Jamin Asay
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1004290 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jamin Asay |
| PRENOMES | Jamin |
| SOBRENOME | Asay |
| ASSINATURA | ASAY J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Hong Kong |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1972-0035 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 18 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 23 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2009 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Experimenting with Truth
The metaphysics of conceptual engineering
This paper argues that the movement known as conceptual engineering cannot constitute a substantial methodological program for philosophy. The thought that conceptual engineering could be a revolutionary and/or revisionary method for philosophy rests on inaccurate understanding of the role that concepts play in philosophy. After showing how philosophy is ultimately interested in various phenomena, not the concepts capturing them, I argue that the…
Arne Næss’s experiments in truth
Irreplaceable truth
Deflationism, truth, and desire
Deflationists about truth generally regard the contribution that “true” makes to utterances to be purely logical or expressive: it exists to facilitate communication, and remedy our expressive deficiencies that are due to ignorance or finitude. This paper presents a challenge to that view by considering alethic desires. Alethic desires are desires for one's beliefs to be true. Such desires, I argue, do not admit of any deflationarily acceptable a…
The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth
Truth
Something is true
The thesis that nothing is true has long been thought to be a self‐refuting position not worthy of serious philosophical consideration. Recently, however, the thesis of alethic nihilism —that nothing is true—has been explicitly defended (notably by David Liggins). Nihilism is also, I argue, a consequence of other views about truth that have recently been advocated, such as fictionalism about truth and the inconsistency account. After offering an …
A Theory of Truthmaking
The theory of truthmaking has long aroused skepticism from philosophers who believe it to be tangled up in contentious ontological commitments and unnecessary theoretical baggage. In this book, Jamin Asay shows why that suspicion is unfounded. Challenging the current orthodoxy that truthmaking's fundamental purpose is to be a tool for explaining why truths are true, Asay revives the conception of truthmaking as fundamentally an exercise in ontolo…
Going local
Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking
In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflat…
The role of truth in psychological science
In their 2012 article, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies th…
Putting Pluralism in its Place
Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist…
Run Aground
Kit Fine, the leading proponent of the metaphysical project of grounding theory, has offered a number of potentially devastating objections to truthmaker theory, the branch of metaphysics dedicated to exploring the ontological grounds for truths. In this paper I show what presuppositions about truthmaker theory Fine’s objections are based upon, and why they are false. I discuss four objections that Fine raises, and demonstrate how truthmaker theo…
Epistemicism and the liar
A modest defense of manifestationalism
Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism
Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth
Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive …
Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism
Putting Pluralism in its Place
Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist…
Truth
Going local
Epistemicism and the liar
Something is true
The thesis that nothing is true has long been thought to be a self‐refuting position not worthy of serious philosophical consideration. Recently, however, the thesis of alethic nihilism —that nothing is true—has been explicitly defended (notably by David Liggins). Nihilism is also, I argue, a consequence of other views about truth that have recently been advocated, such as fictionalism about truth and the inconsistency account. After offering an …
Run Aground
Kit Fine, the leading proponent of the metaphysical project of grounding theory, has offered a number of potentially devastating objections to truthmaker theory, the branch of metaphysics dedicated to exploring the ontological grounds for truths. In this paper I show what presuppositions about truthmaker theory Fine’s objections are based upon, and why they are false. I discuss four objections that Fine raises, and demonstrate how truthmaker theo…
Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth
Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive …
Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism
Epistemicism and the liar
A modest defense of manifestationalism
Putting Pluralism in its Place
Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist…
Run Aground
Kit Fine, the leading proponent of the metaphysical project of grounding theory, has offered a number of potentially devastating objections to truthmaker theory, the branch of metaphysics dedicated to exploring the ontological grounds for truths. In this paper I show what presuppositions about truthmaker theory Fine’s objections are based upon, and why they are false. I discuss four objections that Fine raises, and demonstrate how truthmaker theo…
The role of truth in psychological science
In their 2012 article, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies th…
Going local
Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking
In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflat…
A Theory of Truthmaking
The theory of truthmaking has long aroused skepticism from philosophers who believe it to be tangled up in contentious ontological commitments and unnecessary theoretical baggage. In this book, Jamin Asay shows why that suspicion is unfounded. Challenging the current orthodoxy that truthmaking's fundamental purpose is to be a tool for explaining why truths are true, Asay revives the conception of truthmaking as fundamentally an exercise in ontolo…
Truth
Something is true
The thesis that nothing is true has long been thought to be a self‐refuting position not worthy of serious philosophical consideration. Recently, however, the thesis of alethic nihilism —that nothing is true—has been explicitly defended (notably by David Liggins). Nihilism is also, I argue, a consequence of other views about truth that have recently been advocated, such as fictionalism about truth and the inconsistency account. After offering an …
Deflationism, truth, and desire
Deflationists about truth generally regard the contribution that “true” makes to utterances to be purely logical or expressive: it exists to facilitate communication, and remedy our expressive deficiencies that are due to ignorance or finitude. This paper presents a challenge to that view by considering alethic desires. Alethic desires are desires for one's beliefs to be true. Such desires, I argue, do not admit of any deflationarily acceptable a…
The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth
Arne Næss’s experiments in truth
Irreplaceable truth
Experimenting with Truth
The metaphysics of conceptual engineering
This paper argues that the movement known as conceptual engineering cannot constitute a substantial methodological program for philosophy. The thought that conceptual engineering could be a revolutionary and/or revisionary method for philosophy rests on inaccurate understanding of the role that concepts play in philosophy. After showing how philosophy is ultimately interested in various phenomena, not the concepts capturing them, I argue that the…
Epistemology (17 obras) · Philosophy (16 obras) · Metaphysics (12 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 obras) · Philosophy of language (7 obras) · Philosophy of science (7 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras)