Daniel Giberman
Biographic Data
| ID | 974851 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Giberman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Giberman |
| SIGNATURE | GIBERMAN D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Gothenburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1680-089X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Is Mereology Not a Guide to Conceivability
Zombies are non-conscious physical duplicates of conscious physical entities. It has been argued that the conceivability of zombies supports their (metaphysical) possibility (Chalmers in The conscious mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; in The two-dimensional argument against materialism, pp 414–201, 2010a, in The character of consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b). This is important because if zombies are possible then p…
Value in a limitless world
We argue that three theses involving three separate areas of philosophy jointly yield an interesting but overlooked result. The first is from the metaphysics of mind, and says that everything is conscious (Panpsychism). The second is axiological, and says that, necessarily, every instance of consciousness is intrinsically valuable (Value). The third is from mereology, and says that everything has proper parts (Gunk). The result is that every non-…
Property dualists shouldn’t be nominalists about properties
Substance dualism is the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances: physical and mental. By contrast, according to property dualism there is only one kind of substance (physical) but two fundamentally different kinds of properties: physical and mental. Property nominalism is the view that there are neither repeatable nor non-repeatable fundamentally predicable entities (i.e. neither universals nor tropes) and that things…
Concrete Particulars
This book presents a novel metaphysics of concrete entities. The author uses the theory developed to address three major topics in the metaphysics of concreta: fundamentality, persistence over time, and phenomenal consciousness. The book provides a new theory of what “bundles” particular property instances, or tropes, into material property bearers. The theory is based on two new ideas. The first is that the primitive nature of one sui generis mo…
Panprotopsychism Instantiated
The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be that many properties are ever instantiated by one object. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. In this essay, the author argues that, surprisingly, an extant candidate solution to this problem is at the same time an independently developed candidate solution to the mind-body problem. Specifically, what is a…
Ostrich tropes
Deep gunk and deep junk
Supertropestantivalism
According to the identity version of spacetime supersubstantivalism, material objects are numerically identical to spacetime regions. While the view has been commended for its parsimony and concordance with physics, it has not properly been assessed in light of the metaphysics of properties. The present essay fills this void by discerning several subspecies of identity supersubstantivalism, corresponding to various property ontologies. Finding th…
Moving parts
Ostrich tropes
Deep gunk and deep junk
Supertropestantivalism
According to the identity version of spacetime supersubstantivalism, material objects are numerically identical to spacetime regions. While the view has been commended for its parsimony and concordance with physics, it has not properly been assessed in light of the metaphysics of properties. The present essay fills this void by discerning several subspecies of identity supersubstantivalism, corresponding to various property ontologies. Finding th…
Moving parts
Deep gunk and deep junk
Supertropestantivalism
According to the identity version of spacetime supersubstantivalism, material objects are numerically identical to spacetime regions. While the view has been commended for its parsimony and concordance with physics, it has not properly been assessed in light of the metaphysics of properties. The present essay fills this void by discerning several subspecies of identity supersubstantivalism, corresponding to various property ontologies. Finding th…
Panprotopsychism Instantiated
The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be that many properties are ever instantiated by one object. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. In this essay, the author argues that, surprisingly, an extant candidate solution to this problem is at the same time an independently developed candidate solution to the mind-body problem. Specifically, what is a…
Ostrich tropes
Property dualists shouldn’t be nominalists about properties
Substance dualism is the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances: physical and mental. By contrast, according to property dualism there is only one kind of substance (physical) but two fundamentally different kinds of properties: physical and mental. Property nominalism is the view that there are neither repeatable nor non-repeatable fundamentally predicable entities (i.e. neither universals nor tropes) and that things…
Concrete Particulars
This book presents a novel metaphysics of concrete entities. The author uses the theory developed to address three major topics in the metaphysics of concreta: fundamentality, persistence over time, and phenomenal consciousness. The book provides a new theory of what “bundles” particular property instances, or tropes, into material property bearers. The theory is based on two new ideas. The first is that the primitive nature of one sui generis mo…
Value in a limitless world
We argue that three theses involving three separate areas of philosophy jointly yield an interesting but overlooked result. The first is from the metaphysics of mind, and says that everything is conscious (Panpsychism). The second is axiological, and says that, necessarily, every instance of consciousness is intrinsically valuable (Value). The third is from mereology, and says that everything has proper parts (Gunk). The result is that every non-…
Is Mereology Not a Guide to Conceivability
Zombies are non-conscious physical duplicates of conscious physical entities. It has been argued that the conceivability of zombies supports their (metaphysical) possibility (Chalmers in The conscious mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; in The two-dimensional argument against materialism, pp 414–201, 2010a, in The character of consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b). This is important because if zombies are possible then p…
Philosophy (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Property (philosophy) (3 works)