Christine Swanton
Biographic Data
| ID | 976176 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christine Swanton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christine |
| FAMILY NAME | Swanton |
| SIGNATURE | SWANTON C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Auckland |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 38 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 103 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 37 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1980 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Practical Shape
Nietzschean Virtue Ethics
Perspectives in Role Ethics
A Virtue Ethical Theory of Role Ethics
Virtue Ethics
The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche
Individual and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy
Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality
On the Genealogy of Morality is Nietzsche's most influential, provocative, and challenging work of ethics. In this volume of newly commissioned essays, fourteen leading philosophers offer fresh insights into many of the work's central questions: How did our dominant values originate and what functions do they really serve? What future does the concept of 'evil' have - and can it be revalued? What sorts of virtues and ideals does Nietzsche advocat…
Nietzsche and the virtues of mature egoism
A major obstacle to reading Nietzsche as a philosopher who has something to offer substantive moral theory is his self-ascriptions as both an immoralist and an egoist. This chapter focuses the discussion on the virtues of mature egoism as portrayed in GM, but Nietzsche's conception of the mature egoist underlies all his central works in ethics. The argument of the chapter has the following general structure. What is needed is a proper understandi…
Heideggerian Environmental Virtue Ethics
Deadly Vices ? Gabriele Taylor
Journal Article Deadly Vices – Gabriele Taylor Get access Deadly Vices. Gabriele Taylor, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. 163. Price £25.00.) Christine Swanton Christine Swanton University of Auckland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 229, October 2007, Pages 693–696, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.521_4.x Published: 14 September 2007
Virtue and Constraints
This Chapter gives a virtue ethical account of the problem of demandingness, showing how a virtue ethics may resolve the problem of ethics being excessively demanding.
Objectivity
This chapter gives an account of the objective perspective in virtue ethical terms. It criticizes accounts that neglect the nature of the agent, and shows the importance of depth motivational factors.
Demandingness
This chapter shows how virtue ethics can accommodate the sort of constraints on the realization of goals that are central to deontological ethics.
Normative Dimensions of Virtue
This chapter gives an account of the types of response that comprise virtuous response to the world, and an argument, against consequentialism, for the view that these modes of response are plural.
Creativity
Creativity is an important response in virtue, but neglected in moral philosophy. The chapter explores the nature of creative response and its relation to virtue as a whole.
Conclusion
Author Webpage Consider the basic definition of virtue given in Chapter 1, p. 19. With respect to this basic definition, types of virtue ethics vary on several dimensions, since they vary in their responses to many different questions. Important questions include the following. In this book I have presented a type of moral theory where the notion of virtue (as opposed to, say, consequences, agent‐neutral value, or the categorical imperative) is s…
Love and Respect
This chapter provides an account of love and respect as modes of moral response that comprise virtuous response, and shows the relation between them, in virtue.
Expression
This chapter explores the idea that virtuous behaviour expresses a character state. The idea of expression is deployed to resolve some difficulties in virtue ethics, and the nature of virtue.
Virtue and the Good Life
This chapter explores the relation between virtue and the good life.
Virtues of Practice
This chapter discusses moral epistemology from a virtue ethical perspective, rejecting an account of virtuous agent as oracle, and replacing it with a virtue ethical kind of dialogic ethics.
What Makes a Character Trait a Virtue
This chapter provides arguments against eudaimonistic virtue ethics.
Indeterminacy
This chapter answers the common objection to virtue ethics that the ethical guidance given by virtue ethics is insufficiently determinate.
The Anatomy of Virtue
This chapter gives the definition of virtue and provides an account of its nature.
A Virtue‐Ethical Account of Right Action
This chapter provides a new target‐centred virtue ethical account of right action.
Virtue Ethics
This book offers a comprehensive virtue ethics that breaks from the tradition of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. In developing a pluralistic view, it shows how different ’modes of moral response’ such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity are all central to the virtuous response and thereby to ethics. It offers virtue ethical accounts of the good life, objectivity, rightness, demandingness, and moral epistemology
Satisficing and Virtue
Il existe une forme de satisfaction nommee satisizing. Philip Pettit l'appelle unmotivated submaximization et la decrit comme profondement irrationnelle. Tandis que pour l'A. elle est Moderation, Rationalite et Vertu
The Concept of Interests
Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Indirection
Many forms of virtue ethics, like certain forms of utilitarianism, suffer from the problem of indirection. In those forms, the criterion for status of a trait as a virtue is not the same as the criterion for the status of an act as right. Furthermore, if the virtues for example are meant to promote the nourishing of the agent, the virtuous agent is not standardly supposed to be motivated by concern for her own flourishing in her activity. In this…
The supposed tension between ‘strength’ and ‘gentleness’ conceptions of the virtues
Outline of an intuitionist response to Nozick
The paper is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I counter criticisms that in Anarchy State and Utopia Nozick has no argument for his views on property rights, by presenting what I take to be his main argument that the absolutist nature of property rights makes redistributive taxation impermissible. In the second part, I outline an intuitionist response to this argument. This response presupposes the truth of all the premises of Nozic…
The Concept of Interests
Is the Difference Principle a Principle of Justice?
Journal Article Is the Difference Principle a Principle of Justice? Get access CHRISTINE SWANTON CHRISTINE SWANTON UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XC, Issue 359, July 1981, Pages 415–421, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XC.359.415 Published: 01 July 1981
Outline of an intuitionist response to Nozick
The paper is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I counter criticisms that in Anarchy State and Utopia Nozick has no argument for his views on property rights, by presenting what I take to be his main argument that the absolutist nature of property rights makes redistributive taxation impermissible. In the second part, I outline an intuitionist response to this argument. This response presupposes the truth of all the premises of Nozic…
On the "Essential Contestedness" of Political Concepts
The Role Played by the Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Moral Epistemology
The method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) has been defended by Kai Nielsen as an exciting new development in the search for a device for increasing our ability to choose between competing moral conceptions. Nonetheless, this confidence will be seen as misplaced unless serious issues are resolved. Lack of clarity surrounds the questions: (1) What is the claimed epistemological role for WRE? (2) What version of WRE is to be employed? In this …
Commentary on Michael Slote's “Virtue Ethics and Democratic Values”
Satisficing and Virtue
Il existe une forme de satisfaction nommee satisizing. Philip Pettit l'appelle unmotivated submaximization et la decrit comme profondement irrationnelle. Tandis que pour l'A. elle est Moderation, Rationalite et Vertu
Freedom
This strikingly original work presents a theory of freedom as the absence of a wide variety of flaws, breakdowns, and restrictions that limit the potential flourishing of human beings as agents. This defeasibility conception, it is argued, can accommodate the diverse intuitions that make the concept of freedom so widely contested and which have given rise to so many conflicting accounts of it: each competing theory can be seen as concentrating on…
Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Indirection
Many forms of virtue ethics, like certain forms of utilitarianism, suffer from the problem of indirection. In those forms, the criterion for status of a trait as a virtue is not the same as the criterion for the status of an act as right. Furthermore, if the virtues for example are meant to promote the nourishing of the agent, the virtuous agent is not standardly supposed to be motivated by concern for her own flourishing in her activity. In this…
The supposed tension between ‘strength’ and ‘gentleness’ conceptions of the virtues
Outline of a Nietzschean Virtue Ethics
L'A. souligne les caracteristiques d'une ethique de la vertu nietzscheenne repondant a la question de l'action droite et a la question du trait de caractere vertueux, par comparaison au paradigme aristotelicien de l'ethique de la vertu. Examinant la conception pessimiste et maladive de la condition humaine chez Nietzsche, l'A. montre que l'idee selon laquelle l'action droite trouve son origine dans la force, d'une part, et l'idee selon laquelle l…
Virtue Ethics, Value-centredness, and Consequentialism
In relation to the first feature, I argue against two ideas: (a) Value should be understood entirely independently of virtue; and (b) The only right-making respects which serve to make an action better than another is degree of value. I argue that what I call the bases of moral response are several, including also status, the good for, and bonds. Against the Hegemony of Promotion thesis I argue for several modes of moral responsiveness constituti…
Virtue and Constraints
This Chapter gives a virtue ethical account of the problem of demandingness, showing how a virtue ethics may resolve the problem of ethics being excessively demanding.
Objectivity
This chapter gives an account of the objective perspective in virtue ethical terms. It criticizes accounts that neglect the nature of the agent, and shows the importance of depth motivational factors.
Demandingness
This chapter shows how virtue ethics can accommodate the sort of constraints on the realization of goals that are central to deontological ethics.
Normative Dimensions of Virtue
This chapter gives an account of the types of response that comprise virtuous response to the world, and an argument, against consequentialism, for the view that these modes of response are plural.
Creativity
Creativity is an important response in virtue, but neglected in moral philosophy. The chapter explores the nature of creative response and its relation to virtue as a whole.
Conclusion
Author Webpage Consider the basic definition of virtue given in Chapter 1, p. 19. With respect to this basic definition, types of virtue ethics vary on several dimensions, since they vary in their responses to many different questions. Important questions include the following. In this book I have presented a type of moral theory where the notion of virtue (as opposed to, say, consequences, agent‐neutral value, or the categorical imperative) is s…
Love and Respect
This chapter provides an account of love and respect as modes of moral response that comprise virtuous response, and shows the relation between them, in virtue.
Expression
This chapter explores the idea that virtuous behaviour expresses a character state. The idea of expression is deployed to resolve some difficulties in virtue ethics, and the nature of virtue.
Virtue and the Good Life
This chapter explores the relation between virtue and the good life.
Virtues of Practice
This chapter discusses moral epistemology from a virtue ethical perspective, rejecting an account of virtuous agent as oracle, and replacing it with a virtue ethical kind of dialogic ethics.
What Makes a Character Trait a Virtue
This chapter provides arguments against eudaimonistic virtue ethics.
Indeterminacy
This chapter answers the common objection to virtue ethics that the ethical guidance given by virtue ethics is insufficiently determinate.
The Anatomy of Virtue
This chapter gives the definition of virtue and provides an account of its nature.
Epistemology (28 works) · Philosophy (25 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (22 works) · Virtue (19 works) · Sociology (14 works) · Environmental ethics (13 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (12 works) · Ethics in medical practice (11 works) · Political science (11 works) · Virtue ethics (11 works)