Mark Balaguer
Biographic Data
| ID | 969692 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mark Balaguer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mark |
| FAMILY NAME | Balaguer |
| SIGNATURE | BALAGUER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | California State University Los Angeles |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2799-7608 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 23 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
How We Could Have Libertarian Free Will Even if God Were a Total Know-It-All About the Future
We argue that libertarianism (roughly, the thesis that we have indeterministic, libertarian free will) is compatible with God’s infallible foreknowledge. We use eternalism (roughly, the thesis that reality is a 4-dimensional block and that past, present, and future objects exist) as an explanatory stepping stone between libertarianism and God’s foreknowledge: eternalism entails that (and comes close to explaining how) an omniscient God would know…
Why metaphysical debates are not merely verbal (or how to have a non-verbal metaphysical debate)
Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there’s no fact of the matter whether anything exists)
Conceptual analysis and x-phi
Anti‐Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology
This paper argues for a certain kind of anti‐metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti‐metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non‐factualism, physical‐empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non‐factualism o…
Effective Intentions
Book Review| July 01 2011 Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will Mele, Alfred R., Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. ix + 178 pp. Mark Balaguer Mark Balaguer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452. https://doi.org/10.1215/0031808-1263701 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Ma…
Free will as an open scientific problem
Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism
Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics
In this deft and vigorous book, Mark Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism (i.e., the view that abstract, or non-spatio-temporal, mathematical objects exist, and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such objects). Balaguer does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible positions. In Part I, he shows that the former is defensible by introducing a nove…
Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics
Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism (“full-blooded platonism”) that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispe…
Attitudes without Propositions
objects are causally relevant to the physical world, it follows that none of our mixed sentences express bottom-level mixed facts and, hence, that empirical science has a nominalistic that captures its complete picture of the physical world-a nominalistic that says that the physical world holds up its end of the empirical-science bargain. Thus, I conclude that (NC) is true. To recapitulate, the argument for this rests on three premises, viz., (i)…
A platonist epistemology
Against (Maddian) Naturalized Platonism
It is argued here that mathematical objects cannot be simultaneously abstract and perceptible. Thus, naturalized versions of mathematical platonism, such as the one advocated by Penelope Maddy, are unintelligble. Thus, platonists cannot respond to Benacerrafian epistemological arguments against their view vias Maddy-style naturalization. Finally, it is also argued that naturalized platonists cannot respond to this situation by abandoning abstract…
A platonist epistemology
Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics
Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism (“full-blooded platonism”) that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispe…
Anti‐Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology
This paper argues for a certain kind of anti‐metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti‐metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non‐factualism, physical‐empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non‐factualism o…
Conceptual analysis and x-phi
Attitudes without Propositions
objects are causally relevant to the physical world, it follows that none of our mixed sentences express bottom-level mixed facts and, hence, that empirical science has a nominalistic that captures its complete picture of the physical world-a nominalistic that says that the physical world holds up its end of the empirical-science bargain. Thus, I conclude that (NC) is true. To recapitulate, the argument for this rests on three premises, viz., (i)…
Against (Maddian) Naturalized Platonism
It is argued here that mathematical objects cannot be simultaneously abstract and perceptible. Thus, naturalized versions of mathematical platonism, such as the one advocated by Penelope Maddy, are unintelligble. Thus, platonists cannot respond to Benacerrafian epistemological arguments against their view vias Maddy-style naturalization. Finally, it is also argued that naturalized platonists cannot respond to this situation by abandoning abstract…
A platonist epistemology
Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics
Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism (“full-blooded platonism”) that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispe…
Attitudes without Propositions
objects are causally relevant to the physical world, it follows that none of our mixed sentences express bottom-level mixed facts and, hence, that empirical science has a nominalistic that captures its complete picture of the physical world-a nominalistic that says that the physical world holds up its end of the empirical-science bargain. Thus, I conclude that (NC) is true. To recapitulate, the argument for this rests on three premises, viz., (i)…
Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics
In this deft and vigorous book, Mark Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism (i.e., the view that abstract, or non-spatio-temporal, mathematical objects exist, and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such objects). Balaguer does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible positions. In Part I, he shows that the former is defensible by introducing a nove…
Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism
Free will as an open scientific problem
Effective Intentions
Book Review| July 01 2011 Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will Mele, Alfred R., Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. ix + 178 pp. Mark Balaguer Mark Balaguer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452. https://doi.org/10.1215/0031808-1263701 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Ma…
Anti‐Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology
This paper argues for a certain kind of anti‐metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti‐metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non‐factualism, physical‐empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non‐factualism o…
Conceptual analysis and x-phi
Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there’s no fact of the matter whether anything exists)
Why metaphysical debates are not merely verbal (or how to have a non-verbal metaphysical debate)
How We Could Have Libertarian Free Will Even if God Were a Total Know-It-All About the Future
We argue that libertarianism (roughly, the thesis that we have indeterministic, libertarian free will) is compatible with God’s infallible foreknowledge. We use eternalism (roughly, the thesis that reality is a 4-dimensional block and that past, present, and future objects exist) as an explanatory stepping stone between libertarianism and God’s foreknowledge: eternalism entails that (and comes close to explaining how) an omniscient God would know…
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works)