Hrafn Asgeirsson
Biographic Data
| ID | 9694605 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hrafn Asgeirsson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hrafn |
| FAMILY NAME | Asgeirsson |
| SIGNATURE | ASGEIRSSON H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Surrey |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5104-0999 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A Puzzle About Vagueness, Reasons, and Judicial Discretion
The following two theses seem both plausible and consistent: in cases where it is indeterminate whether the relevant legal language applies to the relevant set of facts, officials are not bound to decide the case one way rather than the other, but may reason either way; all reasons for action are—in some relevant sense—knowable. In this paper, I point out what I take to be a robust but unacknowledged tension between these two claims. The tension …
Vagueness, Comparative Value, and the “Lawmakers’ Challenge”
In “The Value of Vagueness,” Timothy Endicott argues that vague law can be better than precise law. I think he is in many respects correct, but will suggest that we modify and supplement his framework in order to get a firmer grip on what I call the Lawmakers’ Challenge: the scenario in which lawmakers find themselves when they must determine whether the consequences of precision are worse than the consequences of vagueness. This will allow us to…
No prominent works on this page.
Vagueness, Comparative Value, and the “Lawmakers’ Challenge”
In “The Value of Vagueness,” Timothy Endicott argues that vague law can be better than precise law. I think he is in many respects correct, but will suggest that we modify and supplement his framework in order to get a firmer grip on what I call the Lawmakers’ Challenge: the scenario in which lawmakers find themselves when they must determine whether the consequences of precision are worse than the consequences of vagueness. This will allow us to…
A Puzzle About Vagueness, Reasons, and Judicial Discretion
The following two theses seem both plausible and consistent: in cases where it is indeterminate whether the relevant legal language applies to the relevant set of facts, officials are not bound to decide the case one way rather than the other, but may reason either way; all reasons for action are—in some relevant sense—knowable. In this paper, I point out what I take to be a robust but unacknowledged tension between these two claims. The tension …
Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Fuzzy logic (2 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Vagueness (2 works)