Daniel C Burnston
Biographic Data
| ID | 985226 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel C Burnston |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel C |
| FAMILY NAME | Burnston |
| SIGNATURE | BURNSTON D C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tulane University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8281-3256 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 41 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Thinking mechanistically about perceptual learning
Traditionally, philosophy of psychology has individuated mental states functionally or semantically. These approaches have shaped many of the debates surrounding cognitive architecture and perceptual experience. We argue that understanding perceptual learning requires a mechanistic approach, which focuses on the structure of the mental representations underlying learned perceptual abilities. We articulate the mechanistic approach, then show how i…
Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’
“Reduction” is a widely rejected view of how commonsense psychological notions relate to neuroscience. I argue that there is a particular view of reduction on which reduction of the key commonsense concept of ‘decision’ is a live option. In particular, I advance a version of epistemic reduction based on “connectability.” On this view, reduction relations are not logical relationships, but instead posited identifications that guide subsequent mode…
How to think about higher‐level perceptual contents
The standard assumption for what perception must do in order to represent a “higher level” content—say, tiger— is that it must represent the kind as such . I argue that this “as such condition” is not constitutive of what it means for a content to be “higher‐level”, and that embracing it produces a range of unfortunate dialectical consequences. After offering this critique, I give an alternative construal, the “extended perceptual space” view of …
Anti-Intellectualism for the Learning and Employment of Skill
Perceptual Learning, Categorical Perception, and Cognitive Permeation
Proponents of cognitive penetration often argue for the thesis on the basis of combined intuitions about categorical perception and perceptual learning. The claim is that beliefs penetrate perceptions in the course of learning to perceive categories. I argue that this "diachronic" penetration thesis is false. In order to substantiate a robust notion of penetration, the beliefs that enable learning must describe the particular ability that subject…
Bayes, predictive processing, and the cognitive architecture of motor control
Contents, vehicles, and complex data analysis in neuroscience
The notion of representation in neuroscience has largely been predicated on localizing the components of computational processes that explain cognitive function. On this view, which I call “algorithmic homuncularism,” individual, spatially and temporally distinct parts of the brain serve as vehicles for distinct contents, and the causal relationships between them implement the transformations specified by an algorithm. This view has a widespread …
Getting over Atomism
Functional decomposition is an important goal in the life sciences, and is central to mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction. A growing literature in philosophy of science, however, has challenged decomposition-based notions of explanation. ‘Holists’ posit that complex systems exhibit context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and network dependence, and that these properties undermine decomposition. They then infer from the failure of …
Cognitive penetration and the cognition–perception interface
Real Patterns in Biological Explanation
In discussion of mechanisms, philosophers often debate about whether quantitative descriptions of generalizations or qualitative descriptions of operations are explanatorily fundamental. I argue that these debates have erred by conflating the explanatory roles of generalizations and patterns. Patterns are types of variations within or between quantities in a mechanism over time or across conditions. While these patterns must often be represented …
Data graphs and mechanistic explanation
Computational neuroscience and localized neural function
Scientists’ use of diagrams in developing mechanistic explanations
We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at developing mechanistic explanations of biological phenomena. We offer a case study focusing on one research project that resulted in a published paper advancing a new understanding of the mechanism by which the central circadian oscillator in Synechococcus elongatus controls gene expression. By examining how the diagrams prepared for the paper develo…
Why Do Biologists Use So Many Diagrams
Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective medium for communicating research findings, but they are even more impressive as tools for scientific reasoning. To explore this role, we examine diagrammatic formats that have been devised by biologists to ( a ) identify and illuminate phenomena involving circadian rhythms and ( b ) develop and modify mechanistic explanations of these phenomena
Naturalism and scientific creativity
In the preface to Models of discovery and creativity, Thomas Nickles pitches the book as the continuation of a research program that began unofficially at a conference on scientific discovery in the late 1970's. The project is defined by its interdisciplinary nature, applying the combined resources of philosophy, social science, and cognitive science to the complex issues surrounding scientific concepts, practice, and methodology. Nickles offers …
Getting over Atomism
Functional decomposition is an important goal in the life sciences, and is central to mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction. A growing literature in philosophy of science, however, has challenged decomposition-based notions of explanation. ‘Holists’ posit that complex systems exhibit context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and network dependence, and that these properties undermine decomposition. They then infer from the failure of …
Cognitive penetration and the cognition–perception interface
Why Do Biologists Use So Many Diagrams
Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective medium for communicating research findings, but they are even more impressive as tools for scientific reasoning. To explore this role, we examine diagrammatic formats that have been devised by biologists to ( a ) identify and illuminate phenomena involving circadian rhythms and ( b ) develop and modify mechanistic explanations of these phenomena
Computational neuroscience and localized neural function
Data graphs and mechanistic explanation
Real Patterns in Biological Explanation
In discussion of mechanisms, philosophers often debate about whether quantitative descriptions of generalizations or qualitative descriptions of operations are explanatorily fundamental. I argue that these debates have erred by conflating the explanatory roles of generalizations and patterns. Patterns are types of variations within or between quantities in a mechanism over time or across conditions. While these patterns must often be represented …
Contents, vehicles, and complex data analysis in neuroscience
The notion of representation in neuroscience has largely been predicated on localizing the components of computational processes that explain cognitive function. On this view, which I call “algorithmic homuncularism,” individual, spatially and temporally distinct parts of the brain serve as vehicles for distinct contents, and the causal relationships between them implement the transformations specified by an algorithm. This view has a widespread …
Naturalism and scientific creativity
In the preface to Models of discovery and creativity, Thomas Nickles pitches the book as the continuation of a research program that began unofficially at a conference on scientific discovery in the late 1970's. The project is defined by its interdisciplinary nature, applying the combined resources of philosophy, social science, and cognitive science to the complex issues surrounding scientific concepts, practice, and methodology. Nickles offers …
Why Do Biologists Use So Many Diagrams
Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective medium for communicating research findings, but they are even more impressive as tools for scientific reasoning. To explore this role, we examine diagrammatic formats that have been devised by biologists to ( a ) identify and illuminate phenomena involving circadian rhythms and ( b ) develop and modify mechanistic explanations of these phenomena
Scientists’ use of diagrams in developing mechanistic explanations
We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at developing mechanistic explanations of biological phenomena. We offer a case study focusing on one research project that resulted in a published paper advancing a new understanding of the mechanism by which the central circadian oscillator in Synechococcus elongatus controls gene expression. By examining how the diagrams prepared for the paper develo…
Data graphs and mechanistic explanation
Computational neuroscience and localized neural function
Cognitive penetration and the cognition–perception interface
Real Patterns in Biological Explanation
In discussion of mechanisms, philosophers often debate about whether quantitative descriptions of generalizations or qualitative descriptions of operations are explanatorily fundamental. I argue that these debates have erred by conflating the explanatory roles of generalizations and patterns. Patterns are types of variations within or between quantities in a mechanism over time or across conditions. While these patterns must often be represented …
Anti-Intellectualism for the Learning and Employment of Skill
Perceptual Learning, Categorical Perception, and Cognitive Permeation
Proponents of cognitive penetration often argue for the thesis on the basis of combined intuitions about categorical perception and perceptual learning. The claim is that beliefs penetrate perceptions in the course of learning to perceive categories. I argue that this "diachronic" penetration thesis is false. In order to substantiate a robust notion of penetration, the beliefs that enable learning must describe the particular ability that subject…
Bayes, predictive processing, and the cognitive architecture of motor control
Contents, vehicles, and complex data analysis in neuroscience
The notion of representation in neuroscience has largely been predicated on localizing the components of computational processes that explain cognitive function. On this view, which I call “algorithmic homuncularism,” individual, spatially and temporally distinct parts of the brain serve as vehicles for distinct contents, and the causal relationships between them implement the transformations specified by an algorithm. This view has a widespread …
Getting over Atomism
Functional decomposition is an important goal in the life sciences, and is central to mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction. A growing literature in philosophy of science, however, has challenged decomposition-based notions of explanation. ‘Holists’ posit that complex systems exhibit context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and network dependence, and that these properties undermine decomposition. They then infer from the failure of …
How to think about higher‐level perceptual contents
The standard assumption for what perception must do in order to represent a “higher level” content—say, tiger— is that it must represent the kind as such . I argue that this “as such condition” is not constitutive of what it means for a content to be “higher‐level”, and that embracing it produces a range of unfortunate dialectical consequences. After offering this critique, I give an alternative construal, the “extended perceptual space” view of …
Thinking mechanistically about perceptual learning
Traditionally, philosophy of psychology has individuated mental states functionally or semantically. These approaches have shaped many of the debates surrounding cognitive architecture and perceptual experience. We argue that understanding perceptual learning requires a mechanistic approach, which focuses on the structure of the mental representations underlying learned perceptual abilities. We articulate the mechanistic approach, then show how i…
Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’
“Reduction” is a widely rejected view of how commonsense psychological notions relate to neuroscience. I argue that there is a particular view of reduction on which reduction of the key commonsense concept of ‘decision’ is a live option. In particular, I advance a version of epistemic reduction based on “connectability.” On this view, reduction relations are not logical relationships, but instead posited identifications that guide subsequent mode…
Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Psychology (12 works) · Cognitive science (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Cognition (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works)