Finnur Dellsén
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1025955 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Finnur Dellsén |
| PRENOMES | Finnur |
| SOBRENOME | Dellsén |
| ASSINATURA | DELLSÉN F |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Iceland |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4989-4204 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 29 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 87 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 29 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2016 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Medical Progress
In recent years, notable figures within the medical community have expressed concerns about the rate of medical progress, suggesting that the rapid advances of medicine’s ‘golden age’ are now giving way to an ‘age of disappointment’. While these pessimistic pronouncements about medical progress must–implicitly if not explicitly–appeal to some criteria for what medical progress would be, the task of explicitly defining medical progress has been no…
The Centrality of Progressive Realism to the Scientific Realism Debate
We report new findings from an empirical study of scientists from seven disciplines and scholars working in history and philosophy of science regarding their views about scientific realism. We found that researchers’ general disposition to endorse or reject realism was better predicted by their views regarding scientific progress than their views about the mind-independence of scientific phenomena or other common theses in the realism debate. Age…
Dejustifying Scientific Progress
Stegenga (forthcoming) formulates and defends a novel account of scientific progress, according to which science makes progress just in case there is a change in scientific justification. Here, we present several problems for Stegenga’s account, concerning, respectively, (i) obtaining misleading evidence, (ii) losses or destruction of evidence, (iii) oscillations in scientific justification, and (iv) the possibility of scientific regress. We conc…
Inferring to the Best Explanation from Uncertain Evidence
This paper presents a new problem for the inference rule commonly known as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). The problem is that uncertainty about parts of one’s evidence may undermine the inferrability of a hypothesis that would provide the best explanation of that evidence, especially in cases where there is an alternative hypothesis that would provide a better explanation of only the more certain pieces of evidence. A potential solution…
Promoting scientific progress
In the philosophical debate about scientific progress, several authors appeal to a distinction between what constitutes scientific progress and what promotes it (e.g., Bird, 2008; Rowbottom, 2008; Dellsén, 2016). However, the extant literature is almost completely silent on what exactly it is for scientific progress to be promoted. Here I provide a precise account of progress promotion on which it consists, roughly, in increasing expected progres…
Inclusive inquiry
What is the point of inquiry? Some say that the aim of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer; others, that the aim is to attain justified belief, epistemic improvement, or some other coveted epistemic status. Still others eschew “aim” talk altogether, and instead formulate norms governing inquiry. However, virtually all extant work on inquiry has agreed on at least this much: the aims or norms of inquiry can be specified in t…
Consensus versus Unanimity
Around 97% of climate scientists endorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory that human activities are partly responsible for recent increases in global average temperatures. Clearly, this widespread endorsement of AGW is a reason for non-experts to believe in AGW. But what is the epistemic significance of the fact that some climate scientists do not endorse AGW? This paper contrasts expert unanimity, in which virtually no expert disag…
Probabilifying reflective equilibrium
This paper aims to flesh out the celebrated notion of reflective equilibrium within a probabilistic framework for epistemic rationality. On the account developed here, an agent’s attitudes are in reflective equilibrium when there is a certain sort of harmony between the agent’s credences , on the one hand, and what the agent accepts , on the other hand. Somewhat more precisely, reflective equilibrium is taken to consist in the agent accepting, or…
What is philosophical progress
What is it for philosophy to make progress? While various putative forms of philosophical progress have been explored in some depth, this overarching question is rarely addressed explicitly, perhaps because it has been assumed to be intractable or unlikely to have a single, unified answer. In this paper, we aim to show that the question is tractable, that it does admit of a single, unified answer, and that one such answer is plausible. This answe…
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress
In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the “hard sciences”). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically and consider the general question: How (if at all…
Scientific progress
When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements t…
Thinking about Progress
Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This …
Excessive testimony
This paper identifies two distinct dimensions of what might be called testimonial strength : first, in the case of testimony from more than one speaker, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that a greater proportion of the speakers give identical testimony; second, in both single‐speaker and multi‐speaker testimony, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that each speaker expresses greater conviction in the relevant prop…
Rational understanding
Understanding scientific progress
What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted). Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a scientific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect to X . The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific resul…
Disagreement in science
Scientific Realism in the Wild
We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in seven scientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothesized dimensions of scientific realism. Among other things, we found (i) that natural scientists tended to express more strongly realist views than social scientists, (ii) that history and philosophy of science scholars tended to express more antirealist views than na…
Explanatory Consolidation
In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven’t thought of? Wouldn’t that undermine our warrant for believing the best available explanation? Many philosophers have assumed that we can solve such underconsideration problems by s…
Beyond Explanation
This article presents and argues for an account of objectual understanding that aims to do justice to the full range of cases of scientific understanding, including cases in which one does not have an explanation of the understood phenomenon. According to the proposed account, one understands a phenomenon just in case one grasps a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model of the ways in which it or its features are situated within a network o…
Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement
We report the results of an exploratory study that examines the judgments of climate scientists, climate policy experts, astrophysicists, and non-experts (N = 3367) about the factors that contribute to the creation and persistence of disagreement within climate science and astrophysics and about how one should respond to expert disagreement. We found that, as compared to non-experts, climate experts believe that within climate science (i) there i…
Should scientific realists embrace theoretical conservatism
Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance
The epistemic value of expert autonomy
According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn’t rely epistemically on other people's say‐so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis o…
Scientific progress
Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories "get closer to the truth," i.e., increase their degree of trut…
Realism and the absence of rivals
Scientific progress
Scientific progress
Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories "get closer to the truth," i.e., increase their degree of trut…
Beyond Explanation
This article presents and argues for an account of objectual understanding that aims to do justice to the full range of cases of scientific understanding, including cases in which one does not have an explanation of the understood phenomenon. According to the proposed account, one understands a phenomenon just in case one grasps a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model of the ways in which it or its features are situated within a network o…
Scientific Realism in the Wild
We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in seven scientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothesized dimensions of scientific realism. Among other things, we found (i) that natural scientists tended to express more strongly realist views than social scientists, (ii) that history and philosophy of science scholars tended to express more antirealist views than na…
Should scientific realists embrace theoretical conservatism
Understanding scientific progress
What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted). Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a scientific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect to X . The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific resul…
The epistemic value of expert autonomy
According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn’t rely epistemically on other people's say‐so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis o…
Rational understanding
Realism and the absence of rivals
Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance
Consensus versus Unanimity
Around 97% of climate scientists endorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory that human activities are partly responsible for recent increases in global average temperatures. Clearly, this widespread endorsement of AGW is a reason for non-experts to believe in AGW. But what is the epistemic significance of the fact that some climate scientists do not endorse AGW? This paper contrasts expert unanimity, in which virtually no expert disag…
Scientific progress
When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements t…
Reactionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection
Dejustifying Scientific Progress
Stegenga (forthcoming) formulates and defends a novel account of scientific progress, according to which science makes progress just in case there is a change in scientific justification. Here, we present several problems for Stegenga’s account, concerning, respectively, (i) obtaining misleading evidence, (ii) losses or destruction of evidence, (iii) oscillations in scientific justification, and (iv) the possibility of scientific regress. We conc…
Disagreement in science
Explanatory Consolidation
In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven’t thought of? Wouldn’t that undermine our warrant for believing the best available explanation? Many philosophers have assumed that we can solve such underconsideration problems by s…
Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument
Although many aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation ( IBE ) have been extensively discussed, very little has so far been said about what it takes for a hypothesis to count as a rival explanatory hypothesis in the context of IBE . The primary aim of this article is to rectify this situation by arguing for a specific account of explanatory rivalry. On this account, explanatory rivals are (roughly speaking) complete explanations of a given ex…
Scientific progress
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
Suppose you and I are equally well informed on some factual issue and equally competent in forming beliefs on the basis of the information we possess. Having evaluated this information, each of us independently forms a belief on the issue. However, since neither of us is infallible, we may end up with contrary beliefs. How should I react if I discover that we disagree in this way? According to conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreemen…
Realism and the absence of rivals
Reactionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection
Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance
The epistemic value of expert autonomy
According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn’t rely epistemically on other people's say‐so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis o…
Scientific progress
Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories "get closer to the truth," i.e., increase their degree of trut…
Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement
We report the results of an exploratory study that examines the judgments of climate scientists, climate policy experts, astrophysicists, and non-experts (N = 3367) about the factors that contribute to the creation and persistence of disagreement within climate science and astrophysics and about how one should respond to expert disagreement. We found that, as compared to non-experts, climate experts believe that within climate science (i) there i…
Should scientific realists embrace theoretical conservatism
Scientific Realism in the Wild
We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in seven scientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothesized dimensions of scientific realism. Among other things, we found (i) that natural scientists tended to express more strongly realist views than social scientists, (ii) that history and philosophy of science scholars tended to express more antirealist views than na…
Explanatory Consolidation
In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven’t thought of? Wouldn’t that undermine our warrant for believing the best available explanation? Many philosophers have assumed that we can solve such underconsideration problems by s…
Beyond Explanation
This article presents and argues for an account of objectual understanding that aims to do justice to the full range of cases of scientific understanding, including cases in which one does not have an explanation of the understood phenomenon. According to the proposed account, one understands a phenomenon just in case one grasps a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model of the ways in which it or its features are situated within a network o…
Rational understanding
Understanding scientific progress
What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted). Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a scientific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect to X . The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific resul…
Disagreement in science
Thinking about Progress
Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This …
Excessive testimony
This paper identifies two distinct dimensions of what might be called testimonial strength : first, in the case of testimony from more than one speaker, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that a greater proportion of the speakers give identical testimony; second, in both single‐speaker and multi‐speaker testimony, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that each speaker expresses greater conviction in the relevant prop…
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress
In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the “hard sciences”). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically and consider the general question: How (if at all…
Scientific progress
When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements t…
Probabilifying reflective equilibrium
This paper aims to flesh out the celebrated notion of reflective equilibrium within a probabilistic framework for epistemic rationality. On the account developed here, an agent’s attitudes are in reflective equilibrium when there is a certain sort of harmony between the agent’s credences , on the one hand, and what the agent accepts , on the other hand. Somewhat more precisely, reflective equilibrium is taken to consist in the agent accepting, or…
What is philosophical progress
What is it for philosophy to make progress? While various putative forms of philosophical progress have been explored in some depth, this overarching question is rarely addressed explicitly, perhaps because it has been assumed to be intractable or unlikely to have a single, unified answer. In this paper, we aim to show that the question is tractable, that it does admit of a single, unified answer, and that one such answer is plausible. This answe…
The Centrality of Progressive Realism to the Scientific Realism Debate
We report new findings from an empirical study of scientists from seven disciplines and scholars working in history and philosophy of science regarding their views about scientific realism. We found that researchers’ general disposition to endorse or reject realism was better predicted by their views regarding scientific progress than their views about the mind-independence of scientific phenomena or other common theses in the realism debate. Age…
Dejustifying Scientific Progress
Stegenga (forthcoming) formulates and defends a novel account of scientific progress, according to which science makes progress just in case there is a change in scientific justification. Here, we present several problems for Stegenga’s account, concerning, respectively, (i) obtaining misleading evidence, (ii) losses or destruction of evidence, (iii) oscillations in scientific justification, and (iv) the possibility of scientific regress. We conc…
Inferring to the Best Explanation from Uncertain Evidence
This paper presents a new problem for the inference rule commonly known as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). The problem is that uncertainty about parts of one’s evidence may undermine the inferrability of a hypothesis that would provide the best explanation of that evidence, especially in cases where there is an alternative hypothesis that would provide a better explanation of only the more certain pieces of evidence. A potential solution…
Philosophy (27 obras) · Epistemology (26 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (24 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (19 obras) · Philosophy of science (13 obras) · Philosophy (10 obras) · Computer Science (9 obras) · Political science (8 obras) · Economics (7 obras) · Law (7 obras)