Charles R Plott
Biographic Data
| ID | 972129 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Charles R Plott |
| GIVEN NAMES | Charles R |
| FAMILY NAME | Plott |
| SIGNATURE | PLOTT C R |
| AFFILIATIONS | California Institute of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8363-3628 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 259 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1965 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Matching problems in biodiversity offset markets: A case study of the New South Wales biodiversity offsets scheme
Biodiversity offset credits in New South Wales are transacted within a regulatory environment defined by detailed trading rules and many different types of biodiversity credits that can lead to thin markets and high transaction costs. This paper describes a market designed to facilitate efficient and effective transactions. The market includes a search algorithm to identify who can exchange with whom, according to the regulatory constraints, and …
A Pari-Mutuel-Like Mechanism for Information Aggregation: A Field Test inside Intel
A new information aggregation mechanism (IAM), developed via laboratory experimental methods, is implemented inside Intel Corporation in a long-running field test. The IAM, incorporating features of pari-mutuel betting, is uniquely designed to collect and quantize as probability distributions dispersed, subjectively held information. IAM participants’ incentives support timely information revelation and the emergence of consensus beliefs over fut…
Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science
Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing
This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified in…
Personal reflections on the influence of Buchanan, Tullock, and The Calculus of Consent
From uninformed to informed choices: Voters, pre-election polls and updating
The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations
We conduct experiments to explore the possibility that subject misconceptions, as opposed to a particular theory of preferences referred to as the “endowment effect,” account for reported gaps between willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept (“WTA”). The literature reveals two important facts. First, there is no consensus regarding the nature or robustness of WTP-WTA gaps. Second, while experimenters are careful to control for subject…
The Principles of Exchange Rate Determination in an International Finance Experiment
This paper reports the first experiments designed to explore the behavior of economies with prominent features of international finance. Two “countries,” each with its own currency, were created. International trade could take place only through the operation of markets for currency. The law of one price and the flow of funds theory of exchange rate determination were used to produce general equilibrium models that captured much of the behavior o…
Marshallian Vs. Walrasian Stability in an Experimental Market
The experiments discussed below are an attempt to examine concepts of \nstability as found in economic textbooks. Two concepts of stability, which stem \nfrom two different concepts of market adjustment, seem to have dominated \nthinking. Whilst these two concepts are typically called Walras stability and \nMarshall stability, some controversy exists over the extent to which these two \nmodels represent their respective thinking. No doubt the cur…
Economics in 2090: The Views of an Experimentalist
Journal Article Economics in 2090: The Views of an Experimentalist Get access Charles R. Plott Charles R. Plott California Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 101, Issue 404, 1 January 1991, Pages 88–93, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233843 Published: 01 January 1991
The effect of two trading institutions on price expectations and the stability of supply-response lag markets
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets
This paper reports on the behaviour of simple, laboratory markets which have \nan externality. Experiences with these markets provide some help in answering \ntwo broad questions. (1) Do markets with externalities behave in accordance \nwith the law of supply and demand? (2) How do the pollution tax, pollution \nstandard, and pollution licenses compare as methods for correcting the externality
Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models
The study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one-priced security. Returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature. Some agents (insiders), whose identity was unknown to other agents, knew the state before the markets opened. With replication of market conditions, the predictions of a fully revealing rationa…
Rawls’s Theory of Justice: An Impossibility Result
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study
This article reports the findings of a series of experiments on committee decision making under majority rule. The committee members had relatively fixed preferences, so that the process was one of making decisions rather than one of problem solving. The predictions of a variety of models drawn from Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Game Theory were compared to the experimental results. One predictive concept, the core of the noncoopera…
Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation
Normative concerns are central to the study of democratic theory and the policy- relevant areas of political science and economics. The same normative concerns are central to the study of axiomatic social choice theory. Despite similarities in origin and in underlying philosophical orientation, the fields have evolved separately and within different methodologies. This paper attempts to survey the most recent major results in axiomatic social cho…
Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
The paper provides several axiomatizations of the concept of "path independence" as \napplied to choice functions defined over finite sets. The axioms are discussed in terms of \ntheir relationship to "rationality" postulates and their meaning with respect to social \nchoice models.
Ethics, social choice theory and the theory of economic policy
This essay is intended as an expository paper on how the seemingly abstract social \nchoice models are related to the practical problems of formulating models of economic \npolicy. The flexibility of the social choice models in dealing with the problem of relating \nethical propositions to propositions concerning social actions is not widely understood. \nThe arguments found in the literature are frequently somewhat mathematical and \nauthors sel…
A method for finding “acceptable proposals” in group decision processes
Externalities and Corrective Taxes
Consider a factory which produces some unspecified product called \nX. The process of producing X involves the creation of an external \ndiseconomy for a nearby business. It is generally recognized that this \ndiseconomy may be the result of some resource used in the production \nof X such as smoke created from a burning process. However, the \nparticipants in the recent discussion of externalities, as well as Pigou, \nhave assumed either by mean…
Marshall's Mathematical Note XIX
Journal Article Marshall’s Mathematical Note XIX Get access James M. Buchanan, James M. Buchanan University of Virginia, Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Charles Plott Charles Plott University of Virginia, Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 75, Issue 299, 1 September 1965, Pages 618–620, https://doi.org/10…
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study
This article reports the findings of a series of experiments on committee decision making under majority rule. The committee members had relatively fixed preferences, so that the process was one of making decisions rather than one of problem solving. The predictions of a variety of models drawn from Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Game Theory were compared to the experimental results. One predictive concept, the core of the noncoopera…
Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation
Normative concerns are central to the study of democratic theory and the policy- relevant areas of political science and economics. The same normative concerns are central to the study of axiomatic social choice theory. Despite similarities in origin and in underlying philosophical orientation, the fields have evolved separately and within different methodologies. This paper attempts to survey the most recent major results in axiomatic social cho…
Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models
The study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one-priced security. Returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature. Some agents (insiders), whose identity was unknown to other agents, knew the state before the markets opened. With replication of market conditions, the predictions of a fully revealing rationa…
Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing
This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified in…
Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets
This paper reports on the behaviour of simple, laboratory markets which have \nan externality. Experiences with these markets provide some help in answering \ntwo broad questions. (1) Do markets with externalities behave in accordance \nwith the law of supply and demand? (2) How do the pollution tax, pollution \nstandard, and pollution licenses compare as methods for correcting the externality
Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science
From uninformed to informed choices: Voters, pre-election polls and updating
The Principles of Exchange Rate Determination in an International Finance Experiment
This paper reports the first experiments designed to explore the behavior of economies with prominent features of international finance. Two “countries,” each with its own currency, were created. International trade could take place only through the operation of markets for currency. The law of one price and the flow of funds theory of exchange rate determination were used to produce general equilibrium models that captured much of the behavior o…
Ethics, social choice theory and the theory of economic policy
This essay is intended as an expository paper on how the seemingly abstract social \nchoice models are related to the practical problems of formulating models of economic \npolicy. The flexibility of the social choice models in dealing with the problem of relating \nethical propositions to propositions concerning social actions is not widely understood. \nThe arguments found in the literature are frequently somewhat mathematical and \nauthors sel…
The effect of two trading institutions on price expectations and the stability of supply-response lag markets
Economics in 2090: The Views of an Experimentalist
Journal Article Economics in 2090: The Views of an Experimentalist Get access Charles R. Plott Charles R. Plott California Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 101, Issue 404, 1 January 1991, Pages 88–93, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233843 Published: 01 January 1991
Marshallian Vs. Walrasian Stability in an Experimental Market
The experiments discussed below are an attempt to examine concepts of \nstability as found in economic textbooks. Two concepts of stability, which stem \nfrom two different concepts of market adjustment, seem to have dominated \nthinking. Whilst these two concepts are typically called Walras stability and \nMarshall stability, some controversy exists over the extent to which these two \nmodels represent their respective thinking. No doubt the cur…
Personal reflections on the influence of Buchanan, Tullock, and The Calculus of Consent
A method for finding “acceptable proposals” in group decision processes
Externalities and Corrective Taxes
Consider a factory which produces some unspecified product called \nX. The process of producing X involves the creation of an external \ndiseconomy for a nearby business. It is generally recognized that this \ndiseconomy may be the result of some resource used in the production \nof X such as smoke created from a burning process. However, the \nparticipants in the recent discussion of externalities, as well as Pigou, \nhave assumed either by mean…
Marshall's Mathematical Note XIX
Journal Article Marshall’s Mathematical Note XIX Get access James M. Buchanan, James M. Buchanan University of Virginia, Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Charles Plott Charles Plott University of Virginia, Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 75, Issue 299, 1 September 1965, Pages 618–620, https://doi.org/10…
Externalities and Corrective Taxes
Consider a factory which produces some unspecified product called \nX. The process of producing X involves the creation of an external \ndiseconomy for a nearby business. It is generally recognized that this \ndiseconomy may be the result of some resource used in the production \nof X such as smoke created from a burning process. However, the \nparticipants in the recent discussion of externalities, as well as Pigou, \nhave assumed either by mean…
A method for finding “acceptable proposals” in group decision processes
Ethics, social choice theory and the theory of economic policy
This essay is intended as an expository paper on how the seemingly abstract social \nchoice models are related to the practical problems of formulating models of economic \npolicy. The flexibility of the social choice models in dealing with the problem of relating \nethical propositions to propositions concerning social actions is not widely understood. \nThe arguments found in the literature are frequently somewhat mathematical and \nauthors sel…
Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
The paper provides several axiomatizations of the concept of "path independence" as \napplied to choice functions defined over finite sets. The axioms are discussed in terms of \ntheir relationship to "rationality" postulates and their meaning with respect to social \nchoice models.
Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation
Normative concerns are central to the study of democratic theory and the policy- relevant areas of political science and economics. The same normative concerns are central to the study of axiomatic social choice theory. Despite similarities in origin and in underlying philosophical orientation, the fields have evolved separately and within different methodologies. This paper attempts to survey the most recent major results in axiomatic social cho…
Rawls’s Theory of Justice: An Impossibility Result
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study
This article reports the findings of a series of experiments on committee decision making under majority rule. The committee members had relatively fixed preferences, so that the process was one of making decisions rather than one of problem solving. The predictions of a variety of models drawn from Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Game Theory were compared to the experimental results. One predictive concept, the core of the noncoopera…
Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models
The study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one-priced security. Returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature. Some agents (insiders), whose identity was unknown to other agents, knew the state before the markets opened. With replication of market conditions, the predictions of a fully revealing rationa…
Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets
This paper reports on the behaviour of simple, laboratory markets which have \nan externality. Experiences with these markets provide some help in answering \ntwo broad questions. (1) Do markets with externalities behave in accordance \nwith the law of supply and demand? (2) How do the pollution tax, pollution \nstandard, and pollution licenses compare as methods for correcting the externality
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
The effect of two trading institutions on price expectations and the stability of supply-response lag markets
Economics in 2090: The Views of an Experimentalist
Journal Article Economics in 2090: The Views of an Experimentalist Get access Charles R. Plott Charles R. Plott California Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 101, Issue 404, 1 January 1991, Pages 88–93, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233843 Published: 01 January 1991
Marshallian Vs. Walrasian Stability in an Experimental Market
The experiments discussed below are an attempt to examine concepts of \nstability as found in economic textbooks. Two concepts of stability, which stem \nfrom two different concepts of market adjustment, seem to have dominated \nthinking. Whilst these two concepts are typically called Walras stability and \nMarshall stability, some controversy exists over the extent to which these two \nmodels represent their respective thinking. No doubt the cur…
The Principles of Exchange Rate Determination in an International Finance Experiment
This paper reports the first experiments designed to explore the behavior of economies with prominent features of international finance. Two “countries,” each with its own currency, were created. International trade could take place only through the operation of markets for currency. The law of one price and the flow of funds theory of exchange rate determination were used to produce general equilibrium models that captured much of the behavior o…
The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations
We conduct experiments to explore the possibility that subject misconceptions, as opposed to a particular theory of preferences referred to as the “endowment effect,” account for reported gaps between willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept (“WTA”). The literature reveals two important facts. First, there is no consensus regarding the nature or robustness of WTP-WTA gaps. Second, while experimenters are careful to control for subject…
Personal reflections on the influence of Buchanan, Tullock, and The Calculus of Consent
From uninformed to informed choices: Voters, pre-election polls and updating
Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science
Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing
This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified in…
A Pari-Mutuel-Like Mechanism for Information Aggregation: A Field Test inside Intel
A new information aggregation mechanism (IAM), developed via laboratory experimental methods, is implemented inside Intel Corporation in a long-running field test. The IAM, incorporating features of pari-mutuel betting, is uniquely designed to collect and quantize as probability distributions dispersed, subjectively held information. IAM participants’ incentives support timely information revelation and the emergence of consensus beliefs over fut…
Matching problems in biodiversity offset markets: A case study of the New South Wales biodiversity offsets scheme
Biodiversity offset credits in New South Wales are transacted within a regulatory environment defined by detailed trading rules and many different types of biodiversity credits that can lead to thin markets and high transaction costs. This paper describes a market designed to facilitate efficient and effective transactions. The market includes a search algorithm to identify who can exchange with whom, according to the regulatory constraints, and …
Economics (21 works) · Microeconomics (12 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (9 works) · Positive economics (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Economic theories and models (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Sociology (7 works)