Hélder Vasconcelos
Biographic Data
| ID | 976393 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hélder Vasconcelos |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hélder |
| FAMILY NAME | Vasconcelos |
| SIGNATURE | VASCONCELOS H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto and CEPR |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2584-4352 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Competitive effects of mergers and of spectrum divestment remedies in mobile telecommunication markets
Motivated by recent mergers in mobile telecommunications markets, this paper investigates the merger induced effects on consumer surplus in a setting where: (i) the industry is modeled as a triopoly in which firms sell products that are both horizontally and vertically differentiated; (ii) the merging parties are able to pool their spectrum assets; and (iii) the joint management of pooled spectrum assets enables merging parties to offer a better …
Acordos De Distribuição Exclusiva No Contexto Da Economia Digital
O presente artigo investiga os efeitos concorrenciais dos acordos de distribuição exclusiva no contexto da economia digital. Ao analisar as principais conclusões da literatura económica existente sobre o tema, bem como a jurisprudência relevante na União Europeia, concluímos que, embora este tipo de contratos possa conduzir ao encerramento do mercado, aumentando as barreiras à entrada e/ou contribuindo para aumentar os custos dos rivais, a exclus…
Endogenous Mergers and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures
Recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric, while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion. Including an indivisible cost of cartelization, we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion, since they balance the small firms' incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders' indivisible cartelization cost. Using an endogenous merger mode…
Endogenous Mergers and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures
Recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric, while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion. Including an indivisible cost of cartelization, we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion, since they balance the small firms' incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders' indivisible cartelization cost. Using an endogenous merger mode…
Endogenous Mergers and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures
Recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric, while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion. Including an indivisible cost of cartelization, we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion, since they balance the small firms' incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders' indivisible cartelization cost. Using an endogenous merger mode…
Competitive effects of mergers and of spectrum divestment remedies in mobile telecommunication markets
Motivated by recent mergers in mobile telecommunications markets, this paper investigates the merger induced effects on consumer surplus in a setting where: (i) the industry is modeled as a triopoly in which firms sell products that are both horizontally and vertically differentiated; (ii) the merging parties are able to pool their spectrum assets; and (iii) the joint management of pooled spectrum assets enables merging parties to offer a better …
Acordos De Distribuição Exclusiva No Contexto Da Economia Digital
O presente artigo investiga os efeitos concorrenciais dos acordos de distribuição exclusiva no contexto da economia digital. Ao analisar as principais conclusões da literatura económica existente sobre o tema, bem como a jurisprudência relevante na União Europeia, concluímos que, embora este tipo de contratos possa conduzir ao encerramento do mercado, aumentando as barreiras à entrada e/ou contribuindo para aumentar os custos dos rivais, a exclus…
Digital Platforms and Economics (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Industrial organization (2 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (2 works) · Antisymmetry (1 work) · Cartel (1 work) · Collusion (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)