Uriah Kriegel
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1106759 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Uriah Kriegel |
| PRENOMES | Uriah |
| SOBRENOME | Kriegel |
| ASSINATURA | KRIEGEL U |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Rice University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 37 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 36 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 32 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 6 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2002 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
What is knowledge by acquaintance
Russell famously posited a type of knowledge distinct from and irreducible to propositional knowledge, which he called knowledge by acquaintance . In recent years, several epistemologists have reignited interest in knowledge by acquaintance, pointing out an array of theoretical jobs it is serviceable in performing. Nonetheless knowledge by acquaintance continues to be met with resistance and disregard. I surmise that this has partly to do with th…
Mood and Wellbeing
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind is an annual publication of some of the most cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind. The themes covered in this fourth volume are twenty-first-century idealism, acquaintance and perception, and acquaintance and consciousness. It also contains a book symposium on David Chalmers’ Reality+, and a historical article on Aristotle’s philosophy of mind.
Beatrice Edgell’s myth of the given
Wilfrid Sellars' ‘myth of the given' had a momentous influence on 20th-century epistemology, putting under pressure the internalist foundationalism so prominent in early analytic philosophy. In this paper, I argue that the core themes in Sellars' argument are anticipated in the work of the London philosopher and psychologist Beatrice Edgell (1871-1948). Edgell explicitly argued that “‘knowledge by acquaintance' is a myth invented by epistemology”…
Inner awareness
We present a new argument in favor of the Awareness Principle, the principle that one is always aware of one’s concurrent conscious states. Informally, the argument is this: (1) Your conscious states are such that you can attend to them without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention ; but (2) You cannot come to attend to something without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention unless you are already aware of that thi…
Event plenitude
Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First
Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p ”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance . On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p . This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate a sympathetic reconsideration
The Sublime of Consciousness
The aesthetic tradition has identified as paradigmatically sublime such objects as imposing mountains and intense storms, as well as monumental art. But the tradition also acknowledges less paradigmatic cases, including sometimes mathematical structures or abstract concepts. In this paper, we argue that there is also a case for considering phenomenal consciousness—the experiential quality of subjective awareness—as a sublime phenomenon. One appre…
Brentano on consciousness, intentionality, value, will, and emotion
It is a regrettable feature of this book symposium that it appears only after the book itself. If I could solicit from three outstanding philosophers detailed analyses of substantial portions of the book before publishing it, the book would have been far better. Below, I indicate some of the ways the book would have been better
Précis of Brentano ' s Philosophical System
Here is a rather difficult two-part question: How may we grasp (a) the nature of reality and (b) the nature of value? As I understand the man, answering this question was the principal, overarching aim of Franz Brentano’s philosophical work. More specifically, he wanted to provide an answer that respected a self-imposed theoretical constraint, namely, that our grasp of a thing’s status as real or as valuable be ultimately grounded in direct encou…
The epistemology of intentionality notional constituents vs. direct grasp
Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano's repeated attempts to analyz…
The Structure of Phenomenal Justification
An increasing number of epistemologists defend the notion that some perceptual experiences can immediately justify some beliefs and do so in virtue of (some of) their phenomenal properties. But this view, which we may call phenomenal dogmatism, is also the target of various objections. Here I want to consider an objection that may be put as follows: what is so special about perceptual phenomenology that only it can immediately justify beliefs, wh…
A Fitting-Attitude Approach to Aesthetic Value
It is a noteworthy disanalogy between contemporary ethics and aesthetics that the fitting-attitude account of value, so prominent in contemporary ethics, sees comparatively little play in aesthetics. The aim of this paper is to articulate what a systematic fitting-attitude-style framework for understanding aesthetic value might look like. In the bulk of the paper, I sketch possible fitting-attitude-style accounts of three central aesthetic values…
Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience
Egalitarian vs. Elitist Plenitude
Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction
Phenomenal Grounds of Epistemic Value
Imagine a zombie world that looks "from the outside" just like ours, but where there is no phenomenal consciousness. Creatures that look like us move about just as we do and make the same noises we do, but nobodyexperiencesorfeelsanything. How much of the epistemic value that's exemplified in our world survives in that one? The short answer is: any kind of epistemic value that requires the occurrence of consciousness for its exemplification canno…
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind is an annual publication of some of the most cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind. The philosophy of mind has, for at least half a decade, been torn between a traditional, armchair-led approach and a naturalistic, empirically driven approach. The most prestigious general philosophy journals tend to favor the traditional approach, while journals dedicated to the philosophy of mind tend to favor the natur…
The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons
In this chapter Uriah Kriegel and Mark Timmons apply to the feeling of respect an approach that has become common in understanding other mental phenomena, such as emotions. They distinguish the functional role of respect in moral philosophy (such as the types of treatment that respect leads to), which is described third-personally, from the phenomenological account of what it feels like to experience respect, which is described first-personally. …
The concreteness of objects
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
This book provides a panoramic view of the state of the art in current philosophical research on consciousness. Featuring some of the most prominent contributors to the field, it explores (1) the wide range of types of consciousness there may be, (2) the many psychological phenomena with which consciousness interacts, and (3) the various views concerning the ultimate relationship between consciousness and the physical reality.
The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School
The name the “Prague School of Brentano” refers to three generations of thinkers who temporarily or permanently lived in Prague, bound together by teacher/student relationships, and who accepted the main views of Franz Brentano ́s philosophy. The chapter focuses on describing the reistic model of mind developed in Prague by Karl Kraus and his students especially in relation to intentionality, values and judgment. It also offers a short overview o…
Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness
Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson , Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003a, 2003b, 2009, Thomas , Smith , Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, ). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpret…
The Varieties of Consciousness
Recent work on consciousness has featured a number of debates on the existence and character of controversial types of phenomenal experience. Perhaps the best-known is the debate over the existence of a sui generis, irreducible cognitive phenomenology - a phenomenology proper to thought. Another concerns the existence of a sui generis phenomenology of agency. Such debates bring up a more general question: how many types of sui generis, irreducibl…
Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality
How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving
Consciousness, Theories of
Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience's phenomenal character . Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys the currently prominent theories, paying special att…
Naturalizing Subjective Character
Panic theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness
Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is "one and the same as" (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference between those mental states that have phenomenal charac…
Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First
Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p ”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance . On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p . This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate a sympathetic reconsideration
Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles
A Fitting-Attitude Approach to Aesthetic Value
It is a noteworthy disanalogy between contemporary ethics and aesthetics that the fitting-attitude account of value, so prominent in contemporary ethics, sees comparatively little play in aesthetics. The aim of this paper is to articulate what a systematic fitting-attitude-style framework for understanding aesthetic value might look like. In the bulk of the paper, I sketch possible fitting-attitude-style accounts of three central aesthetic values…
Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness
Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson , Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003a, 2003b, 2009, Thomas , Smith , Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, ). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpret…
Thought and Thing
Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring
Les discussions philosophiques actuelles sur le problème de la conscience [consciousness] se concentrent sur la question des qualia, ou qualités sensorielles. Mais les auteurs traditionnels au sujet de la conscience - tels que Kant et William James - s'intéressaient davantage à un autre aspect de l'expérience consciente, à savoir le fait que lorsqu' on est conscient [conscious], on est en même temps, et de façon permanente, conscient de soi-même …
Panic theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness
Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is "one and the same as" (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference between those mental states that have phenomenal charac…
Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring
Les discussions philosophiques actuelles sur le problème de la conscience [consciousness] se concentrent sur la question des qualia, ou qualités sensorielles. Mais les auteurs traditionnels au sujet de la conscience - tels que Kant et William James - s'intéressaient davantage à un autre aspect de l'expérience consciente, à savoir le fait que lorsqu' on est conscient [conscious], on est en même temps, et de façon permanente, conscient de soi-même …
Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles
Naturalizing Subjective Character
Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
Leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the representational theory of consciousness and the higher-order monitoring theory. In this pioneering collection of essays, leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that consciousness always involves some form of self-awareness. The self-representat…
Critical Notices
Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again, MARK ROWLANDS. Montreal and Kingston, and Ithaca
Consciousness, Theories of
Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience's phenomenal character . Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys the currently prominent theories, paying special att…
A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness
One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), face is what we might call "the why question": why would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the cross-order integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousne…
Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality
How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving
Subjective Consciousness
Uriah Kriegel develops an objective theory of what it is for a mental state to be conscious. The theory is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental states differ from unconscious ones in that they represent themselves in a very specific way.
The Sources of Intentionality
What do paintings, thoughts, words, desires, photographs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness that some items exhibit while others do not.
Thought and Thing
L'empirisme introspectif
Lorsque je me réveille le matin, je trouve ma femme à côté de moi et notre chien lové entre nous. Elle est calme et il est petit. Le faible bruit de leur respiration m’enveloppe tandis que je reprends progressivement conscience. Je repousse la couverture ; la fraîcheur de l’air me frappe. Je vais dans la cuisine et tourne le robinet pour me remplir un verre d’eau. Je suis l’aiguille des secondes sur
The Varieties of Consciousness
Recent work on consciousness has featured a number of debates on the existence and character of controversial types of phenomenal experience. Perhaps the best-known is the debate over the existence of a sui generis, irreducible cognitive phenomenology - a phenomenology proper to thought. Another concerns the existence of a sui generis phenomenology of agency. Such debates bring up a more general question: how many types of sui generis, irreducibl…
Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness
Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson , Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003a, 2003b, 2009, Thomas , Smith , Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, ). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpret…
The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School
The name the “Prague School of Brentano” refers to three generations of thinkers who temporarily or permanently lived in Prague, bound together by teacher/student relationships, and who accepted the main views of Franz Brentano ́s philosophy. The chapter focuses on describing the reistic model of mind developed in Prague by Karl Kraus and his students especially in relation to intentionality, values and judgment. It also offers a short overview o…
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
This book provides a panoramic view of the state of the art in current philosophical research on consciousness. Featuring some of the most prominent contributors to the field, it explores (1) the wide range of types of consciousness there may be, (2) the many psychological phenomena with which consciousness interacts, and (3) the various views concerning the ultimate relationship between consciousness and the physical reality.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind is an annual publication of some of the most cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind. The philosophy of mind has, for at least half a decade, been torn between a traditional, armchair-led approach and a naturalistic, empirically driven approach. The most prestigious general philosophy journals tend to favor the traditional approach, while journals dedicated to the philosophy of mind tend to favor the natur…
The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons
In this chapter Uriah Kriegel and Mark Timmons apply to the feeling of respect an approach that has become common in understanding other mental phenomena, such as emotions. They distinguish the functional role of respect in moral philosophy (such as the types of treatment that respect leads to), which is described third-personally, from the phenomenological account of what it feels like to experience respect, which is described first-personally. …
The concreteness of objects
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1
Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience
Egalitarian vs. Elitist Plenitude
Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction
Phenomenal Grounds of Epistemic Value
Imagine a zombie world that looks "from the outside" just like ours, but where there is no phenomenal consciousness. Creatures that look like us move about just as we do and make the same noises we do, but nobodyexperiencesorfeelsanything. How much of the epistemic value that's exemplified in our world survives in that one? The short answer is: any kind of epistemic value that requires the occurrence of consciousness for its exemplification canno…
Philosophy (32 obras) · Epistemology (29 obras) · Psychology (26 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (19 obras) · Consciousness (11 obras) · Computer Science (10 obras) · Metaphysics (10 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (9 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (9 obras)