Mona Simion
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 984954 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Mona Simion |
| PRENOMES | Mona |
| SOBRENOME | Simion |
| ASSINATURA | SIMION M |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7289-0872 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 28 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 39 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 27 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2015 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Brown on group evidence, group justification, and group responsibility
Jessica Brown’s excellent new book (2024) is highly ambitious: it develops a unified account of group doxastic, epistemic, and responsibility phenomena. Importantly for our purposes here, Brown dev
McKenna on Non-Ideal Epistemology
This paper argues for a picture on which we should engage in ideal epistemology and leave non-ideal epistemology to sociologists and psychologists – to people interested in how we actually form beliefs, rather than how we ought to. Compatibly, we should keep an eye on results in these fields in order to understand the ‘cans’ to our ‘oughts’, and thereby what our epistemic ideals should look like
Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation
Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive r…
What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’
This paper develops and defends novel accounts of accurate and reasonable doubt. We take a cue from Sosa's telic epistemic normative picture to argue that one’s degree of doubt that p is accurate just in case it matches the level of veritic risk involved in believing that p. In turn, on this account, reasonable doubt is doubt that is generated by a properly functioning cognitive capacity with the function of encoding veritic risk
Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice
Alessandra Taniesini's 'The Mismeasure of the Self' develops an internalist account of epistemic vice. On this view, epistemic vices are grounded in attitudes towards the self: fatalism, self-satisfaction, narcissistic infatuation, and self-abasement. The account is internalist insofar as it claims to ground both the nature and the normativity of vice within the subject's skull. In this paper, I argue against vice internalism: epistemic vices, I …
Disinformation, Politically Motivated Reasoning, and Knowledge Resistance
We have increasingly sophisticated ways of acquiring and communicating knowledge, yet, paradoxically, we are currently facing an unprecedented global ignorance crisis that affects our personal and societal well-being, as well as the stability of our democracies. There are two key triggers to this crisis, i.e. two crucial obstacles to learning: first, the widespread sharing of disinformation, which, in conjunction with an overly trusting audience,…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
What is trustworthiness
This paper develops a novel, bifocal account of trustworthiness according to which both trustworthiness simpliciter (as in ‘Ann is trustworthy’) and trustworthiness to phi (as in ‘Ann is trustworthy when it comes to keeping your secrets’) are analysed in terms of dispositions to fulfil one's obligations. We also offer a systematic account of the relation between the two types of trustworthiness, an account of degrees of trustworthiness and compar…
Linguistic innovation for gender terms
This paper explores the political prospects of linguistic innovation for gender terms. It develops and defends a model that leaves the concept of woman in place but replaces the term with a novel one that lacks the problematic social and political connotations. It is shown that linguistic innovation reaps all the political benefits of competing proposals in conceptual ethics, without any of the downsides
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe
This article develops and defends a full account of the nature and normativity of resistance to evidence, according to which resistance to evidence is an instance of input‐level epistemic malfunctioning. At the core of this epistemic normative picture lies the notion of knowledge indicators, as evidential probability increasing facts that one is in a position to know; resistance to evidence is construed as a failure to uptake knowledge indicators
The epistemic normativity of conjecture
This paper has two aims: (1) it develops and defends a fully-fledged account of the epistemic normativity of conjecture (2) it goes sharply against orthodoxy, in arguing that conjecture is epistemically more demanding than assertion. According to the view defended here, one’s conjecture that p is permissible only if one knows that one has warrant, but not sufficient warrant to believe that p . I argue for my account on three independent grounds: …
How to be an infallibilist
The Epistemology of Groups
Jennifer Lackey’s excellent new book is very ambitious, as the title suggests: it covers all of collective epistemology (group justification, group knowledge, group speech acts), but also related issues in ethics (group responsibility), language (group assertion and lying), and mind (group belief).I don’t have the space here to do justice to all the excellent philosophy in this book. I will therefore focus on the topics that I take to be central …
Testimonial contractarianism
According to anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti‐reductionism; one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie. This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti‐reductionist answers to this question and argues that they remain…
Disagreement and epistemic improvement
This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter . We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a nor…
Knowledge and reasoning
This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasonin…
Blame as performance
This paper develops a novel account of the nature of blame: on this account, blame is a species of performance with a constitutive aim. The argument for the claim that blame is an action is speech-act theoretic: it relies on the nature of performatives and the parallelism between mental and spoken blame. I argue that the view scores well on prior plausibility and theoretical fruitfulness, in that: it rests on claims that are widely accepted acros…
Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology
Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little …
Conversational Pressure
Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges is a fantastic book and the first full account of the diverse normative landscape generated by conversation. The book is extremely rich, synthesizing a comprehensive and sophisticated normative framework and developing novel accounts of several interrelated conversational phenomena, including the normativity of address, the normativity of silence, epistemic duties generated by friendship, t…
Down Girl
In her fascinating and provocative book, Kate Manne argues that we should abandon the naïve understanding of misogyny as a simple psychological phenomenon—i.e., hatred towards women qua women, in favour of seeing it as a complex social and political phenomenon. Manne sees her project as one in conceptual engineering: The ambition is to build a novel concept of misogyny that is better equipped to serve our feminist goals. On the ensuing account, m…
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat
Hoops and Barns
This paper critically assesses Sosa’s normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa’s central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa’s account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if s…
How to be an anti-reductionist
The C account of assertion
According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature
A puzzle for epistemic WAMs
Assertion
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe
This article develops and defends a full account of the nature and normativity of resistance to evidence, according to which resistance to evidence is an instance of input‐level epistemic malfunctioning. At the core of this epistemic normative picture lies the notion of knowledge indicators, as evidential probability increasing facts that one is in a position to know; resistance to evidence is construed as a failure to uptake knowledge indicators
How to be an anti-reductionist
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology
Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little …
The C account of assertion
According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature
Knowledge and reasoning
This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasonin…
Blame as performance
This paper develops a novel account of the nature of blame: on this account, blame is a species of performance with a constitutive aim. The argument for the claim that blame is an action is speech-act theoretic: it relies on the nature of performatives and the parallelism between mental and spoken blame. I argue that the view scores well on prior plausibility and theoretical fruitfulness, in that: it rests on claims that are widely accepted acros…
Down Girl
In her fascinating and provocative book, Kate Manne argues that we should abandon the naïve understanding of misogyny as a simple psychological phenomenon—i.e., hatred towards women qua women, in favour of seeing it as a complex social and political phenomenon. Manne sees her project as one in conceptual engineering: The ambition is to build a novel concept of misogyny that is better equipped to serve our feminist goals. On the ensuing account, m…
Commodious knowledge
Non-probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Veil
Assertion
Commodious knowledge
A puzzle for epistemic WAMs
Hoops and Barns
This paper critically assesses Sosa’s normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa’s central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa’s account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if s…
How to be an anti-reductionist
The C account of assertion
According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature
Testimonial contractarianism
According to anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti‐reductionism; one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie. This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti‐reductionist answers to this question and argues that they remain…
Disagreement and epistemic improvement
This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter . We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a nor…
Knowledge and reasoning
This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasonin…
Blame as performance
This paper develops a novel account of the nature of blame: on this account, blame is a species of performance with a constitutive aim. The argument for the claim that blame is an action is speech-act theoretic: it relies on the nature of performatives and the parallelism between mental and spoken blame. I argue that the view scores well on prior plausibility and theoretical fruitfulness, in that: it rests on claims that are widely accepted acros…
Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology
Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little …
Conversational Pressure
Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges is a fantastic book and the first full account of the diverse normative landscape generated by conversation. The book is extremely rich, synthesizing a comprehensive and sophisticated normative framework and developing novel accounts of several interrelated conversational phenomena, including the normativity of address, the normativity of silence, epistemic duties generated by friendship, t…
Down Girl
In her fascinating and provocative book, Kate Manne argues that we should abandon the naïve understanding of misogyny as a simple psychological phenomenon—i.e., hatred towards women qua women, in favour of seeing it as a complex social and political phenomenon. Manne sees her project as one in conceptual engineering: The ambition is to build a novel concept of misogyny that is better equipped to serve our feminist goals. On the ensuing account, m…
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat
The epistemic normativity of conjecture
This paper has two aims: (1) it develops and defends a fully-fledged account of the epistemic normativity of conjecture (2) it goes sharply against orthodoxy, in arguing that conjecture is epistemically more demanding than assertion. According to the view defended here, one’s conjecture that p is permissible only if one knows that one has warrant, but not sufficient warrant to believe that p . I argue for my account on three independent grounds: …
How to be an infallibilist
The Epistemology of Groups
Jennifer Lackey’s excellent new book is very ambitious, as the title suggests: it covers all of collective epistemology (group justification, group knowledge, group speech acts), but also related issues in ethics (group responsibility), language (group assertion and lying), and mind (group belief).I don’t have the space here to do justice to all the excellent philosophy in this book. I will therefore focus on the topics that I take to be central …
What is trustworthiness
This paper develops a novel, bifocal account of trustworthiness according to which both trustworthiness simpliciter (as in ‘Ann is trustworthy’) and trustworthiness to phi (as in ‘Ann is trustworthy when it comes to keeping your secrets’) are analysed in terms of dispositions to fulfil one's obligations. We also offer a systematic account of the relation between the two types of trustworthiness, an account of degrees of trustworthiness and compar…
Linguistic innovation for gender terms
This paper explores the political prospects of linguistic innovation for gender terms. It develops and defends a model that leaves the concept of woman in place but replaces the term with a novel one that lacks the problematic social and political connotations. It is shown that linguistic innovation reaps all the political benefits of competing proposals in conceptual ethics, without any of the downsides
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe
This article develops and defends a full account of the nature and normativity of resistance to evidence, according to which resistance to evidence is an instance of input‐level epistemic malfunctioning. At the core of this epistemic normative picture lies the notion of knowledge indicators, as evidential probability increasing facts that one is in a position to know; resistance to evidence is construed as a failure to uptake knowledge indicators
Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation
Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive r…
What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’
This paper develops and defends novel accounts of accurate and reasonable doubt. We take a cue from Sosa's telic epistemic normative picture to argue that one’s degree of doubt that p is accurate just in case it matches the level of veritic risk involved in believing that p. In turn, on this account, reasonable doubt is doubt that is generated by a properly functioning cognitive capacity with the function of encoding veritic risk
Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice
Alessandra Taniesini's 'The Mismeasure of the Self' develops an internalist account of epistemic vice. On this view, epistemic vices are grounded in attitudes towards the self: fatalism, self-satisfaction, narcissistic infatuation, and self-abasement. The account is internalist insofar as it claims to ground both the nature and the normativity of vice within the subject's skull. In this paper, I argue against vice internalism: epistemic vices, I …
Disinformation, Politically Motivated Reasoning, and Knowledge Resistance
We have increasingly sophisticated ways of acquiring and communicating knowledge, yet, paradoxically, we are currently facing an unprecedented global ignorance crisis that affects our personal and societal well-being, as well as the stability of our democracies. There are two key triggers to this crisis, i.e. two crucial obstacles to learning: first, the widespread sharing of disinformation, which, in conjunction with an overly trusting audience,…
Philosophy (25 obras) · Epistemology (24 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (21 obras) · Computer Science (13 obras) · Metaphysics (13 obras) · Philosophy of language (13 obras) · Philosophy of science (12 obras) · Psychology (12 obras) · Free Will and Agency (10 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 obras)