Sameer Bajaj
Biographic Data
| ID | 971140 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sameer Bajaj |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sameer |
| FAMILY NAME | Bajaj |
| SIGNATURE | BAJAJ S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Noncompliance and the Demands of Public Reason
Political liberals argue that democratic citizens have a duty of public reason to ensure that important laws are justified by reasons fellow citizens can accept given their own moral and philosophical beliefs.1 In any real-world democracy, many will fail to comply with this duty. Most people have never heard of public reason, and many who have heard of it reject it. This raises an important question about the demands of public reason: is there ev…
Consenting Under Coercion: The Partial Validity Account
How is the validity of our consent, and others’ moral permission to act on our consent affected by coercion? Everyone agrees that in cases of two-party coercion—when X coerces Y to do something with or for X—the consent of the coerced is invalid, and the coercer is not permitted to act upon the consent they receive. But coercers and the recipients of consent are not always identical. Sometimes a victim, Y, agrees to do something to, with, or for …
Noumenal Power, Reasons, and Justification: A Critique of Forst
This chapter addresses the connection between the right to justification and power. It reconstructs Forst’s noumenal understanding of power by analyzing his argumentative steps from the recognition of reasons by subjects of power to the thesis that this recognition requires justification and, ultimately, to the conclusion that power requires justification. It then challenges different aspects of this account related to a conceptual link and a nor…
The weight of fairness
Many philosophers argue that individuals have duties to do their fair shares of the demands of achieving important common ends. But what happens when some individuals fail to do their fair shares? Are the remaining duty bearers required to take up the slack? The most prominent view, Fair Shares, holds that individuals are never required to take up the slack. But this view has counterintuitive implications; in many cases, it would show callous dis…
Self-defeat and the foundations of public reason
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Self-defeat and the foundations of public reason
Noumenal Power, Reasons, and Justification: A Critique of Forst
This chapter addresses the connection between the right to justification and power. It reconstructs Forst’s noumenal understanding of power by analyzing his argumentative steps from the recognition of reasons by subjects of power to the thesis that this recognition requires justification and, ultimately, to the conclusion that power requires justification. It then challenges different aspects of this account related to a conceptual link and a nor…
The weight of fairness
Many philosophers argue that individuals have duties to do their fair shares of the demands of achieving important common ends. But what happens when some individuals fail to do their fair shares? Are the remaining duty bearers required to take up the slack? The most prominent view, Fair Shares, holds that individuals are never required to take up the slack. But this view has counterintuitive implications; in many cases, it would show callous dis…
Noncompliance and the Demands of Public Reason
Political liberals argue that democratic citizens have a duty of public reason to ensure that important laws are justified by reasons fellow citizens can accept given their own moral and philosophical beliefs.1 In any real-world democracy, many will fail to comply with this duty. Most people have never heard of public reason, and many who have heard of it reject it. This raises an important question about the demands of public reason: is there ev…
Consenting Under Coercion: The Partial Validity Account
How is the validity of our consent, and others’ moral permission to act on our consent affected by coercion? Everyone agrees that in cases of two-party coercion—when X coerces Y to do something with or for X—the consent of the coerced is invalid, and the coercer is not permitted to act upon the consent they receive. But coercers and the recipients of consent are not always identical. Sometimes a victim, Y, agrees to do something to, with, or for …
Political Philosophy and Ethics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Democracy (2 works)