Raymond Dacey
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1078565 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Raymond Dacey |
| PRENOMES | Raymond |
| SOBRENOME | Dacey |
| ASSINATURA | DACEY R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Idaho |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 24 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 39 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 24 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1975 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Explaining the conflicting behavior of inexperienced and experienced political elites
The empirical results on the influence of inexperience and experience in decision making are inconclusive. This paper offers a resolution to the puzzle of how empirical studies that advance contradictory risk-related claims can all command empirical support. The paper employs a paradigmatic model of decision making that examines two variables: (1) the decision maker's personality, of which inexperience and experience is one component; and (2) the…
Guidelines for Revitalizing International Organizations for the Post-Covid-19 Era
Caruso, R. 2020. “What Post COVID-19? ‹‹Avoiding a 21st Century General Crisis››.” Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy 26 (2). May 2020 provides a prescription for avoiding a general global crisis in the Post-Covid-19 era via the revitalization of Post-WWII era international organizations. Here we examine the implications of contributions from the game theory and the trade and conflict realms of the peace science literature to asses…
The use of fear and anger to alter crisis initiation
This paper provides a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the use of fear and anger on the decision to initiate a crisis. The formalization employs the finding that fearful decision-makers are risk-averting across frames and make pessimistic risk assessments, and that angry decision-makers are risk-seeking across frames and make optimistic risk assessments. The work presented here employs a sequential decision analysis based on the two-side…
Social norms and the traditional deterrence game
Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo
The model developed in this paper provides a formal prospect theory account of Challenger's behavior in the traditional deterrence game played under sequential decision analysis. The model is used to analyze two basic claims commonly made in the international relations literature regarding the importation of prospect theory into the analysis of crisis games. These claims pertain to Challenger's behavior when the valuation of the status quo is pos…
The Status of Likelihood Claims in International Relations and Peace Science
Many of the best scholars working in International Relations and Peace Science have employed statistical (e.g., logit/probit) and theoretical models to buttress claims of causally increased or decreased probabilities. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: to display the applicability of the tools of probabilistic causality and statistical explanation to assessing analyses in International Relations and Peace Science, and to assess the status of …
Traditional Decision Analysis and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making
The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making posits a two-stage process wherein the decision maker first employs a noncompensatory decision rule to eliminate politically unacceptable alternatives and then employs a (perhaps) traditional decision procedure to select from the remaining set of acceptable alternatives. Ageneral decision analysis is used to provide a structured account of the elimination process of the first stage of the…
The S-Shaped Utility Function
Policy Disputes Over Water Development Projects
The economics of peace
Risk Attitude, Punishment, and the Intifada
The Israelis occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for approximately twenty years without facing an uprising. This state of affairs ended, surprising both the Israelis and the PLO, in December 1987 with the beginning of the Intifada. Various authors conclude that the Israeli occupation policy caused the Intifada (Peretz 1990; Nassar and Heacock 1990; Siniora 1988; U.S. Department of State 1989). This paper takes exception with the foregoing v…
Crime control and harassment of the innocent
Nineteenth Century Britain as a Subtle Commercial Hegemon
A general model of international interactions and peace economics
This paper arises from some recent discussions of Peace Economics (Dacey, 1994a; Isard, 1994; Polachek, 1994; and Tinbergen, 1994). The purpose of the paper is to provide a model that integrates the seemingly disparate disciplines of international relations, domestic politics, and international business, and thereby provide a unified model of international interactions and peace economics. I present a model of international interactions based on …
Inducing fair trade out of hegemonic trade
The impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race
This paper examines the impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race via the computer simulation introduced in Dacey and Pendegraft (1988). We answer two basic questions. First, in an arms race are there advantages to holding elections frequently (i.e., on a short interval) as opposed to infrequently (i.e., on a long interval)? Second, do crises have an influence on the outcome of arms races, and if so, how? The answers to these que…
Guest editor's preface
The optimality of tit‐for‐tat
The paper examines the performance of tit‐for‐tat in iterated plays of prisoners’ dilemma and chicken. In particular, the paper examines, via computer simulations, a space of surrogate Axelrod‐type tournaments over these games. The surrogate tournaments are specified in terms of characteristics of strategies similar to those Axelrod identifies as fundamental. The paper shows that the zones of optimality for tit‐for‐tat in tournament play of both …
The probability of war in then-crises problem
The Wyoming Summer Institute for the Study of Conflict Theory and International Security
The Summer Institute for the Study of Conflict Theory and International Security' conducts an annual symposium for the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge of both scientific and practical import in the areas of conflict theory and international security. The principal focus of the Institute is formal, analytic interdisciplinary research in the areas of conflict theory, especially conflict between nations, and international security. The In…
An interrogative account of the dialectical inquiring system based upon the economic theory of information
Detection and Disarmament
Journal Article Detection and Disarmament: A Comment on “The Geometry of the Arms Race” Get access Raymond Dacey Raymond Dacey College of Business Administration, University of Oklahoma Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 4, December 1979, Pages 589–598, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600330 Published: 01 December 1979
A Theory of Conclusions
This paper presents a theory of conclusions based upon the suggestions of Tukey [21]. The logic offered here is based upon two rules of detachment that occur naturally in probabilistic inference, a traditional rule of acceptance, and a rule of rejection. The rules of detachment provide flexibility: the theory of conclusions can account for both statistical and deductive arguments. The rule of acceptance governs the acceptance of new conclusions, …
The Role of Economic Theory in Supporting Counterfactual Arguments
Traditional Decision Analysis and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making
The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making posits a two-stage process wherein the decision maker first employs a noncompensatory decision rule to eliminate politically unacceptable alternatives and then employs a (perhaps) traditional decision procedure to select from the remaining set of acceptable alternatives. Ageneral decision analysis is used to provide a structured account of the elimination process of the first stage of the…
Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo
The model developed in this paper provides a formal prospect theory account of Challenger's behavior in the traditional deterrence game played under sequential decision analysis. The model is used to analyze two basic claims commonly made in the international relations literature regarding the importation of prospect theory into the analysis of crisis games. These claims pertain to Challenger's behavior when the valuation of the status quo is pos…
The optimality of tit‐for‐tat
The paper examines the performance of tit‐for‐tat in iterated plays of prisoners’ dilemma and chicken. In particular, the paper examines, via computer simulations, a space of surrogate Axelrod‐type tournaments over these games. The surrogate tournaments are specified in terms of characteristics of strategies similar to those Axelrod identifies as fundamental. The paper shows that the zones of optimality for tit‐for‐tat in tournament play of both …
The use of fear and anger to alter crisis initiation
This paper provides a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the use of fear and anger on the decision to initiate a crisis. The formalization employs the finding that fearful decision-makers are risk-averting across frames and make pessimistic risk assessments, and that angry decision-makers are risk-seeking across frames and make optimistic risk assessments. The work presented here employs a sequential decision analysis based on the two-side…
Risk Attitude, Punishment, and the Intifada
The Israelis occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for approximately twenty years without facing an uprising. This state of affairs ended, surprising both the Israelis and the PLO, in December 1987 with the beginning of the Intifada. Various authors conclude that the Israeli occupation policy caused the Intifada (Peretz 1990; Nassar and Heacock 1990; Siniora 1988; U.S. Department of State 1989). This paper takes exception with the foregoing v…
Inducing fair trade out of hegemonic trade
Detection and Disarmament
Journal Article Detection and Disarmament: A Comment on “The Geometry of the Arms Race” Get access Raymond Dacey Raymond Dacey College of Business Administration, University of Oklahoma Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 4, December 1979, Pages 589–598, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600330 Published: 01 December 1979
Explaining the conflicting behavior of inexperienced and experienced political elites
The empirical results on the influence of inexperience and experience in decision making are inconclusive. This paper offers a resolution to the puzzle of how empirical studies that advance contradictory risk-related claims can all command empirical support. The paper employs a paradigmatic model of decision making that examines two variables: (1) the decision maker's personality, of which inexperience and experience is one component; and (2) the…
The S-Shaped Utility Function
Crime control and harassment of the innocent
Nineteenth Century Britain as a Subtle Commercial Hegemon
A general model of international interactions and peace economics
This paper arises from some recent discussions of Peace Economics (Dacey, 1994a; Isard, 1994; Polachek, 1994; and Tinbergen, 1994). The purpose of the paper is to provide a model that integrates the seemingly disparate disciplines of international relations, domestic politics, and international business, and thereby provide a unified model of international interactions and peace economics. I present a model of international interactions based on …
The impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race
This paper examines the impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race via the computer simulation introduced in Dacey and Pendegraft (1988). We answer two basic questions. First, in an arms race are there advantages to holding elections frequently (i.e., on a short interval) as opposed to infrequently (i.e., on a long interval)? Second, do crises have an influence on the outcome of arms races, and if so, how? The answers to these que…
The Role of Economic Theory in Supporting Counterfactual Arguments
A Theory of Conclusions
This paper presents a theory of conclusions based upon the suggestions of Tukey [21]. The logic offered here is based upon two rules of detachment that occur naturally in probabilistic inference, a traditional rule of acceptance, and a rule of rejection. The rules of detachment provide flexibility: the theory of conclusions can account for both statistical and deductive arguments. The rule of acceptance governs the acceptance of new conclusions, …
Detection and Disarmament
Journal Article Detection and Disarmament: A Comment on “The Geometry of the Arms Race” Get access Raymond Dacey Raymond Dacey College of Business Administration, University of Oklahoma Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 4, December 1979, Pages 589–598, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600330 Published: 01 December 1979
An interrogative account of the dialectical inquiring system based upon the economic theory of information
The Wyoming Summer Institute for the Study of Conflict Theory and International Security
The Summer Institute for the Study of Conflict Theory and International Security' conducts an annual symposium for the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge of both scientific and practical import in the areas of conflict theory and international security. The principal focus of the Institute is formal, analytic interdisciplinary research in the areas of conflict theory, especially conflict between nations, and international security. The In…
Guest editor's preface
The optimality of tit‐for‐tat
The paper examines the performance of tit‐for‐tat in iterated plays of prisoners’ dilemma and chicken. In particular, the paper examines, via computer simulations, a space of surrogate Axelrod‐type tournaments over these games. The surrogate tournaments are specified in terms of characteristics of strategies similar to those Axelrod identifies as fundamental. The paper shows that the zones of optimality for tit‐for‐tat in tournament play of both …
The probability of war in then-crises problem
The impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race
This paper examines the impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race via the computer simulation introduced in Dacey and Pendegraft (1988). We answer two basic questions. First, in an arms race are there advantages to holding elections frequently (i.e., on a short interval) as opposed to infrequently (i.e., on a long interval)? Second, do crises have an influence on the outcome of arms races, and if so, how? The answers to these que…
Inducing fair trade out of hegemonic trade
A general model of international interactions and peace economics
This paper arises from some recent discussions of Peace Economics (Dacey, 1994a; Isard, 1994; Polachek, 1994; and Tinbergen, 1994). The purpose of the paper is to provide a model that integrates the seemingly disparate disciplines of international relations, domestic politics, and international business, and thereby provide a unified model of international interactions and peace economics. I present a model of international interactions based on …
Crime control and harassment of the innocent
Nineteenth Century Britain as a Subtle Commercial Hegemon
Risk Attitude, Punishment, and the Intifada
The Israelis occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for approximately twenty years without facing an uprising. This state of affairs ended, surprising both the Israelis and the PLO, in December 1987 with the beginning of the Intifada. Various authors conclude that the Israeli occupation policy caused the Intifada (Peretz 1990; Nassar and Heacock 1990; Siniora 1988; U.S. Department of State 1989). This paper takes exception with the foregoing v…
The economics of peace
Policy Disputes Over Water Development Projects
The S-Shaped Utility Function
Traditional Decision Analysis and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making
The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making posits a two-stage process wherein the decision maker first employs a noncompensatory decision rule to eliminate politically unacceptable alternatives and then employs a (perhaps) traditional decision procedure to select from the remaining set of acceptable alternatives. Ageneral decision analysis is used to provide a structured account of the elimination process of the first stage of the…
The Status of Likelihood Claims in International Relations and Peace Science
Many of the best scholars working in International Relations and Peace Science have employed statistical (e.g., logit/probit) and theoretical models to buttress claims of causally increased or decreased probabilities. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: to display the applicability of the tools of probabilistic causality and statistical explanation to assessing analyses in International Relations and Peace Science, and to assess the status of …
Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo
The model developed in this paper provides a formal prospect theory account of Challenger's behavior in the traditional deterrence game played under sequential decision analysis. The model is used to analyze two basic claims commonly made in the international relations literature regarding the importation of prospect theory into the analysis of crisis games. These claims pertain to Challenger's behavior when the valuation of the status quo is pos…
Social norms and the traditional deterrence game
The use of fear and anger to alter crisis initiation
This paper provides a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the use of fear and anger on the decision to initiate a crisis. The formalization employs the finding that fearful decision-makers are risk-averting across frames and make pessimistic risk assessments, and that angry decision-makers are risk-seeking across frames and make optimistic risk assessments. The work presented here employs a sequential decision analysis based on the two-side…
Guidelines for Revitalizing International Organizations for the Post-Covid-19 Era
Caruso, R. 2020. “What Post COVID-19? ‹‹Avoiding a 21st Century General Crisis››.” Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy 26 (2). May 2020 provides a prescription for avoiding a general global crisis in the Post-Covid-19 era via the revitalization of Post-WWII era international organizations. Here we examine the implications of contributions from the game theory and the trade and conflict realms of the peace science literature to asses…
Explaining the conflicting behavior of inexperienced and experienced political elites
The empirical results on the influence of inexperience and experience in decision making are inconclusive. This paper offers a resolution to the puzzle of how empirical studies that advance contradictory risk-related claims can all command empirical support. The paper employs a paradigmatic model of decision making that examines two variables: (1) the decision maker's personality, of which inexperience and experience is one component; and (2) the…
Economics (15 obras) · Political science (14 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Epistemology (10 obras) · Law (9 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Mathematical economics (8 obras) · Mathematics (8 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Psychology (8 obras)