Heather Demarest
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1065490 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Heather Demarest |
| PRENOMES | Heather |
| SOBRENOME | Demarest |
| ASSINATURA | DEMAREST H |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Oklahoma |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3936-8676 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2012 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Persisting Despite the Relativistic Odds
There is a popular view in metaphysics: a mental state exists at a time and depends on a brain state at that time. This is difficult to reconcile with a central claim from special relativity: what exists at a time depends on an arbitrary foliation of spacetime. Together, these seem to suggest that brain states and their accompanying mental states depend on arbitrary foliations of spacetime. I argue that a further implication is that there could b…
How (not) to be a pragmatic Humean
Recently, philosophers have argued that the laws of Lewis’s Best System Analysis (BSA) are not pragmatically useful. In this paper, I argue that these criticisms are substantive only because the BSA laws are characterized independently of their pragmatic roles. It is important to maintain the distinction between what the laws are and what the laws should do if we are to engage in the traditional, metaphysical debates found in the laws literature.…
Isolation, not locality
There is a long tradition of preferring local theories to ones that posit lawful or causal influence at a spacetime distance. In this paper, we argue against this preference. We argue that nonlocality is scientifically unobjectionable and that nonlocal theories can be known. Scientists can gather evidence for them and confirm them in much the same way that they do for local theories. We think these observations point to a deeper constraint on sci…
The Universe Had One Chance
In a deterministically evolving world, the usefulness of nontrivial probabilities can seem mysterious. I use the ‘Mentaculus’ machinery developed by David Albert and Barry Loewer to show how all probabilities in such a world can be derived from a single, initial chance event. I go on to argue that this is the only genuine chance event. Perhaps surprisingly, we have good evidence of its existence and nature. I argue that the existence of this chan…
Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)
If a person, A, branches into B and C, then it is widely held that B and C are not identical to one another. Many think that this is because B and C have contradictory properties at the same time. In this paper, I show why this explanation cannot be right. I argue that contradictory properties at times are not necessary for non‐identity between descendants, and that contradictory properties at times are not sufficient for non‐identity. I also arg…
Fundamental Properties and the Laws of Nature
Fundamental properties and the laws of nature go hand in hand: mass and gravitation, charge and electromagnetism, spin and quantum mechanics. So, it is unsurprising that one's account of fundamental properties affects one's view of the laws of nature and vice versa. In this essay, I will survey a variety of recent attempts to provide a joint account of the fundamental properties and the laws of nature. Many of these accounts are new and unexplore…
Do Counterfactuals Ground the Laws of Nature? A Critique of Lange
Most philosophers of science hold that the laws of nature play an important role in determining which counterfactuals are true. Marc Lange reverses this dependence, arguing that it is the truth of certain counterfactuals that determines which statements are laws. I argue that the context sensitivity of counterfactual sentences makes it impossible for them to determine the laws. Next, I argue that Lange's view cannot avoid additional counterexampl…
Fundamental Properties and the Laws of Nature
Fundamental properties and the laws of nature go hand in hand: mass and gravitation, charge and electromagnetism, spin and quantum mechanics. So, it is unsurprising that one's account of fundamental properties affects one's view of the laws of nature and vice versa. In this essay, I will survey a variety of recent attempts to provide a joint account of the fundamental properties and the laws of nature. Many of these accounts are new and unexplore…
Do Counterfactuals Ground the Laws of Nature? A Critique of Lange
Most philosophers of science hold that the laws of nature play an important role in determining which counterfactuals are true. Marc Lange reverses this dependence, arguing that it is the truth of certain counterfactuals that determines which statements are laws. I argue that the context sensitivity of counterfactual sentences makes it impossible for them to determine the laws. Next, I argue that Lange's view cannot avoid additional counterexampl…
The Universe Had One Chance
In a deterministically evolving world, the usefulness of nontrivial probabilities can seem mysterious. I use the ‘Mentaculus’ machinery developed by David Albert and Barry Loewer to show how all probabilities in such a world can be derived from a single, initial chance event. I go on to argue that this is the only genuine chance event. Perhaps surprisingly, we have good evidence of its existence and nature. I argue that the existence of this chan…
Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)
If a person, A, branches into B and C, then it is widely held that B and C are not identical to one another. Many think that this is because B and C have contradictory properties at the same time. In this paper, I show why this explanation cannot be right. I argue that contradictory properties at times are not necessary for non‐identity between descendants, and that contradictory properties at times are not sufficient for non‐identity. I also arg…
Do Counterfactuals Ground the Laws of Nature? A Critique of Lange
Most philosophers of science hold that the laws of nature play an important role in determining which counterfactuals are true. Marc Lange reverses this dependence, arguing that it is the truth of certain counterfactuals that determines which statements are laws. I argue that the context sensitivity of counterfactual sentences makes it impossible for them to determine the laws. Next, I argue that Lange's view cannot avoid additional counterexampl…
Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)
If a person, A, branches into B and C, then it is widely held that B and C are not identical to one another. Many think that this is because B and C have contradictory properties at the same time. In this paper, I show why this explanation cannot be right. I argue that contradictory properties at times are not necessary for non‐identity between descendants, and that contradictory properties at times are not sufficient for non‐identity. I also arg…
Fundamental Properties and the Laws of Nature
Fundamental properties and the laws of nature go hand in hand: mass and gravitation, charge and electromagnetism, spin and quantum mechanics. So, it is unsurprising that one's account of fundamental properties affects one's view of the laws of nature and vice versa. In this essay, I will survey a variety of recent attempts to provide a joint account of the fundamental properties and the laws of nature. Many of these accounts are new and unexplore…
The Universe Had One Chance
In a deterministically evolving world, the usefulness of nontrivial probabilities can seem mysterious. I use the ‘Mentaculus’ machinery developed by David Albert and Barry Loewer to show how all probabilities in such a world can be derived from a single, initial chance event. I go on to argue that this is the only genuine chance event. Perhaps surprisingly, we have good evidence of its existence and nature. I argue that the existence of this chan…
Isolation, not locality
There is a long tradition of preferring local theories to ones that posit lawful or causal influence at a spacetime distance. In this paper, we argue against this preference. We argue that nonlocality is scientifically unobjectionable and that nonlocal theories can be known. Scientists can gather evidence for them and confirm them in much the same way that they do for local theories. We think these observations point to a deeper constraint on sci…
Persisting Despite the Relativistic Odds
There is a popular view in metaphysics: a mental state exists at a time and depends on a brain state at that time. This is difficult to reconcile with a central claim from special relativity: what exists at a time depends on an arbitrary foliation of spacetime. Together, these seem to suggest that brain states and their accompanying mental states depend on arbitrary foliations of spacetime. I argue that a further implication is that there could b…
How (not) to be a pragmatic Humean
Recently, philosophers have argued that the laws of Lewis’s Best System Analysis (BSA) are not pragmatically useful. In this paper, I argue that these criticisms are substantive only because the BSA laws are characterized independently of their pragmatic roles. It is important to maintain the distinction between what the laws are and what the laws should do if we are to engage in the traditional, metaphysical debates found in the laws literature.…
Philosophy and History of Science (7 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras) · Physics (3 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Philosophy (2 obras) · Philosophy of science (2 obras)