Ioannis Votsis
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1080730 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Ioannis Votsis |
| PRENOMES | Ioannis |
| SOBRENOME | Votsis |
| ASSINATURA | VOTSIS I |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1549-7852 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2003 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
The Interplay of Data, Models, and Theories in Machine Learning
This paper discusses the role of data within scientific reasoning and as evidence for theoretical claims, arguing for the idea that data can yield theoretically grounded models and be inferred, predicted, or explained from/by such models. Contrary to Bogen and Woodward's rejection of data-to-theory and theory-to-data inferences/predictions, we draw upon artificial intelligence as applied to science literature to argue that (a) many models are rou…
Theory-ladenness
In this paper, I investigate two potential ways to experimentally test the thesis that observation is theory-laden. One is a proposal due to Schurz (J Gen Philos Sci 46:139–153, 2015) and the other my own. The two are compared and found to have some features in common. One such feature is that both proposals seek to create conditions that compel test subjects with diverse theoretical backgrounds to resort to bare (or at least as bare as possible)…
Objectivity in confirmation
Introduction
A frame-theoretic analysis of two rival conceptions of heat
Data meet theory
Saving the intuitions
The Prospective Stance in Realism
Scientific realists endeavor to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that, despite the demise of empirically successful theories, the parts of those theories responsible for their success do, in fact, survive theory change. If, as some antirealists have recently suggested, successful theory parts are only identifiable in retrospect, namely, as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialized, …
The Upward Path to Structural Realism
In a recent PSA paper (2001a), as well as some other papers (1995, 2000, 2001b) and a book chapter (1999, Chapter 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR); (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves; and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing
Is Structure Not Enough
This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell's lesser-known epistemological views, viz. “structural realism” (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman's allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uni…
The Prospective Stance in Realism
Scientific realists endeavor to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that, despite the demise of empirically successful theories, the parts of those theories responsible for their success do, in fact, survive theory change. If, as some antirealists have recently suggested, successful theory parts are only identifiable in retrospect, namely, as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialized, …
Data meet theory
Theory-ladenness
In this paper, I investigate two potential ways to experimentally test the thesis that observation is theory-laden. One is a proposal due to Schurz (J Gen Philos Sci 46:139–153, 2015) and the other my own. The two are compared and found to have some features in common. One such feature is that both proposals seek to create conditions that compel test subjects with diverse theoretical backgrounds to resort to bare (or at least as bare as possible)…
A frame-theoretic analysis of two rival conceptions of heat
The Upward Path to Structural Realism
In a recent PSA paper (2001a), as well as some other papers (1995, 2000, 2001b) and a book chapter (1999, Chapter 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR); (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves; and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing
Is Structure Not Enough
This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell's lesser-known epistemological views, viz. “structural realism” (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman's allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uni…
Saving the intuitions
Is Structure Not Enough
This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell's lesser-known epistemological views, viz. “structural realism” (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman's allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uni…
The Upward Path to Structural Realism
In a recent PSA paper (2001a), as well as some other papers (1995, 2000, 2001b) and a book chapter (1999, Chapter 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR); (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves; and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing
Data meet theory
Saving the intuitions
The Prospective Stance in Realism
Scientific realists endeavor to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that, despite the demise of empirically successful theories, the parts of those theories responsible for their success do, in fact, survive theory change. If, as some antirealists have recently suggested, successful theory parts are only identifiable in retrospect, namely, as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialized, …
A frame-theoretic analysis of two rival conceptions of heat
Objectivity in confirmation
Introduction
Theory-ladenness
In this paper, I investigate two potential ways to experimentally test the thesis that observation is theory-laden. One is a proposal due to Schurz (J Gen Philos Sci 46:139–153, 2015) and the other my own. The two are compared and found to have some features in common. One such feature is that both proposals seek to create conditions that compel test subjects with diverse theoretical backgrounds to resort to bare (or at least as bare as possible)…
The Interplay of Data, Models, and Theories in Machine Learning
This paper discusses the role of data within scientific reasoning and as evidence for theoretical claims, arguing for the idea that data can yield theoretically grounded models and be inferred, predicted, or explained from/by such models. Contrary to Bogen and Woodward's rejection of data-to-theory and theory-to-data inferences/predictions, we draw upon artificial intelligence as applied to science literature to argue that (a) many models are rou…
Epistemology (10 obras) · Philosophy (10 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Mathematics (5 obras) · Realism (4 obras) · Scientific realism (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras)