Andrew Schotter
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1045571 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Andrew Schotter |
| PRENOMES | Andrew |
| SOBRENOME | Schotter |
| ASSINATURA | SCHOTTER A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | New York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6157-6084 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 170 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1978 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2019 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
Learning and Mechanism Design
While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms—even those for which truth-…
Talking Ourselves to Efficiency
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the…
Strong and Wrong
The main purpose of rational choice theory is to lay out in clear and transparent terms what conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the validity of statements about consistent human behavior. Strong criteria for rationality are ‘wrong’ if understood as a positive description. However, their very strength provides a sharp guide for experimental social science’s project of mapping the properties of individual behavior
Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games
We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "intergenerational games" or games in which a sequence of nonoverlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t can offer advice to their successors in generation t + 1. What we find is that word-of-mouth social …
Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games
Research Article| December 01 1992 Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games Andrew Schotter Andrew Schotter Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 95–112. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-Supplement-95 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Andrew Schotter; Oskar Morgenstern's Con…
Tournaments and Piece Rates
Measurement in Public Choice
Journal Article Measurement in Public Choice Get access Measurement in Public Choice. Edited by STEINAR STROM. (London: Macmillan, 1981. Pp. ix + 212. £15.00.) Andrew Schotter Andrew Schotter New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 93, Issue 370, 1 June 1983, Pages 447–448, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232819 Published: 01 June 1983
A mathematical theory of institution creation
In this chapter I present a mathematical theory of institution creation. Being only a theory as opposed to the theory, it cannot be considered the only possible approach that one could take. However, it is my feeling that the model presented here does contain two elements that any successful theory of institution creation must contain. The first is a theory of norm creation and change which must be included in any theory that tries to depict the …
The Economic Theory of Social Institutions
This book uses game theory to analyse the creation, evolution and function of economic and social institutions. The author illustrates his analysis by describing the organic or unplanned evolution of institutions such as the conventions of war, the use of money, property rights and oligopolistic pricing conventions. Professor Schotter begins by linking his work with the ideas of the philosophers Rawls, Nozick and Lewis. Institutions are regarded …
Power Relationships in the International Monetary Fund
Jacob S. Dreyer, Andrew Schotter, Power Relationships in the International Monetary Fund: The Consequences of Quota Changes, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Feb., 1980), pp. 97-106
Applied Game Theory
The inevitability of the ?paradox of redistribution? in the allocation of voting weights
The Effects of Precedent on Arbitration
This paper presents a new view of the arbitration process in which the arbitrator is depicted as a random device to generate arbitration decisions. The conflicting parties must decide whether to send their dispute to the arbitrator, based on their subjective probability beliefs concerning the arbitration's outcome. If their beliefs are “sufficiently divergent,” we can expect both to agree to arbitration. As similar disputes are arbitrated and pre…
The Economic Theory of Social Institutions
This book uses game theory to analyse the creation, evolution and function of economic and social institutions. The author illustrates his analysis by describing the organic or unplanned evolution of institutions such as the conventions of war, the use of money, property rights and oligopolistic pricing conventions. Professor Schotter begins by linking his work with the ideas of the philosophers Rawls, Nozick and Lewis. Institutions are regarded …
Tournaments and Piece Rates
Talking Ourselves to Efficiency
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the…
Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games
We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "intergenerational games" or games in which a sequence of nonoverlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t can offer advice to their successors in generation t + 1. What we find is that word-of-mouth social …
Strong and Wrong
The main purpose of rational choice theory is to lay out in clear and transparent terms what conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the validity of statements about consistent human behavior. Strong criteria for rationality are ‘wrong’ if understood as a positive description. However, their very strength provides a sharp guide for experimental social science’s project of mapping the properties of individual behavior
The inevitability of the ?paradox of redistribution? in the allocation of voting weights
Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games
Research Article| December 01 1992 Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games Andrew Schotter Andrew Schotter Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 95–112. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-Supplement-95 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Andrew Schotter; Oskar Morgenstern's Con…
Learning and Mechanism Design
While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms—even those for which truth-…
Measurement in Public Choice
Journal Article Measurement in Public Choice Get access Measurement in Public Choice. Edited by STEINAR STROM. (London: Macmillan, 1981. Pp. ix + 212. £15.00.) Andrew Schotter Andrew Schotter New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 93, Issue 370, 1 June 1983, Pages 447–448, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232819 Published: 01 June 1983
The inevitability of the ?paradox of redistribution? in the allocation of voting weights
The Effects of Precedent on Arbitration
This paper presents a new view of the arbitration process in which the arbitrator is depicted as a random device to generate arbitration decisions. The conflicting parties must decide whether to send their dispute to the arbitrator, based on their subjective probability beliefs concerning the arbitration's outcome. If their beliefs are “sufficiently divergent,” we can expect both to agree to arbitration. As similar disputes are arbitrated and pre…
Applied Game Theory
Power Relationships in the International Monetary Fund
Jacob S. Dreyer, Andrew Schotter, Power Relationships in the International Monetary Fund: The Consequences of Quota Changes, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Feb., 1980), pp. 97-106
A mathematical theory of institution creation
In this chapter I present a mathematical theory of institution creation. Being only a theory as opposed to the theory, it cannot be considered the only possible approach that one could take. However, it is my feeling that the model presented here does contain two elements that any successful theory of institution creation must contain. The first is a theory of norm creation and change which must be included in any theory that tries to depict the …
The Economic Theory of Social Institutions
This book uses game theory to analyse the creation, evolution and function of economic and social institutions. The author illustrates his analysis by describing the organic or unplanned evolution of institutions such as the conventions of war, the use of money, property rights and oligopolistic pricing conventions. Professor Schotter begins by linking his work with the ideas of the philosophers Rawls, Nozick and Lewis. Institutions are regarded …
Measurement in Public Choice
Journal Article Measurement in Public Choice Get access Measurement in Public Choice. Edited by STEINAR STROM. (London: Macmillan, 1981. Pp. ix + 212. £15.00.) Andrew Schotter Andrew Schotter New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 93, Issue 370, 1 June 1983, Pages 447–448, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232819 Published: 01 June 1983
Tournaments and Piece Rates
Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games
Research Article| December 01 1992 Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games Andrew Schotter Andrew Schotter Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1992) 24 (Supplement): 95–112. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-Supplement-95 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Andrew Schotter; Oskar Morgenstern's Con…
Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games
We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "intergenerational games" or games in which a sequence of nonoverlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t can offer advice to their successors in generation t + 1. What we find is that word-of-mouth social …
Strong and Wrong
The main purpose of rational choice theory is to lay out in clear and transparent terms what conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the validity of statements about consistent human behavior. Strong criteria for rationality are ‘wrong’ if understood as a positive description. However, their very strength provides a sharp guide for experimental social science’s project of mapping the properties of individual behavior
Talking Ourselves to Efficiency
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the…
Learning and Mechanism Design
While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms—even those for which truth-…
Computer Science (10 obras) · Economics (9 obras) · Mathematical economics (6 obras) · Microeconomics (6 obras) · Game theory (5 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (5 obras) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 obras) · Political science (5 obras) · Epistemology (4 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 obras)