Andrew Elby
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1104850 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Andrew Elby |
| PRENOMES | Andrew |
| SOBRENOME | Elby |
| ASSINATURA | ELBY A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1965-8406 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1992 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
How a child entangles empathy and computational thinking in reasoning about fairness
Arguing about argument and evidence
Science education researchers agree about the importance of evidence in science practices such as argumentation. Yet, disagreements and ambiguities about what counts as “evidence” in science classrooms pervade the literature. We argue that these ambiguities and disagreements can be viewed as falling along three fault lines: (i) the source of evidence, specifically, whether it must be first‐hand; (ii) whether “evidence” must always be empirical; a…
The tension between pattern‐seeking and mechanistic reasoning in explanation construction
Through analysis of a classroom lesson led by a decorated teacher, we illustrate how instructional practices favor students seeking empirical patterns at the expense of using mechanistic reasoning. In the lesson, when students spontaneously come up with hypothetical mechanisms to explain why a light bulb in an electric circuit does or does not light, the teacher, following the guidance of standardized curricula, redirects them toward pattern‐seek…
Contentious Contents
According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on ‘the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e’: that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e.I propose a new conditi…
Why Local Realistic Theories Violate, Nontrivially, the Quantum Mechanical EPR Perfect Correlations
Using the Kochen–Specker contradiction, I prove that ‘local realistic’ theories predict nontrivial violations of the quantum mechanical EPR-type perfect anticorrelations. The proof invokes the same stochastic local realism conditions used in Bell arguments. For a class of theories called ‘orthodox spin theories’, the perfect anticorrelations used in the proof emerge from rotational symmetry. Therefore, an orthodox spin theorist must abandon eithe…
Should we Explain the EPR Correlations Causally
Using three intuitive notions about causes, including Redhead's robustness condition, I formulate necessary conditions on partial causes. I then demonstrate that we cannot explain the EPR correlations in terms of partial causes unless we abandon the quantum mechanical framework and adopt a nonlocal hidden-variable theory. The argument, unlike its predecessors, does not appeal to relativity theory
Should we Explain the EPR Correlations Causally
Using three intuitive notions about causes, including Redhead's robustness condition, I formulate necessary conditions on partial causes. I then demonstrate that we cannot explain the EPR correlations in terms of partial causes unless we abandon the quantum mechanical framework and adopt a nonlocal hidden-variable theory. The argument, unlike its predecessors, does not appeal to relativity theory
Contentious Contents
According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on ‘the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e’: that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e.I propose a new conditi…
Should we Explain the EPR Correlations Causally
Using three intuitive notions about causes, including Redhead's robustness condition, I formulate necessary conditions on partial causes. I then demonstrate that we cannot explain the EPR correlations in terms of partial causes unless we abandon the quantum mechanical framework and adopt a nonlocal hidden-variable theory. The argument, unlike its predecessors, does not appeal to relativity theory
Why Local Realistic Theories Violate, Nontrivially, the Quantum Mechanical EPR Perfect Correlations
Using the Kochen–Specker contradiction, I prove that ‘local realistic’ theories predict nontrivial violations of the quantum mechanical EPR-type perfect anticorrelations. The proof invokes the same stochastic local realism conditions used in Bell arguments. For a class of theories called ‘orthodox spin theories’, the perfect anticorrelations used in the proof emerge from rotational symmetry. Therefore, an orthodox spin theorist must abandon eithe…
Contentious Contents
According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on ‘the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e’: that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e.I propose a new conditi…
The tension between pattern‐seeking and mechanistic reasoning in explanation construction
Through analysis of a classroom lesson led by a decorated teacher, we illustrate how instructional practices favor students seeking empirical patterns at the expense of using mechanistic reasoning. In the lesson, when students spontaneously come up with hypothetical mechanisms to explain why a light bulb in an electric circuit does or does not light, the teacher, following the guidance of standardized curricula, redirects them toward pattern‐seek…
Arguing about argument and evidence
Science education researchers agree about the importance of evidence in science practices such as argumentation. Yet, disagreements and ambiguities about what counts as “evidence” in science classrooms pervade the literature. We argue that these ambiguities and disagreements can be viewed as falling along three fault lines: (i) the source of evidence, specifically, whether it must be first‐hand; (ii) whether “evidence” must always be empirical; a…
How a child entangles empathy and computational thinking in reasoning about fairness
Epistemology (6 obras) · Argument (complex analysis) (4 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras) · Psychology (3 obras) · Curriculum (2 obras) · Educational Strategies and Epistemologies (2 obras) · EPR paradox (2 obras) · Law (2 obras)