Stephanie Rosenkranz
Biographic Data
| ID | 996065 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stephanie Rosenkranz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stephanie |
| FAMILY NAME | Rosenkranz |
| SIGNATURE | ROSENKRANZ S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Utrecht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5931-7913 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Social nudges in policymaking: Information selection by civil servants under differing levels of complexity
Diverse information is key for informed and effective policymaking when addressing complex policy issues. Policymakers need to decide what information to process given their limited time and cognitive capacity. This paper presents an online vignette experiment in which 157 civil servants from a Dutch medium-sized municipality participated. We test how civil servants respond to the presence of a social nudge that stimulates more diverse informatio…
Incentivized choice in large-scale voting experiments
Survey experiments that investigate how voting procedures affect voting behavior and election outcomes use hypothetical questions and non-representative samples. We present here the results of a novel survey experiment that addresses both concerns. First, the winning party in our experiment receives a donation to its campaign funds inducing real consequences for voting. Second, we run an online experiment with a Dutch national representative samp…
The effect of pledges on the distribution of lying behavior: An online experiment
Manufacturer suggested retail prices, loss aversion and competition
Information Acquisition and Exchange In Social Networks
n Contains fulltext :\n 179681.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)\n
How Farsightedness Affects Network Formation
We develop a theoretical model of network formation where actors are limitedly farsighted. In this way we extend current models with a new set of micro-foundations. Computer simulations are used to predict the stable network structures that are likely to emerge under the new assumptions. The co-author model by Jackson/Wolinsky (1996) is used as an example. The co-author model formulates a tension between stability and efficiency when actors are m…
Exploiting opportunities at all cost? Entrepreneurial intent and externalities
Why Suggest Non-Binding Retail Prices: Why Suggest Non-Binding Retail Prices
We provide a simple behavioural explanation of why manufacturers frequently announce non-binding suggested retail prices for their products. Our model is based on the assumption that once the actual price for a product exceeds its suggested retail price, the marginal propensity to consume suddenly jumps downward. We show that this may induce a monopolistic retailer to set the price equal to the suggested retail price in equilibrium, although the …
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation
The fact that, according to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold‐up problem, which occurs if non‐verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade t…
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the usual result, the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility l…
Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Applications
To Reveal or Not to Reveal: Know-How Disclosure and Joint Ventures in Procurement Auctions
Firm's incentives to form joint ventures are analyzed in an incomplete-information framework when technological know-how is private information. Firms first decide on cooperation and then compete in a second-price procurement auction. Provided that firms indicate their willingness to cooperate by revealing a fraction of their know-how, it can be shown that noncooperation is always an equilibrium. If spillovers are sufficiently low, cooperation ca…
Exploiting opportunities at all cost? Entrepreneurial intent and externalities
The effect of pledges on the distribution of lying behavior: An online experiment
Manufacturer suggested retail prices, loss aversion and competition
Why Suggest Non-Binding Retail Prices: Why Suggest Non-Binding Retail Prices
We provide a simple behavioural explanation of why manufacturers frequently announce non-binding suggested retail prices for their products. Our model is based on the assumption that once the actual price for a product exceeds its suggested retail price, the marginal propensity to consume suddenly jumps downward. We show that this may induce a monopolistic retailer to set the price equal to the suggested retail price in equilibrium, although the …
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the usual result, the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility l…
Incentivized choice in large-scale voting experiments
Survey experiments that investigate how voting procedures affect voting behavior and election outcomes use hypothetical questions and non-representative samples. We present here the results of a novel survey experiment that addresses both concerns. First, the winning party in our experiment receives a donation to its campaign funds inducing real consequences for voting. Second, we run an online experiment with a Dutch national representative samp…
Information Acquisition and Exchange In Social Networks
n Contains fulltext :\n 179681.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)\n
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation
The fact that, according to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold‐up problem, which occurs if non‐verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade t…
To Reveal or Not to Reveal: Know-How Disclosure and Joint Ventures in Procurement Auctions
Firm's incentives to form joint ventures are analyzed in an incomplete-information framework when technological know-how is private information. Firms first decide on cooperation and then compete in a second-price procurement auction. Provided that firms indicate their willingness to cooperate by revealing a fraction of their know-how, it can be shown that noncooperation is always an equilibrium. If spillovers are sufficiently low, cooperation ca…
Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Applications
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation
The fact that, according to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold‐up problem, which occurs if non‐verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade t…
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the usual result, the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility l…
Why Suggest Non-Binding Retail Prices: Why Suggest Non-Binding Retail Prices
We provide a simple behavioural explanation of why manufacturers frequently announce non-binding suggested retail prices for their products. Our model is based on the assumption that once the actual price for a product exceeds its suggested retail price, the marginal propensity to consume suddenly jumps downward. We show that this may induce a monopolistic retailer to set the price equal to the suggested retail price in equilibrium, although the …
Exploiting opportunities at all cost? Entrepreneurial intent and externalities
How Farsightedness Affects Network Formation
We develop a theoretical model of network formation where actors are limitedly farsighted. In this way we extend current models with a new set of micro-foundations. Computer simulations are used to predict the stable network structures that are likely to emerge under the new assumptions. The co-author model by Jackson/Wolinsky (1996) is used as an example. The co-author model formulates a tension between stability and efficiency when actors are m…
Manufacturer suggested retail prices, loss aversion and competition
Information Acquisition and Exchange In Social Networks
n Contains fulltext :\n 179681.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)\n
The effect of pledges on the distribution of lying behavior: An online experiment
Incentivized choice in large-scale voting experiments
Survey experiments that investigate how voting procedures affect voting behavior and election outcomes use hypothetical questions and non-representative samples. We present here the results of a novel survey experiment that addresses both concerns. First, the winning party in our experiment receives a donation to its campaign funds inducing real consequences for voting. Second, we run an online experiment with a Dutch national representative samp…
Social nudges in policymaking: Information selection by civil servants under differing levels of complexity
Diverse information is key for informed and effective policymaking when addressing complex policy issues. Policymakers need to decide what information to process given their limited time and cognitive capacity. This paper presents an online vignette experiment in which 157 civil servants from a Dutch medium-sized municipality participated. We test how civil servants respond to the presence of a social nudge that stimulates more diverse informatio…
Economics (11 works) · Microeconomics (8 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Computer security (3 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (3 works) · Market economy (3 works)