in Rural India

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 30

    This paper investigates the impact of informal microfinance groups (self-help groups, or SHGs) on children’s education and work in rural India. In 2002, 24 eligible villages were randomly selected for opening SHGs, and 12 others were randomly selected as a control group. Households were surveyed three times over a 5-year period, allowing for the study of medium-term outcomes. We find a robust and strong increase in secondary school enrollment rat…

  • Innovation, monopolies and the poverty trap

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 10

  • Are Economists Concerned With Power

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•IDS Bulletin•1993•Cited by: 1•References: 20

    While till recently economists were essentially concerned with analysing the (free) play of market forces and their consequences, thus leaving power outside their field of investigation, the same cannot be said of a host of recent contributions based on the concept of strategic rationality. However, the latter approaches still follow an abstract mode of analysis and thereby tend to focus on the mechanisms whereby power is exerted and reproduced a…

  • Why does asset inequality affect unemployment? A study of the demand composition problem

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1991•Cited by: 2•References: 7

  • The wage-goods constraint on a developing economy

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1991

  • Foodgrain stocks and macrodynamic adjustment mechanisms in a dual semi-industrialized economy

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1993•References: 2

  • Are Economists Concerned With Power

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•IDS Bulletin•1993•Cited by: 1•References: 20

    While till recently economists were essentially concerned with analysing the (free) play of market forces and their consequences, thus leaving power outside their field of investigation, the same cannot be said of a host of recent contributions based on the concept of strategic rationality. However, the latter approaches still follow an abstract mode of analysis and thereby tend to focus on the mechanisms whereby power is exerted and reproduced a…

  • Peasants versus City-Dwellers: Taxation and the Burden of Economic Development . Raaj K. Sah , Joseph E. Stiglitz

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•1995

  • Innovation, monopolies and the poverty trap

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 10

  • Coordination problems in local-level resource management

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1997•Cited by: 7•References: 2

  • The political economy of underinvestment in agriculture

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1998•References: 4

  • The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•1999•Cited by: 75•References: 13

  • Daily wages and piece rates in agrarian economies

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1999•Cited by: 2

  • Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•BOOK•Halting Degradation of Natural…•2000•Cited by: 178

    This book focuses on the efficient and equitable management of local or village-level natural resources. It is divided into two parts. Part 1 provides an in-depth analysis on the optimal use of natural resources. It dwells on the “tragedy of the commons”, which attributes inefficient resource use to the absence of well-defined property rights. Non-cooperative game theory is used to examine the impact of human interactions on resource management, …

  • Rent-seeking and resource booms

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2000•Cited by: 37•References: 1

  • Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability

    Jean‐marie Baland, Samuel Bowle et al.•BOOK•Inequality, Cooperation, and…•2007

    Does inequality exacerbate environmental problems?Would an equal ization of wealth, social status, and political power contribute to environ mental sustainability?Or is environmental degradation a likely byproduct of efforts to advance the economic, social, and political interests of the less well-off?In this book, we investigate the impact of inequality on envi ronmental sustainability.We focus on local commons as they are essential to the livel…

  • CHAPTER 2. Collective Action on the Commons: The Role of Inequality

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•CHAPTER•Inequality, Cooperation, and…•2007

  • Mortality risks, education and child labor

    Open Access•Fernanda Estevan, Jean-Marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2007•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2008

    Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relati…

  • Enforcement in informal saving groups

    Open Access•Anderson, Siwan Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2008•Cited by: 14•References: 2

  • Dégradation forestière himalayenne: Quel rôle des pouvoirs publics

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland•ARTICLE•Afrique contemporaine•2009•References: 16

    Cet article s’intéresse à la dégradation des forêts dans l’Himalaya indien, qui a pour conséquences une érosion des sols spectaculaire et l’enlisement des grands fleuves de la région. Sur la base d’un ensemble d’études de terrains, cet article analyse les causes de ce phénomène et la nécessité d’une intervention publique pour réduire la pression humaine sur les forêts, et principalement celle qui s’exerce à travers la collecte de bois de chauffe.…

  • Governance and Development

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•CHAPTER•Development Economics•2010

  • Forests to the People: Decentralization and Forest Degradation in the Indian Himalayas

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2010•Cited by: 18•References: 6

  • Pretending to Be Poor: Borrowing to Escape Forced Solidarity in Cameroon

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2011•Cited by: 18•References: 5

    From field observations of credit cooperatives in Cameroon, we find that 19% of the loans taken are fully collateralized by savings held in the same institutions. This behavior is costly to the borrower, as it represents a net interest payment of about 24% per year. While traditional explanations may partly explain this behavior, interviews with members of the cooperatives suggest the following new rationale: members resort to borrowing to signal…

  • Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2013•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • The economic consequences of mutual help in extended families

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2016•Cited by: 14•References: 7

  • Now or later? The allocation of the pot and the insurance motive in fixed roscas

    Open Access•Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2019•Cited by: 2•References: 3

  • Socially Disadvantaged Groups and Microfinance in India

    Jean-Marie Baland, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2019•Cited by: 4•References: 20

    About two-thirds of microfinance clients in India are reported to be in self-help groups (SHGs). We study the survival of members and groups and their differential access to credit using a census of SHGs created between 1998 and 2006 in 386 villages in eastern India. Households without land and those from disadvantaged castes exhibit higher attrition rates and smaller loans, but the main predictor of differential outcomes is education. Members wi…

Economics (25 works) · Microeconomics (12 works) · Political science (11 works) · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion (8 works) · Economic growth (7 works) · Finance (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Geography (6 works) · Law (6 works)

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