Martin Montminy
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1021056 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Martin Montminy |
| PRENOMES | Martin |
| SOBRENOME | Montminy |
| ASSINATURA | MONTMINY M |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Oklahoma |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7250-262X |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 19 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1992 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Resultant Luck and Responsibility for Character
A puzzle about excuses
An excuse is an event or condition that exonerates an agent for a wrongdoing. An excuse may be an event or condition that interferes with the exercises of a person’s rational capacities, thereby preventing them from doing the right thing. I argue that a person who fails to do the right thing always has an excuse for their failure. This puzzle has troubling consequences, for it means that we are never to blame for our wrongdoings
Harm, relevant alternatives and norms
I present cases where the same act appears to be both harmful and beneficial, raising doubt about a common assumption concerning harm. Given the possibility of such cases, to assess whether an act is harmful, we should compare it not with a single alternative act, but with a range of relevant alternative acts. Relevance, I argue, depends in part on norms. I show how my account solves a number of problems faced by standard counterfactual accounts.…
Haters and egoists
I argue that a capacity‐based account of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness is superior to an account based on quality of will. I focus on four types of cases about which the two accounts disagree and show that the capacity‐based view offers a better treatment. As part of my argument, I motivate the distinction between an assessment of a person's moral character, as reflected by her action, and an assessment of her blameworthiness or praisewort…
It was not supposed to happen like that
Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action A freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing A. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a pers…
Soft Libertarianism and the Value of Incompatibilist Control
Omissions and Their Effects
According to what I call the identity view , omissions are actual events. For example, the nominal ‘Ali's non-jogging’ denotes whatever Ali is doing at the time she is said not to be jogging. Some have objected that omissions (and more generally absences) cannot be events, since the two do not have the same causal relations. I show how advocates of the identity view can offer a pragmatic account of the data the objection relies on
The role of context in contextualism
Two contextualist fallacies
Context and communication
Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction
Holisme, référence et irréductibilité du mental
I examine in detail the argument vaguely suggested by Davidson to the effect that holism entails the irreducibility of the mental. I defend this argument against two objections often made against arguments that attempt to derive metaphysical theses from premises that concern our ordinary criteria for applying terms. I appeal to two-dimensional semantics to explain the links between these criteria and issues about reference and reduction. I show h…
Triangulation, Objectivity and the Ambiguity Problem
Davidson claims that a creature that has spent its entire life in isolation cannot have thoughts. His two reasons for this claim are that (i) interaction with another creature (what he calls "triangulation") is required to locate the cause of the creature's responses, and that (ii) linguistic communication is necessary to acquire the concept of objective truth, which is itself required in order to have thoughts. I argue that, at best, these two r…
Réponse à Delpla
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Posséder un concept selon Peacocke
Christopher Peacocke defends a sophisticated version of Conceptual Role Theory. For him, the nature of a concept is completely determined by an account of what it is to possess that concept. The possession conditions he puts forward rest on the notion of primitively compelling transitions or, more recently, on the idea of implicit conceptions. I show that his account is circular and appeals to a dubious distinction between constitutive transition…
Sémantique et vérité. De Tarski à DavidsonFrançois Rivenc Collection «Philosophies» Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, 128 p
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Les conditions de l'interprétation
Donald Davidson considère qu'une théorie de l'interprétation doit être radicale , c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne doit présupposer aucune connaissance de la langue à interpréter. Cette exigence repose sur l'idée suivante: si une théorie de l'interprétation pour une langue L présuppose une certaine compréhension de L, alors elle perd son pouvoir explicatif et échoue à rendre compte de ce qui permet la compréhension de L. L'interpr'tation radicale a l'avan…
Indétermination de la traduction et sous-détermination des théories scientifiques
La thèse de l'indétermination de la traduction de W. V. O. Quine est certainement une des thèses les plus controversées de la philosophie du langage. Le présent article explique en quoi consiste cette thèse et examine les liens qu'elle entretient avec la thèse de la sous-détermination des théories scientifiques. La première section montre comment la thèse de l'indétermination de la traduction découle de la conception behavioriste du langage de Qu…
Indétermination de la traduction et sous-détermination des théories scientifiques
La thèse de l'indétermination de la traduction de W. V. O. Quine est certainement une des thèses les plus controversées de la philosophie du langage. Le présent article explique en quoi consiste cette thèse et examine les liens qu'elle entretient avec la thèse de la sous-détermination des théories scientifiques. La première section montre comment la thèse de l'indétermination de la traduction découle de la conception behavioriste du langage de Qu…
Les conditions de l'interprétation
Donald Davidson considère qu'une théorie de l'interprétation doit être radicale , c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne doit présupposer aucune connaissance de la langue à interpréter. Cette exigence repose sur l'idée suivante: si une théorie de l'interprétation pour une langue L présuppose une certaine compréhension de L, alors elle perd son pouvoir explicatif et échoue à rendre compte de ce qui permet la compréhension de L. L'interpr'tation radicale a l'avan…
Sémantique et vérité. De Tarski à DavidsonFrançois Rivenc Collection «Philosophies» Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, 128 p
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Posséder un concept selon Peacocke
Christopher Peacocke defends a sophisticated version of Conceptual Role Theory. For him, the nature of a concept is completely determined by an account of what it is to possess that concept. The possession conditions he puts forward rest on the notion of primitively compelling transitions or, more recently, on the idea of implicit conceptions. I show that his account is circular and appeals to a dubious distinction between constitutive transition…
Triangulation, Objectivity and the Ambiguity Problem
Davidson claims that a creature that has spent its entire life in isolation cannot have thoughts. His two reasons for this claim are that (i) interaction with another creature (what he calls "triangulation") is required to locate the cause of the creature's responses, and that (ii) linguistic communication is necessary to acquire the concept of objective truth, which is itself required in order to have thoughts. I argue that, at best, these two r…
Réponse à Delpla
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Holisme, référence et irréductibilité du mental
I examine in detail the argument vaguely suggested by Davidson to the effect that holism entails the irreducibility of the mental. I defend this argument against two objections often made against arguments that attempt to derive metaphysical theses from premises that concern our ordinary criteria for applying terms. I appeal to two-dimensional semantics to explain the links between these criteria and issues about reference and reduction. I show h…
Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction
Two contextualist fallacies
Context and communication
The role of context in contextualism
Omissions and Their Effects
According to what I call the identity view , omissions are actual events. For example, the nominal ‘Ali's non-jogging’ denotes whatever Ali is doing at the time she is said not to be jogging. Some have objected that omissions (and more generally absences) cannot be events, since the two do not have the same causal relations. I show how advocates of the identity view can offer a pragmatic account of the data the objection relies on
Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action A freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing A. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a pers…
Soft Libertarianism and the Value of Incompatibilist Control
Haters and egoists
I argue that a capacity‐based account of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness is superior to an account based on quality of will. I focus on four types of cases about which the two accounts disagree and show that the capacity‐based view offers a better treatment. As part of my argument, I motivate the distinction between an assessment of a person's moral character, as reflected by her action, and an assessment of her blameworthiness or praisewort…
It was not supposed to happen like that
A puzzle about excuses
An excuse is an event or condition that exonerates an agent for a wrongdoing. An excuse may be an event or condition that interferes with the exercises of a person’s rational capacities, thereby preventing them from doing the right thing. I argue that a person who fails to do the right thing always has an excuse for their failure. This puzzle has troubling consequences, for it means that we are never to blame for our wrongdoings
Harm, relevant alternatives and norms
I present cases where the same act appears to be both harmful and beneficial, raising doubt about a common assumption concerning harm. Given the possibility of such cases, to assess whether an act is harmful, we should compare it not with a single alternative act, but with a range of relevant alternative acts. Relevance, I argue, depends in part on norms. I show how my account solves a number of problems faced by standard counterfactual accounts.…
Resultant Luck and Responsibility for Character
Philosophy (15 obras) · Epistemology (12 obras) · Psychology (9 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Mathematics (7 obras) · Free Will and Agency (6 obras) · Linguistics (5 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 obras)