Stephen L Darwall
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1091346 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Stephen L Darwall |
| PRENOMES | Stephen L |
| SOBRENOME | Darwall |
| ASSINATURA | DARWALL S L |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 18 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 20 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 18 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1974 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Morality, authority, and law
Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy
Contractarianism, Contractualism (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy)
Contractarianism and contractualism are instances of a major approach to normative ethical theory that stresses reciprocity and mutual consent. 'Contractarianism' is the name given to the idea, first broached by Thomas Hobbes, that morality can be viewed as a set of social practices that self-interestedly rational actors "adopt" in their common interest, as if by a kind of contract. 'Contractualism' refers, on the other hand, to a related, but im…
Internalism and Agency
As interest has refocused in recent years on fundamental questions of metaethics, a group of loosely-related ideas collectively referred to as internalism have come in for increasing attention and controversy. A good example would be recent debates about moral realism where question of the relation between ethics (or ethical judgment) and the will has come to loom large.1 Unfortunately, however, the range of positions labelled internalist in ethi…
Virtue by Consensus
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Virtue by Consensus. By Vincent Hope. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. vii + 166. Price £20.00.) Stephen L. Darwall Stephen L. Darwall University of Michigan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 162, January 1991, Pages 113–114, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219798 Published: 01 January 1991
Ought, Reasons, and Morality.
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution
Having Reasons
Abolishing morality
Harm to Others
Reason and Value
The Rejection of Consequentialism
Free Will
Reason, Judgment, and the Desire to Be Rational
Thinking about Morality
Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person
Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply…
Two Kinds of Respect
Pleasure as Ultimate Good in Sidgwick’s Ethics
Journal Article Pleasure as Ultimate Good in Sidgwick's Ethics Get access Stephen L. Darwall Stephen L. Darwall University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 58, Issue 3, 1 July 1974, Pages 475–489, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197458334 Published: 19 December 2014
Internalism and Agency
As interest has refocused in recent years on fundamental questions of metaethics, a group of loosely-related ideas collectively referred to as internalism have come in for increasing attention and controversy. A good example would be recent debates about moral realism where question of the relation between ethics (or ethical judgment) and the will has come to loom large.1 Unfortunately, however, the range of positions labelled internalist in ethi…
Pleasure as Ultimate Good in Sidgwick’s Ethics
Journal Article Pleasure as Ultimate Good in Sidgwick's Ethics Get access Stephen L. Darwall Stephen L. Darwall University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 58, Issue 3, 1 July 1974, Pages 475–489, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197458334 Published: 19 December 2014
Abolishing morality
Reason, Judgment, and the Desire to Be Rational
Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person
Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply…
Pleasure as Ultimate Good in Sidgwick’s Ethics
Journal Article Pleasure as Ultimate Good in Sidgwick's Ethics Get access Stephen L. Darwall Stephen L. Darwall University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 58, Issue 3, 1 July 1974, Pages 475–489, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197458334 Published: 19 December 2014
Two Kinds of Respect
Thinking about Morality
Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person
Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply…
Free Will
Reason, Judgment, and the Desire to Be Rational
The Rejection of Consequentialism
Reason and Value
Abolishing morality
Harm to Others
Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution
Having Reasons
Ought, Reasons, and Morality.
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
Virtue by Consensus
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Virtue by Consensus. By Vincent Hope. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. vii + 166. Price £20.00.) Stephen L. Darwall Stephen L. Darwall University of Michigan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 162, January 1991, Pages 113–114, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219798 Published: 01 January 1991
Internalism and Agency
As interest has refocused in recent years on fundamental questions of metaethics, a group of loosely-related ideas collectively referred to as internalism have come in for increasing attention and controversy. A good example would be recent debates about moral realism where question of the relation between ethics (or ethical judgment) and the will has come to loom large.1 Unfortunately, however, the range of positions labelled internalist in ethi…
Contractarianism, Contractualism (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy)
Contractarianism and contractualism are instances of a major approach to normative ethical theory that stresses reciprocity and mutual consent. 'Contractarianism' is the name given to the idea, first broached by Thomas Hobbes, that morality can be viewed as a set of social practices that self-interestedly rational actors "adopt" in their common interest, as if by a kind of contract. 'Contractualism' refers, on the other hand, to a related, but im…
Morality, authority, and law
Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy
Epistemology (13 obras) · Philosophy (10 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (8 obras) · Analytic philosophy (6 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · General interest (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Morality (4 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (4 obras)