Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Biographic Data
| ID | 970617 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Valerie Gray Hardcastle |
| GIVEN NAMES | Valerie Gray |
| FAMILY NAME | Hardcastle |
| SIGNATURE | HARDCASTLE V G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Virginia Tech |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6653-2267 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 21 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The Impact of In-Detention Treatment on Female Substance Abusers’ Sense of Self
This study investigates the cognitive changes for female detainees participating in a chemical dependency program that relies on cognitive behavioral therapy to help participants understand their addiction from biological, cognitive, and social perspectives. We examined how in-detention treatment perceptions of self and social connectedness. Qualitative data, collected through essays written by participants pre-treatment and upon release from det…
It’s complicated: A multi-method approach to broadening participation in STEM
Purpose A lot is known about systemic barriers to broadening participation (BP) in STEM. Empirical research has demonstrated the existence and impact of implicit bias, stereotype threat, and micro-aggressions on a sense of belonging, organizational productivity and leadership opportunities. We also know that achieving greater participation of women and faculty of color in the STEM disciplines is complicated and depends on altering complex and mul…
Addiction, Chronic Illness, and Responsibility
Some theorists have argued that we should understand the notion of free will from a functional perspective: free will just is our ability to choose effectively and adaptively in an ever-changing environment. Although far from what many philosophers normally mean by free will, those who adopt this biological-evolutionary perspective can clearly define and defend a notion of personal responsibility. One consequenceof this point of view is that addi…
What Do Brain Data Really Show
There is a bias in neuroscience toward localizing and modularizing brain functions. Single cell recording, imaging studies, and the study of neurological deficits all feed into the Gallian view that different brain areas do different things and the things being done are confined to particular processing streams. At the same time, there is a growing sentiment that brains probably don't work like that after all; it is better to conceive of them as …
Consciousness: Chili of the Brain
Not guilty as charged. A reply to garfield
Interpreting Minds
How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science
On Being Importantly Necessary for Consciousness
What we don't know about brains
Scientific Papers Have Various Structures
Fred Suppe claims that the refereed journal article is an appropriate unit of scientific debate for philosophical analysis. He also claims that when we regiment scientific papers correctly, we can see that the hypothetico-deductive method, Baysian induction, and inference to the best explanation fail to capture the structure of scientific articles adequately. In what follows I demonstrate that the coding scheme Suppe used for uncovering the struc…
The Myth of Pain (Philosophical Psychopathology)
Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders
Journal Article Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders Get access Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Valerie Gray Hardcastle Virginia Tech Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar Owen Flanagan Owen Flanagan Duke University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 82, Issue 4, 1 October 1999, Pages 645-657, https://doi.org/10.5840/…
Assuming away the Explanatory Gap
On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation
There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores t…
[Explanation] Is Explanation Better
Robert Wilson (1994) maintains that many interesting and fundamental aspects of psychology are non-individualistic because large chunks of psychology depend upon organisms being deeply embedded in some environment. I disagree and present one version of narrow content that allows enough reference to the environment to meet any wide challenge. I argue that most psychologists are already this sort of narrow content theorist and that these narrow con…
Ways of Knowing
Computationalism
The Image of Observables
This paper challenges a central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that empirical adequacy has a privileged epistemic status. I argue that perceptions of observables are theory-wrought, and theory-wrought in the same ways as the observation sentences we use to describe those perceptions, van Fraassen can draw no privileged or fundamental distinction between what we observe and interpreting those observations through theory. Since empirical …
Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences
In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can “illuminate” issues…
Partitions, probabilistic causal laws, and Simpson's paradox
Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders
Journal Article Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders Get access Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Valerie Gray Hardcastle Virginia Tech Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar Owen Flanagan Owen Flanagan Duke University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 82, Issue 4, 1 October 1999, Pages 645-657, https://doi.org/10.5840/…
What Do Brain Data Really Show
There is a bias in neuroscience toward localizing and modularizing brain functions. Single cell recording, imaging studies, and the study of neurological deficits all feed into the Gallian view that different brain areas do different things and the things being done are confined to particular processing streams. At the same time, there is a growing sentiment that brains probably don't work like that after all; it is better to conceive of them as …
Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences
In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can “illuminate” issues…
The Image of Observables
This paper challenges a central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that empirical adequacy has a privileged epistemic status. I argue that perceptions of observables are theory-wrought, and theory-wrought in the same ways as the observation sentences we use to describe those perceptions, van Fraassen can draw no privileged or fundamental distinction between what we observe and interpreting those observations through theory. Since empirical …
On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation
There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores t…
It’s complicated: A multi-method approach to broadening participation in STEM
Purpose A lot is known about systemic barriers to broadening participation (BP) in STEM. Empirical research has demonstrated the existence and impact of implicit bias, stereotype threat, and micro-aggressions on a sense of belonging, organizational productivity and leadership opportunities. We also know that achieving greater participation of women and faculty of color in the STEM disciplines is complicated and depends on altering complex and mul…
Partitions, probabilistic causal laws, and Simpson's paradox
Partitions, probabilistic causal laws, and Simpson's paradox
Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences
In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can “illuminate” issues…
The Image of Observables
This paper challenges a central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that empirical adequacy has a privileged epistemic status. I argue that perceptions of observables are theory-wrought, and theory-wrought in the same ways as the observation sentences we use to describe those perceptions, van Fraassen can draw no privileged or fundamental distinction between what we observe and interpreting those observations through theory. Since empirical …
Computationalism
Ways of Knowing
[Explanation] Is Explanation Better
Robert Wilson (1994) maintains that many interesting and fundamental aspects of psychology are non-individualistic because large chunks of psychology depend upon organisms being deeply embedded in some environment. I disagree and present one version of narrow content that allows enough reference to the environment to meet any wide challenge. I argue that most psychologists are already this sort of narrow content theorist and that these narrow con…
Assuming away the Explanatory Gap
On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation
There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores t…
On Being Importantly Necessary for Consciousness
What we don't know about brains
Scientific Papers Have Various Structures
Fred Suppe claims that the refereed journal article is an appropriate unit of scientific debate for philosophical analysis. He also claims that when we regiment scientific papers correctly, we can see that the hypothetico-deductive method, Baysian induction, and inference to the best explanation fail to capture the structure of scientific articles adequately. In what follows I demonstrate that the coding scheme Suppe used for uncovering the struc…
The Myth of Pain (Philosophical Psychopathology)
Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders
Journal Article Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders Get access Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Valerie Gray Hardcastle Virginia Tech Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar Owen Flanagan Owen Flanagan Duke University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 82, Issue 4, 1 October 1999, Pages 645-657, https://doi.org/10.5840/…
Interpreting Minds
How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science
Consciousness: Chili of the Brain
Not guilty as charged. A reply to garfield
What Do Brain Data Really Show
There is a bias in neuroscience toward localizing and modularizing brain functions. Single cell recording, imaging studies, and the study of neurological deficits all feed into the Gallian view that different brain areas do different things and the things being done are confined to particular processing streams. At the same time, there is a growing sentiment that brains probably don't work like that after all; it is better to conceive of them as …
Addiction, Chronic Illness, and Responsibility
Some theorists have argued that we should understand the notion of free will from a functional perspective: free will just is our ability to choose effectively and adaptively in an ever-changing environment. Although far from what many philosophers normally mean by free will, those who adopt this biological-evolutionary perspective can clearly define and defend a notion of personal responsibility. One consequenceof this point of view is that addi…
It’s complicated: A multi-method approach to broadening participation in STEM
Purpose A lot is known about systemic barriers to broadening participation (BP) in STEM. Empirical research has demonstrated the existence and impact of implicit bias, stereotype threat, and micro-aggressions on a sense of belonging, organizational productivity and leadership opportunities. We also know that achieving greater participation of women and faculty of color in the STEM disciplines is complicated and depends on altering complex and mul…
The Impact of In-Detention Treatment on Female Substance Abusers’ Sense of Self
This study investigates the cognitive changes for female detainees participating in a chemical dependency program that relies on cognitive behavioral therapy to help participants understand their addiction from biological, cognitive, and social perspectives. We examined how in-detention treatment perceptions of self and social connectedness. Qualitative data, collected through essays written by participants pre-treatment and upon release from det…
Philosophy (13 works) · Psychology (13 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Cognitive science (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Cognition (3 works)