Daniel Stoljar
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1029660 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Daniel Stoljar |
| PRENOMES | Daniel |
| SOBRENOME | Stoljar |
| ASSINATURA | STOLJAR D |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Australian National University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4506-3614 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 26 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1999 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Philosophical Embarrassment
Philosophers are often embarrassed by philosophy, or at least write as if they are. But what should we make of this connection between philosophy and embarrassment? Taking a cue from sociologist Erving Goffman, this paper treats embarrassment in general as revealing of social phenomena and then considers the case of philosophical embarrassment from that point of view. As we will see, this allows us to formulate and explore several hypotheses abou…
Why ChatGPT doesn’t think
Can AI systems such as ChatGPT think? We present an argument from rationality for the negative answer to this question. The argument is founded on two central ideas. The first is that if ChatGPT thinks, it is not rational, in the sense that it does not respond correctly to its evidence. The second idea, which appears in several different forms in philosophical literature, is that thinkers are by their nature rational. Putting the two ideas togeth…
Two notions of resemblance and the semantics of ‘what it's like’
According to the resemblance account of ‘what it's like’ and similar constructions, a sentence such as ‘there is something it's like to have a toothache’ means ‘there is something having a toothache resembles’. This account has proved controversial in the literature; some writers endorse it, many reject it. We show that this conflict is illusory. Drawing on the semantics of intensional transitive verbs, we show that there are two versions of the …
Universities from an epistemological point of view
What is the nature and social function of universities? In this article I consider the well-known Humboldtian answer to this question, with a view not just to its inherent plausibility but to how it has changed over time. I pay particular attention to how different versions of the Humboldtian answer make different epistemological assumptions and conclude with a suggestion about how best to develop that answer in the future
What is Consciousness?
What is consciousness and why is it so philosophically and scientifically puzzling? For many years philosophers approached this question assuming a standard physicalist framework on which consciousness can be explained by contemporary physics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. This book is a debate between two philosophers who are united in their rejection of this kind of "standard" physicalism - but who differ sharply in what lesson …
Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness
Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs
There is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness—for instance, hallucinations—there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency—which we call the presentation problem—by (a) arguing that ‘conscious of’ and related expressions function as intensional tran…
Philosophy as Synchronic History
Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of cau…
Reflections on Mirror Man
Vendler’s puzzle about imagination
Chalmers v Chalmers
This paper brings out an inconsistency between David Chalmers's dualism, which is the main element of his philosophy of mind, and his structuralism, which is the main element of his epistemology. The point is ad hominem , but the inconsistency if it can be established is of considerable independent interest. For the best response to the inconsistency, I argue, is to adopt what Chalmers calls ‘type‐C Materialism’, a version of materialism that has…
Blockheads!
New essays on the philosophy of Ned Block, with substantive and wide-ranging responses by Block. Perhaps more than any other philosopher of mind, Ned Block synthesizes philosophical and scientific approaches to the mind; he is unique in moving back and forth across this divide, doing so with creativity and intensity. Over the course of his career, Block has made groundbreaking contributions to our understanding of intelligence, representation, an…
In Praise of Poise
Philosophical Progress
Can there be progress in philosophy? On the one hand, it is often thought that problems in philosophy, in contrast to those in science, are perennials for which it is pointless to expect a solution. On the other hand, professional philosophy seems to have organized itself, perhaps unconsciously, around the opposite view: how else to explain the panoply of books, papers, journals, conferences, graduate programmes, websites, etc.? Who is right? And…
Causation
Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives
Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts
Physicalism
Response to Alter and Bennett
Précis of Ignorance and Imagination
Ignorance and Imagination
This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, it is argued, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about i…
Ignorance and imagination
Is there a Lockean argument against expressivism?
It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. 1 Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1998; see also
Physicalism and Its Discontents
Book Review| July 01 2003 Physicalism and Its Discontents Carl Gillet and Barry Loewer, editors, Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge University Press, 2001 Pp. 369, xi. Daniel Stoljar Daniel Stoljar Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 422–424. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-3-422 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Cita…
Two Conceptions of the Physical
The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory‐based conception , it is plausible that (2) is…
The Ontology of Mind
Two Conceptions of the Physical
The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory‐based conception , it is plausible that (2) is…
Is there a Lockean argument against expressivism?
It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. 1 Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1998; see also
Physicalism and Its Discontents
Book Review| July 01 2003 Physicalism and Its Discontents Carl Gillet and Barry Loewer, editors, Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge University Press, 2001 Pp. 369, xi. Daniel Stoljar Daniel Stoljar Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 422–424. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-3-422 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Cita…
Ignorance and Imagination
This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, it is argued, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about i…
Ignorance and imagination
Response to Alter and Bennett
Précis of Ignorance and Imagination
Physicalism
Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts
Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives
Causation
Philosophical Progress
Can there be progress in philosophy? On the one hand, it is often thought that problems in philosophy, in contrast to those in science, are perennials for which it is pointless to expect a solution. On the other hand, professional philosophy seems to have organized itself, perhaps unconsciously, around the opposite view: how else to explain the panoply of books, papers, journals, conferences, graduate programmes, websites, etc.? Who is right? And…
Blockheads!
New essays on the philosophy of Ned Block, with substantive and wide-ranging responses by Block. Perhaps more than any other philosopher of mind, Ned Block synthesizes philosophical and scientific approaches to the mind; he is unique in moving back and forth across this divide, doing so with creativity and intensity. Over the course of his career, Block has made groundbreaking contributions to our understanding of intelligence, representation, an…
In Praise of Poise
Chalmers v Chalmers
This paper brings out an inconsistency between David Chalmers's dualism, which is the main element of his philosophy of mind, and his structuralism, which is the main element of his epistemology. The point is ad hominem , but the inconsistency if it can be established is of considerable independent interest. For the best response to the inconsistency, I argue, is to adopt what Chalmers calls ‘type‐C Materialism’, a version of materialism that has…
Philosophy as Synchronic History
Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of cau…
Reflections on Mirror Man
Vendler’s puzzle about imagination
What is Consciousness?
What is consciousness and why is it so philosophically and scientifically puzzling? For many years philosophers approached this question assuming a standard physicalist framework on which consciousness can be explained by contemporary physics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. This book is a debate between two philosophers who are united in their rejection of this kind of "standard" physicalism - but who differ sharply in what lesson …
Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness
Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs
There is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness—for instance, hallucinations—there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency—which we call the presentation problem—by (a) arguing that ‘conscious of’ and related expressions function as intensional tran…
Universities from an epistemological point of view
What is the nature and social function of universities? In this article I consider the well-known Humboldtian answer to this question, with a view not just to its inherent plausibility but to how it has changed over time. I pay particular attention to how different versions of the Humboldtian answer make different epistemological assumptions and conclude with a suggestion about how best to develop that answer in the future
Two notions of resemblance and the semantics of ‘what it's like’
According to the resemblance account of ‘what it's like’ and similar constructions, a sentence such as ‘there is something it's like to have a toothache’ means ‘there is something having a toothache resembles’. This account has proved controversial in the literature; some writers endorse it, many reject it. We show that this conflict is illusory. Drawing on the semantics of intensional transitive verbs, we show that there are two versions of the …
Philosophical Embarrassment
Philosophers are often embarrassed by philosophy, or at least write as if they are. But what should we make of this connection between philosophy and embarrassment? Taking a cue from sociologist Erving Goffman, this paper treats embarrassment in general as revealing of social phenomena and then considers the case of philosophical embarrassment from that point of view. As we will see, this allows us to formulate and explore several hypotheses abou…
Epistemology (18 obras) · Philosophy (18 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (15 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (12 obras) · Computer Science (11 obras) · Psychology (10 obras) · Metaphysics (8 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (6 obras) · Consciousness (6 obras) · Philosophy of mind (6 obras)