Keith B Payne
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1003570 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Keith B Payne |
| PRENOMES | Keith B |
| SOBRENOME | Payne |
| ASSINATURA | PAYNE K B |
| AFILIAÇÕES | National Institute for Public Policy |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 62 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 60 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 62 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1980 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
A new strategic review for a new age
The pernicious effects of arms control misconceptions on extended deterrence and assurance
Deterring China in the Taiwan Strait
Notes1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 708.2 Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001)
Are Belligerent Reprisals against Civilians Legal
October 25 2021 Are Belligerent Reprisals against Civilians Legal? Christopher A. Ford, Christopher A. Ford Christopher A. Ford is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He served four years in President Donald Trump's administration, including three as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. The views expressed in both letters to the editors are those of the authors and do n…
The “Action-Reaction” Arms Race Narrative vs. Historical Realities
Resurgent expressions of an “action-reaction” arms race narrative and its corollary “inaction-inaction” narrative are the basis for frequent assertions that if the United States would only stop its nuclear programs, opponents would also stop building their nuclear force—and a “peace race” would ensue. In other words, U.S. efforts to maintain its deterrence capabilities are seen as sparking or accelerating the “arms race.” This argument has its ro…
On deterrence, defense and arm control
For five decades Professor Colin Gray’s scholarly writings contributed tremendously to our understanding of strategy and his wise counsel benefited U.S. security policies enormously. His intellectu
Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age
Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Relations
This book critically examines U.S. attempts to establish a nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union and offers new approaches to dealing with the changing strategic environment. Dr. Payne maintains that the most influential theories of nuclear deterrence--Assured Vulnerability and Flexible Targeting—are unrealistic, given Soviet foreign policy and attitudes toward nuclear war, and no longer adequately meet the requirements of U.S. national secu…
Soviet Strategic Thought
James Schlesinger’s lifelong creed of public service and the Schlesinger doctrine
In 1973, at the age of 44 and the height of the Cold War, James Schlesinger was confirmed as the 12th U.S. Secretary of Defense. While serving as Defense Secretary, Dr. Schlesinger implemented important nuclear policy developments designed to strengthen the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies. His 1974 adjustments to U.S. nuclear policy, known as the Schlesinger Doctrine or the Schlesinger Shift. The Schlesinger Doctrine advanced the ba…
Nuclear deterrence in a new age
For over two decades since the end of the Cold War, US nuclear policy has been based on a general belief that nuclear deterrence, and thus also nuclear weapons, are of rapidly declining value because international relations had moved toward a much more benign and enduring stage of history. Nuclear weapons supposedly had little or no remaining role to play in US security; the only real questions were how, and how quickly could the United States le…
Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict
Russian foreign military actions, defense initiatives, markedly expanded conventional and nuclear arms programs, internal repression, and egregious arms control non-compliance are elements of an increasingly assertive and threatening agenda. In this text, we call out and examine the apparent grand strategy underlying Russian policies, programs and behavior.This examination demonstrates that Russian grand strategy now includes a deeply-troubling m…
In Memoriam
Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance
This monograph, Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence, is the second in a series examining the U.S. goals of deterrence, extended deterrence and the assurance of allies, and how to think about the corresponding U.S. standards of adequacy for measuring “how much is enough?” It begins by examining the manifest character of the contemporary threat environment in which the United States m…
The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction
In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler’s territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain’s policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler’s basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similar…
Minimum Deterrence
Preface Executive Summary I. Introduction: Minimum Deterrence II. Minimum Deterrence and U.S. Policy III. Minimum Deterrence: Assumptions, Logic and Conclusions IV. Examining and Testing the Fundamental Assumptions and Logic of Minimum Deterrence V. Summary and Conclusion: How Does Minimum Deterrence Fare Against Available Evidence and What Alternative Guidelines May Be Better? Notes Appendix
Minimum Deterrence
Deterrence and Al-Qa'ida
A commonly held view is that nonstate actors cannot be deterred. A historical review of deterrence vis-à-vis nonstate actors, however, shows that deterrence can be applied successfully to terrorist groups for some purposes and at some times. An examination of the sensitivities, vulnerabilities, and other characteristics of the core al-Qa'ida group suggests a combination of denial and punitive deterrent measures could be used to discourage this no…
How Much Is Enough
Analyses of U.S. strategic force requirements frequently are based on assertions about the requirements for deterrence. A politically attractive position is that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons reliably meets U.S. strategic nuclear requirements. This position, however, is flawed for two reasons: first, the number/types of nuclear weapons required for deterrence cannot be identified with precision because requirements shift dramatical…
The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report and a Brief Assessment of Developments in U.S. Strategic Policy
The bipartisan Congressional Strategy Posture Commission offered numerous recommendations to reduce what it labeled “the nuclear danger.” The Obama Administration has pursued some of these recommendations via its policy documents, such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, its budgets, and plans. There is reason, however, for several concerns in this regard. These involve the high priority placed on nuclear force reductions at the potential expense…
Understanding Deterrence
During the Cold War, academic theorists and senior U.S. policy makers planned strategies of nuclear deterrence according to a particularly narrow application of the rational actor model. Their assumptions were that the Soviet leadership would make decisions pertinent to deterrence per an instrumental rationality, and that the parameters of that rational decision making would be bounded by a familiar and largely Western worldview with regard to pe…
Documentation
Future of Deterrence
Many commentators who publicly calculate “how much is enough” in terms of the U.S. strategic capabilities necessary to support national goals continue to adhere to the Cold War formula that was known as “assured destruction.” That formula, however, is inadequate at best and likely misleading in the post–Cold War era. It bases such calculations on a simplistic numbers game based on weapons and targets and generally is unrelated to the goals that U…
Missile Defense and National Security
The key missile defense questions facing policymakers today are what kind of systems should be fielded and to what extent should investments be made in future missile defense technologies. In recent years, some have argued that more investments are needed to counter theater-range missile threats, even if such investments come at the expense of developing future capabilities. On the surface, this approach seems reasonable given the sizable increas…
Duty to deter
Victory Is Possible
Post-cold war deterrence and missile defense
The nuclear posture review
A former Bush administration Pentagon official clears the air about the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which set in motion far‐reaching changes designed to align U.S. strategic policy with the different realities and threats of the contemporary security environment
The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction
In most Cold War-style analyses of deterrence, leaders are assumed to be rational and willing to engage in cost-benefit calculations when making policy decisions. Yet, the assumption of rationality tends to obscure various factors that may be unique to the context and challenger, including idiosyncratic leadership beliefs that can be decisive in determining whether deterrence threats “work.” This article outlines a methodology for tailoring deter…
Alternative grand strategy options for the United States
The cold war grand strategy of the United States—containment—became outmoded with the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. This article is a description and review of three U.S. post‐cold war grand strategy options, as articulated by different prominent members of the U.S. defense and foreign policy community. The three options—noninterventionism, unipolarism, and multilateralism—capture virtually all of the various pro…
Deterrence and U.S. strategic force requirements after the cold war
The demise of the Soviet Union and the planned reduction of strategic offensive forces have led many to conclude that maintaining an effective policy of deterrence will be less burdensome in the future. That may be correct financially—in the sense that the U.S. strategic offensive nuclear force structure necessary to support deterrence probably will not need to be as robust in the future as it is now. Creation of an effective policy of deterrence…
The case for national missile defense
Post‐cold war requirements for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy
This article addresses post‐Cold War requirements for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, including requirements for both major‐power deterrence and regional deterrence. The report first examines the background and context for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, as it developed during the U.S.‐Soviet competition from 1945 through 1991. It then examines the new context for deterrence and stresses the multiple audiences and circumstances to which the Unite…
Strategic Defense
Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition
Are Belligerent Reprisals against Civilians Legal
October 25 2021 Are Belligerent Reprisals against Civilians Legal? Christopher A. Ford, Christopher A. Ford Christopher A. Ford is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He served four years in President Donald Trump's administration, including three as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. The views expressed in both letters to the editors are those of the authors and do n…
The “Action-Reaction” Arms Race Narrative vs. Historical Realities
Resurgent expressions of an “action-reaction” arms race narrative and its corollary “inaction-inaction” narrative are the basis for frequent assertions that if the United States would only stop its nuclear programs, opponents would also stop building their nuclear force—and a “peace race” would ensue. In other words, U.S. efforts to maintain its deterrence capabilities are seen as sparking or accelerating the “arms race.” This argument has its ro…
Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict
Russian foreign military actions, defense initiatives, markedly expanded conventional and nuclear arms programs, internal repression, and egregious arms control non-compliance are elements of an increasingly assertive and threatening agenda. In this text, we call out and examine the apparent grand strategy underlying Russian policies, programs and behavior.This examination demonstrates that Russian grand strategy now includes a deeply-troubling m…
Understanding Deterrence
During the Cold War, academic theorists and senior U.S. policy makers planned strategies of nuclear deterrence according to a particularly narrow application of the rational actor model. Their assumptions were that the Soviet leadership would make decisions pertinent to deterrence per an instrumental rationality, and that the parameters of that rational decision making would be bounded by a familiar and largely Western worldview with regard to pe…
Forum
In the June–July 2009 issue of Survival, Scott D. Sagan argued the current case for the United States to adopt a declaratory policy of no nuclear first use. Survival invited four experts from Europe, Asia and North America to comment on Sagan's argument. The author concludes the debate with his own final thoughts. Notes 1 See Morton H. Halperin, ‘A Proposal for a Ban on the Use of Nuclear Weapons’, 6 October 1961, at http://www.armscontrolwonk.co…
A Matter of Record
Bush administration strategic policy
In summary, Professor Freedman's discussion of the linkage between norms and deterrence contributes nicely to the ongoing discussion of how deterrence, in theory and practice, may best be updated for the twenty-first century. Unfortunately, despite the ready availability of detailed and unclassified descriptions, his exegesis of the new directions in US strategic policy and thought is deeply flawed, as, consequently, must be his critique of the s…
Action‐reaction metaphysics and negligence
During the missile defense debate of the late 1960s, the inadequacy of a simplistic action‐reaction arms race model was not blatantly obvious. Now it is. Numerous other factors typically drive decisions about the forces a country will, or will not, develop and deploy
Deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction
The identification of “how to deter” the use of WMD, in practice, is a question of how to deter an opposing leadership from extreme provocations under specific circumstances. The size and type of the U.S. threat, and how, when and to whom it should be communicated will be shaped by the context and the character of the opponent. The initial question of interest is whether an opponent can be subjected to deterrence pressure. In addition, a signific…
What if we “ride out” a soviet first strike
(1984). What if we “ride out” a soviet first strike? The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 85-92
Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Relations
Victory Is Possible
Are they interested in stability? The Soviet view of intervention
The Soviet view of intervention is reflected both in Soviet literature and actual foreign policy. An adequate assessment of the Soviet view of intervention and its role in international relations must examine both Soviet declaratory and action policies. Soviet discussion of intervention, when viewed with a clear understanding of Soviet ideological jargon, reflects a belief that Soviet acts of intervention are justified and even proper according t…
Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Relations
Arms Control
The Soviet Union has no discrete arms control goals, although it does have a variety of diplomatic and military objectives which can be pursued via arms control negotiations. In the Soviet Union, there is no organization comparable to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which is charged with advancing the cause of arms control. Instead, there appears to be only a military bureaucracy and a foreign policy apparatus, whose purposes are …
Nuclear Strategy
The real debate over nuclear weapons concerns the optimal method of ensuring deterrence, not the acceptability of nuclear war. Clearing the smoke from the substantive issues in dispute and identifying the common ground among differing positions will constitute a first step towards improving public education on nuclear strategy
Should the ABM treaty be revised
The so‐called “ABM debate” of 1969–1971 constituted the last time that the strategic issues surrounding ballistic missile defense (BMD) were addressed, at least in the West. The decision to limit BMD deployment through the SALT I ABM Treaty reflected in part a consensus within the American arms control community that American societal vulnerability to Soviet attack was inevitable, and that BMD for hardened point targets (such as ICBMs) was either…
What if we “ride out” a soviet first strike
(1984). What if we “ride out” a soviet first strike? The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 85-92
Strategic Defense
Laser Weapons in Space
Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition
The Deterrence Requirement for Defense
Strategic Defense
Christian nuclear pacifism and just war theory
Christian nuclear pacifists have become a powerful force in the political debate over nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy. These nuclear pacifists have argued that the use of nuclear weapons violates the principles of Christian Just War Theory. They advocate either that nuclear weapons can be possessed but never used or that such weapons must be renounced entirely. This article argues that changes in both technology and strategy on the part of t…
ICBMs, arms control, and the SDI
The general public's attitude toward nuclear weapons has over the course of four decades has turned extremely negative. This trend in public thinking about nuclear weapons is reflected in most opinion surveys. Coincidentally, during the 1980s American churches became actively “anti‐nuclear.” The Reagan Administration, well aware of the negative trend in public attitudes toward nuclear weapons, initiated two separate but complementary initiatives.…
SDI's critics and the emerging case for SDI Deployment
The moral case against the SDI, as developed in the 1983 and 1988 publications by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the 1986 publication of the United Methodist Bishops, is built on the secular politico‐strategic arguments against the SDI. These arguments involve negative judgments about SDI's technical feasibility, its likely cost, the Soviet response, and SDI's effect on deterrence stability and arms control negotiations. Each of …
Deterrence and U.S. strategic force requirements after the cold war
The demise of the Soviet Union and the planned reduction of strategic offensive forces have led many to conclude that maintaining an effective policy of deterrence will be less burdensome in the future. That may be correct financially—in the sense that the U.S. strategic offensive nuclear force structure necessary to support deterrence probably will not need to be as robust in the future as it is now. Creation of an effective policy of deterrence…
Proliferation, deterrence, stability and missile defense
Alternative grand strategy options for the United States
The cold war grand strategy of the United States—containment—became outmoded with the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. This article is a description and review of three U.S. post‐cold war grand strategy options, as articulated by different prominent members of the U.S. defense and foreign policy community. The three options—noninterventionism, unipolarism, and multilateralism—capture virtually all of the various pro…
Deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction
The identification of “how to deter” the use of WMD, in practice, is a question of how to deter an opposing leadership from extreme provocations under specific circumstances. The size and type of the U.S. threat, and how, when and to whom it should be communicated will be shaped by the context and the character of the opponent. The initial question of interest is whether an opponent can be subjected to deterrence pressure. In addition, a signific…
Post-cold war deterrence and missile defense
Summary and conclusion
Alternative futures by Keith Payne and Willis Stanley
(1997). Alternative futures by Keith Payne and Willis Stanley. Comparative Strategy: Vol. 16, “Cold peace” or cooperation? The potential for U.S.‐Russian accommodation on Missile defense and the ABM treaty, pp. 167-181
The character of the problem
(1997). The character of the problem. Comparative Strategy: Vol. 16, “Cold peace” or cooperation? The potential for U.S.‐Russian accommodation on Missile defense and the ABM treaty, pp. 127-132
Missile proliferation
(1997). Missile proliferation: Threat and U.S. response. Comparative Strategy: Vol. 16, “Cold peace” or cooperation? The potential for U.S.‐Russian accommodation on Missile defense and the ABM treaty, pp. 133-155
Post‐cold war requirements for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy
This article addresses post‐Cold War requirements for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, including requirements for both major‐power deterrence and regional deterrence. The report first examines the background and context for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, as it developed during the U.S.‐Soviet competition from 1945 through 1991. It then examines the new context for deterrence and stresses the multiple audiences and circumstances to which the Unite…
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