J Christopher Maloney
Biographic Data
| ID | 983976 |
|---|---|
| NAME | J Christopher Maloney |
| GIVEN NAMES | J Christopher |
| FAMILY NAME | Maloney |
| SIGNATURE | MALONEY J C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Oakland University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1981 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
What It Is Like To Perceive
Conscious perception is a distinctive mode of cognition marked by its manifestly sensuous phenomenal character. Why? An intentionalist may reply that perception is a kind of psychological state realized by an oddly contentful mental representation. A higher order theorist might alternatively answer that a perceptual state is sensuous since it is the content of a higher order cognitive state. Neither of these representationalists is right. It is n…
What It Is Like to Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception
Content: Covariation, control and contingency
Information, Semantics & Epistemology
Information, semantics and epistemology: introduction, Enrique Villanueva meaning Frederick Dreske ways of establishing harmony, Daniel Dennet reply to Dretske's does meaning matter?, Jerry Fodor explanatory exclusion and the problem of mental causation, Jaegwon Kim content and rules in a natural world, Christopher Peacocke Fodor's character, Stephen Schiffer narrow aspects of intentionality and the information-theoretic approach to content, Hart…
The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language. By J. Christopher Maloney. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pp. xxvii + 274. Price £27.50.) Jim Edwards Jim Edwards University of Glasgow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 162, January 1991, Pages 106–109, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219794 Published: 01 January 1991
Mental Misrepresentation
An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibili…
The right stuff
Sensation and Scientific Realism
Paul Churchland [3] has persuasively and elegantly argued for the increasingly more popular thesis that an agent's observation judgments are determined by the theories the agent espouses. In league with Sellars [23] and Feyerabend [9], [io], Churchland opposes the myth of the sensuously given, repudiating the classical and fundamental empiricist distinction between the sensible and nonsensible, between what can be perceived and what can only be i…
Methodological Solipsism Reconsidered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology
Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive…
The mundane mental language: How to do words with things
Towards an Improved Theory of Metaphor: Bellert on Metaphorical Interpretation
Professor Irena Bellert's Holmes' Interpretation of Metaphorical Texts (1981) is a significant contribution towards a general theory of metaphor. Indeed, her notion of metaphorical interpretation, that is, a Sherlock Holmes' Interpretation, of a text (Bellert 1981:32-34) may be particularly helpful in resolving what Chana Kronfeld has called 'puzzle of metaphor': how [. . .] people understand each other's metaphors, and how [...] they produce the…
A new way up from empirical foundations
The right stuff
Mental Misrepresentation
An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibili…
Content: Covariation, control and contingency
The mundane mental language: How to do words with things
A new way up from empirical foundations
A new way up from empirical foundations
Towards an Improved Theory of Metaphor: Bellert on Metaphorical Interpretation
Professor Irena Bellert's Holmes' Interpretation of Metaphorical Texts (1981) is a significant contribution towards a general theory of metaphor. Indeed, her notion of metaphorical interpretation, that is, a Sherlock Holmes' Interpretation, of a text (Bellert 1981:32-34) may be particularly helpful in resolving what Chana Kronfeld has called 'puzzle of metaphor': how [. . .] people understand each other's metaphors, and how [...] they produce the…
The mundane mental language: How to do words with things
Methodological Solipsism Reconsidered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology
Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive…
Sensation and Scientific Realism
Paul Churchland [3] has persuasively and elegantly argued for the increasingly more popular thesis that an agent's observation judgments are determined by the theories the agent espouses. In league with Sellars [23] and Feyerabend [9], [io], Churchland opposes the myth of the sensuously given, repudiating the classical and fundamental empiricist distinction between the sensible and nonsensible, between what can be perceived and what can only be i…
The right stuff
Mental Misrepresentation
An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibili…
The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language. By J. Christopher Maloney. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pp. xxvii + 274. Price £27.50.) Jim Edwards Jim Edwards University of Glasgow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 162, January 1991, Pages 106–109, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219794 Published: 01 January 1991
Information, Semantics & Epistemology
Information, semantics and epistemology: introduction, Enrique Villanueva meaning Frederick Dreske ways of establishing harmony, Daniel Dennet reply to Dretske's does meaning matter?, Jerry Fodor explanatory exclusion and the problem of mental causation, Jaegwon Kim content and rules in a natural world, Christopher Peacocke Fodor's character, Stephen Schiffer narrow aspects of intentionality and the information-theoretic approach to content, Hart…
Content: Covariation, control and contingency
What It Is Like To Perceive
Conscious perception is a distinctive mode of cognition marked by its manifestly sensuous phenomenal character. Why? An intentionalist may reply that perception is a kind of psychological state realized by an oddly contentful mental representation. A higher order theorist might alternatively answer that a perceptual state is sensuous since it is the content of a higher order cognitive state. Neither of these representationalists is right. It is n…
What It Is Like to Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Cognition (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works) · Cognitive science (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works)