Nicholas F Stang
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1067928 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Nicholas F Stang |
| PRENOMES | Nicholas F |
| SOBRENOME | Stang |
| ASSINATURA | STANG N F |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Toronto |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0153-5405 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 60 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2012 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Is Kant's critique of metaphysics obsolete
I raise a problem about the possibility of metaphysics originally due to Kant: what explains the fact that the terms in our metaphysical theories (e.g., ‘property’, ‘grounding’) refer to entities and structures (e.g., properties, grounding) in the world? I distinguish a meta‐metaphysical view that can easily answer such questions (‘deflationism’) from a meta‐metaphysical view for which this explanatory task is more difficult (which I call the ‘su…
Ontologically grounding appearances in experience
The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
For much of its history, analytic Kant scholarship has been dominated by the idea of Kant as a deeply anti-metaphysical philosopher. But in the last quarter century, analytically inclined Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly “leave metaphysics behind.” Although such readings interpret Kant’s metaphysics in radically different ways, they share a common commitment to the idea tha…
Kant's Schematism of the categories
The aim of the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason is to solve the problem posed by the “inhomogeneity” of intuitions and categories: the sensible properties of objects represented in intuition are of a different kind than the properties represented by categories. Kant's solution is to introduce what he calls “transcendental schemata,” which mediate the subsumption of objects under categories. I reconstruct Kant's solution in terms …
Kant and the concept of an object
“Object” is one of the most important concepts in Kant's philosophy. I argue that Kant's concept of an object involves a hitherto neglected distinction, between what I call the “quantificational” concept of an object (q‐object) and what I call the “representational” concept of an object (r‐object). I examine the relation between these two concepts and argue that there is a close connection, even in the case of q‐objects we cannot sensibly intuit …
Replies to Critics
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Appearances and Things in Themselves
Lucy Allais’s anti-phenomenalist interpretation of transcendental idealism is incomplete in two ways. First of all, like some phenomenalists, she is committed to denying the coherence of claims of numerical identity of appearances and things in themselves. Secondly, she fails to explain adequately what grounds the actuality of appearances. This opens the door to a phenomenalist understanding of appearances
Kant’s Modal Metaphysics
This book is a study of Kant's theory of possibility, starting from the so-called 'pre-Critical' period of the 1750s and 1760s, through the Critical system of philosophy Kant published in the 1780s and the early 1790s. It discusses Kant's confrontation with the ontological theory of all possible beings shared by many of his rationalist predecessors, his own positive theory of possibility in the 1760s, and his distinctively Critical theory of poss…
Kant's Argument that Existence is not a Determination
In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non‐existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further t…
Freedom, Knowledge and Affection
In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance (the doctrine that we have no knowledge of things in themselves) but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's ac…
Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement
In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibil…
Kant’s Modal Metaphysics
This book is a study of Kant's theory of possibility, starting from the so-called 'pre-Critical' period of the 1750s and 1760s, through the Critical system of philosophy Kant published in the 1780s and the early 1790s. It discusses Kant's confrontation with the ontological theory of all possible beings shared by many of his rationalist predecessors, his own positive theory of possibility in the 1760s, and his distinctively Critical theory of poss…
The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
For much of its history, analytic Kant scholarship has been dominated by the idea of Kant as a deeply anti-metaphysical philosopher. But in the last quarter century, analytically inclined Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly “leave metaphysics behind.” Although such readings interpret Kant’s metaphysics in radically different ways, they share a common commitment to the idea tha…
Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement
In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibil…
Kant's Argument that Existence is not a Determination
In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non‐existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further t…
Is Kant's critique of metaphysics obsolete
I raise a problem about the possibility of metaphysics originally due to Kant: what explains the fact that the terms in our metaphysical theories (e.g., ‘property’, ‘grounding’) refer to entities and structures (e.g., properties, grounding) in the world? I distinguish a meta‐metaphysical view that can easily answer such questions (‘deflationism’) from a meta‐metaphysical view for which this explanatory task is more difficult (which I call the ‘su…
Kant's Schematism of the categories
The aim of the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason is to solve the problem posed by the “inhomogeneity” of intuitions and categories: the sensible properties of objects represented in intuition are of a different kind than the properties represented by categories. Kant's solution is to introduce what he calls “transcendental schemata,” which mediate the subsumption of objects under categories. I reconstruct Kant's solution in terms …
Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement
In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibil…
Freedom, Knowledge and Affection
In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance (the doctrine that we have no knowledge of things in themselves) but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's ac…
Kant's Argument that Existence is not a Determination
In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non‐existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further t…
Appearances and Things in Themselves
Lucy Allais’s anti-phenomenalist interpretation of transcendental idealism is incomplete in two ways. First of all, like some phenomenalists, she is committed to denying the coherence of claims of numerical identity of appearances and things in themselves. Secondly, she fails to explain adequately what grounds the actuality of appearances. This opens the door to a phenomenalist understanding of appearances
Kant’s Modal Metaphysics
This book is a study of Kant's theory of possibility, starting from the so-called 'pre-Critical' period of the 1750s and 1760s, through the Critical system of philosophy Kant published in the 1780s and the early 1790s. It discusses Kant's confrontation with the ontological theory of all possible beings shared by many of his rationalist predecessors, his own positive theory of possibility in the 1760s, and his distinctively Critical theory of poss…
Replies to Critics
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Kant and the concept of an object
“Object” is one of the most important concepts in Kant's philosophy. I argue that Kant's concept of an object involves a hitherto neglected distinction, between what I call the “quantificational” concept of an object (q‐object) and what I call the “representational” concept of an object (r‐object). I examine the relation between these two concepts and argue that there is a close connection, even in the case of q‐objects we cannot sensibly intuit …
The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
For much of its history, analytic Kant scholarship has been dominated by the idea of Kant as a deeply anti-metaphysical philosopher. But in the last quarter century, analytically inclined Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly “leave metaphysics behind.” Although such readings interpret Kant’s metaphysics in radically different ways, they share a common commitment to the idea tha…
Kant's Schematism of the categories
The aim of the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason is to solve the problem posed by the “inhomogeneity” of intuitions and categories: the sensible properties of objects represented in intuition are of a different kind than the properties represented by categories. Kant's solution is to introduce what he calls “transcendental schemata,” which mediate the subsumption of objects under categories. I reconstruct Kant's solution in terms …
Ontologically grounding appearances in experience
Is Kant's critique of metaphysics obsolete
I raise a problem about the possibility of metaphysics originally due to Kant: what explains the fact that the terms in our metaphysical theories (e.g., ‘property’, ‘grounding’) refer to entities and structures (e.g., properties, grounding) in the world? I distinguish a meta‐metaphysical view that can easily answer such questions (‘deflationism’) from a meta‐metaphysical view for which this explanatory task is more difficult (which I call the ‘su…
Epistemology (11 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (8 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Transcendental number (6 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Metaphysics (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Idealism (3 obras) · Linguistics (3 obras)