Timothy N Cason
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1104727 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Timothy N Cason |
| PRENOMES | Timothy N |
| SOBRENOME | Cason |
| ASSINATURA | CASON T N |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Purdue University West Lafayette |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9581-5015 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 15 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 68 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1995 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
An Experimental Investigation of Price Dispersion and Cycles
We report a continuous-time experiment studying the Burdett-Judd model, whose unique Nash equilibrium (NE) features dispersed prices. Adaptive dynamics predict that the NE is stable for one of our parameter sets and unstable for another. The empirical price distribution is close to the NE distribution for the stable parameter set, but for the unstable parameter set it skews toward higher prices in its NE support interval. We offer an empirical de…
Swords without covenants do not lead to self-governance
This paper presents an experimental study of two mechanisms for managing common pool resources. Decentralized peer punishment (swords) has been shown to increase cooperation in related social dilemmas, but only with linear private benefits and costs of public goods provision. We investigate the effectiveness of this mechanism for a more realistic nonlinear public goods environment, in isolation and in combination with nonbinding communication and…
Common Value Auctions with Voluntary and Qualified Entry
Nous étudions les enchères sous différentes règles d’entrée. En pratique, les individus choisissent eux-mêmes de participer aux enchères et les réglementations exigent souvent qu’ils remplissent certains critères de qualification. Notre expérience évalue le rôle joué par l’entrée volontaire et par les exigences financières dans la fréquence des offres excessives et des faillites, qui sont très répandues dans les enchères à valeur commune. Nous mo…
Individual versus Group Play in the Repeated Coordinated Resistance Game
This paper reports an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of repeated interactions in deterring leaders from using divide-and-conquer strategies to extract surplus from their subordinates, when every decision-maker involved is a group instead of an individual. We find that both the resistance rate by subordinates and the divide-and-conquer transgression rate by leaders are the same in the group and individual repeated coordinated resistance …
Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition
This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified in…
Coordinating Resistance Through Communication and Repeated Interaction
Journal Article Coordinating Resistance Through Communication and Repeated Interaction Get access Timothy N. Cason, Timothy N. Cason Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Vai‐Lam Mui Vai‐Lam Mui Monash University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 124, Issue 574, February 2014, Pages F226–F256, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12088…
Price discovery and intermediation in linked emissions trading markets
Can Affirmative Motivations Improve Compliance in Emissions Trading Programs
Early emissions trading programs have obtained a very high rate of compliance, in part by using continuous emissions monitors (CEMs) that automatically record emissions data on a 24‐hour basis. As they expand into a wider range of pollutants and sources, however, such policies will have to rely on less automated forms of self‐reporting. This article asks if improved “affirmative motivations” for compliance based on perceptions of a policy's fairn…
Market power in tradable emission markets
To Spin or not to Spin? Natural and Laboratory Experiments from the Price is Right
Journal Article To Spin or not to Spin? Natural and Laboratory Experiments from the Price is Right Get access Rafael Tenorio, Rafael Tenorio De Paul University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Timothy N. Cason Timothy N. Cason Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 112, Issue 476, January 2002, Pages 170–195, https://doi.org/10…
Durable Goods, Coasian Dynamics, and Uncertainty
This paper presents a model in which a durable goods monopolist sells a product to two buyers. Each buyer is privately informed about his own valuation. Thus all players are imperfectly informed about market demand. We study the monopolist's pricing behavior as players' uncertainty regarding demand vanishes in the limit. In the limit, players are perfectly informed about the downward-sloping demand. We show that in all games belonging to a fixed …
A laboratory study of voluntary public goods provision with imperfect monitoring and communication
A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game
This paper introduces the team dictator game to study whether social dynamics within a group can cause groups' decisions to differ systematically from individuals' decisions. In the individual dictator game, a subject dictates the allocation of y dollars; in the team dictator game, a team of two subjects dictates the allocation of 2y dollars. We derive and test competing predictions for the two dominant psychological theories of group polarisatio…
Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program
This paper examines participation in EPA's 33/50 program to assess the potential for voluntary environmental regulation to achieve improvements in environmental performance. The program's goal is to reduce the releases and transfers of 17 toxic chemicals by 50 percent between 1988 and 1995. The results indicate that the program has strong potential because large firms with the greatest toxic releases are most likely to participate. The results al…
An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation
A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game
This paper introduces the team dictator game to study whether social dynamics within a group can cause groups' decisions to differ systematically from individuals' decisions. In the individual dictator game, a subject dictates the allocation of y dollars; in the team dictator game, a team of two subjects dictates the allocation of 2y dollars. We derive and test competing predictions for the two dominant psychological theories of group polarisatio…
Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition
This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified in…
A laboratory study of voluntary public goods provision with imperfect monitoring and communication
Can Affirmative Motivations Improve Compliance in Emissions Trading Programs
Early emissions trading programs have obtained a very high rate of compliance, in part by using continuous emissions monitors (CEMs) that automatically record emissions data on a 24‐hour basis. As they expand into a wider range of pollutants and sources, however, such policies will have to rely on less automated forms of self‐reporting. This article asks if improved “affirmative motivations” for compliance based on perceptions of a policy's fairn…
Coordinating Resistance Through Communication and Repeated Interaction
Journal Article Coordinating Resistance Through Communication and Repeated Interaction Get access Timothy N. Cason, Timothy N. Cason Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Vai‐Lam Mui Vai‐Lam Mui Monash University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 124, Issue 574, February 2014, Pages F226–F256, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12088…
To Spin or not to Spin? Natural and Laboratory Experiments from the Price is Right
Journal Article To Spin or not to Spin? Natural and Laboratory Experiments from the Price is Right Get access Rafael Tenorio, Rafael Tenorio De Paul University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Timothy N. Cason Timothy N. Cason Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 112, Issue 476, January 2002, Pages 170–195, https://doi.org/10…
An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation
Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program
This paper examines participation in EPA's 33/50 program to assess the potential for voluntary environmental regulation to achieve improvements in environmental performance. The program's goal is to reduce the releases and transfers of 17 toxic chemicals by 50 percent between 1988 and 1995. The results indicate that the program has strong potential because large firms with the greatest toxic releases are most likely to participate. The results al…
A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game
This paper introduces the team dictator game to study whether social dynamics within a group can cause groups' decisions to differ systematically from individuals' decisions. In the individual dictator game, a subject dictates the allocation of y dollars; in the team dictator game, a team of two subjects dictates the allocation of 2y dollars. We derive and test competing predictions for the two dominant psychological theories of group polarisatio…
A laboratory study of voluntary public goods provision with imperfect monitoring and communication
Durable Goods, Coasian Dynamics, and Uncertainty
This paper presents a model in which a durable goods monopolist sells a product to two buyers. Each buyer is privately informed about his own valuation. Thus all players are imperfectly informed about market demand. We study the monopolist's pricing behavior as players' uncertainty regarding demand vanishes in the limit. In the limit, players are perfectly informed about the downward-sloping demand. We show that in all games belonging to a fixed …
To Spin or not to Spin? Natural and Laboratory Experiments from the Price is Right
Journal Article To Spin or not to Spin? Natural and Laboratory Experiments from the Price is Right Get access Rafael Tenorio, Rafael Tenorio De Paul University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Timothy N. Cason Timothy N. Cason Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 112, Issue 476, January 2002, Pages 170–195, https://doi.org/10…
Market power in tradable emission markets
Price discovery and intermediation in linked emissions trading markets
Can Affirmative Motivations Improve Compliance in Emissions Trading Programs
Early emissions trading programs have obtained a very high rate of compliance, in part by using continuous emissions monitors (CEMs) that automatically record emissions data on a 24‐hour basis. As they expand into a wider range of pollutants and sources, however, such policies will have to rely on less automated forms of self‐reporting. This article asks if improved “affirmative motivations” for compliance based on perceptions of a policy's fairn…
Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition
This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified in…
Coordinating Resistance Through Communication and Repeated Interaction
Journal Article Coordinating Resistance Through Communication and Repeated Interaction Get access Timothy N. Cason, Timothy N. Cason Purdue University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Vai‐Lam Mui Vai‐Lam Mui Monash University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 124, Issue 574, February 2014, Pages F226–F256, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12088…
Individual versus Group Play in the Repeated Coordinated Resistance Game
This paper reports an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of repeated interactions in deterring leaders from using divide-and-conquer strategies to extract surplus from their subordinates, when every decision-maker involved is a group instead of an individual. We find that both the resistance rate by subordinates and the divide-and-conquer transgression rate by leaders are the same in the group and individual repeated coordinated resistance …
Swords without covenants do not lead to self-governance
This paper presents an experimental study of two mechanisms for managing common pool resources. Decentralized peer punishment (swords) has been shown to increase cooperation in related social dilemmas, but only with linear private benefits and costs of public goods provision. We investigate the effectiveness of this mechanism for a more realistic nonlinear public goods environment, in isolation and in combination with nonbinding communication and…
Common Value Auctions with Voluntary and Qualified Entry
Nous étudions les enchères sous différentes règles d’entrée. En pratique, les individus choisissent eux-mêmes de participer aux enchères et les réglementations exigent souvent qu’ils remplissent certains critères de qualification. Notre expérience évalue le rôle joué par l’entrée volontaire et par les exigences financières dans la fréquence des offres excessives et des faillites, qui sont très répandues dans les enchères à valeur commune. Nous mo…
An Experimental Investigation of Price Dispersion and Cycles
We report a continuous-time experiment studying the Burdett-Judd model, whose unique Nash equilibrium (NE) features dispersed prices. Adaptive dynamics predict that the NE is stable for one of our parameter sets and unstable for another. The empirical price distribution is close to the NE distribution for the stable parameter set, but for the unstable parameter set it skews toward higher prices in its NE support interval. We offer an empirical de…
Economics (11 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (8 obras) · Microeconomics (7 obras) · Business (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (5 obras) · Social Psychology (5 obras) · Social Psychology (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras)