Peter D Klein

Dados Biográficos

ID978866
NOMEPeter D Klein
PRENOMESPeter D
SOBRENOMEKlein
ASSINATURAKLEIN P D
AFILIAÇÕESRutgers, the State University of New Jersey
ORCID0009-0003-6008-6037
VERIFICADOSim
TOTAL DE OBRAS9
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES3
TOTAL COMO AUTOR8
TOTAL COMO EDITOR1
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1976
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2024
ÍNDICE H1

  • How sceptics teach us to know

    Open AccessPeter D KleinARTICLESynthese2024Referências: 19

    The purpose of this paper is to show (1) that scepticism, in both its traditional forms and contemporary forms, poses no real threat to obtaining inferential empirical knowledge, even if such knowledge requires certainty and (2) that there are some significant lessons to be learned from the traditional sceptics about what constitutes a plausible argument for scepticism and how to obtain knowledge while avoiding dogmatism and (3) that contemporary…

  • Ad Infinitum

    Peter Klein, John Turri et al.BOOKAd Infinitum2014

    This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs-an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.

  • Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma

    Peter D Klein, Peter KleinCHAPTERThe Oxford handbook of philosophy…2009

    This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the…

  • Infinitism’s Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism

    Open AccessPeter D Klein, Peter KleinARTICLEVeritas (Porto Alegre)2005

    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com a…

  • What Is Wrong With Foundationalism Is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem

    Open AccessPeter D Klein, Peter KleinARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2004Citada por: 2

    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so‐called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non‐basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification.1 If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like) and if it is a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like), then it is the ki…

  • Certainty

    Richard Foley, Peter D Klein et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1984Citada por: 1

  • Real knowledge

    Open AccessPeter D Klein, Peter KleinARTICLESynthese1983

  • Keith Lehrer

    Peter D Klein, Peter Klein et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1983

  • Belief, Truth and Knowledge

    Peter D Klein, Peter KleinREVIEWThe Philosophical Review1976

    Part I. Belief: 1. The nature of belief 2. Beliefs as states 3. Belief and language 4. Propositions 5. Concepts and Ideas 6. General beliefs 7. Existential beliefs 8. Further considerations about belief Part II. Truth: 9. Truth Part III: Knowledge. 10. Knowledge entails true belief 11. The infinite regress of reasons 12. Non -inferential knowledge (1) 13. Non-inferential knowledge (2) 14. Inferential and general knowledge 15. Further consideratio…