Tim Henning
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1153499 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Tim Henning |
| PRENOMES | Tim |
| SOBRENOME | Henning |
| ASSINATURA | HENNING T |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0704-8651 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2011 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums
This article attempts to do justice to two conflicting positions in current public debates. On the one hand, it defends a strong version of scientific freedom, according to which science should be free, not only from external obstacles and pressures but also from criticism that is based on reasons “of the wrong kind.” The only admissible criterion in debates about scientific claims, I argue, is whether there is sufficient evidence for their truth…
Killing, letting die, and normative inertia
According to commonsense and deontological ethics, it is impermissible to kill a person in order to save the life of another person, all else being equal. But why? This article suggests a justification of this restriction. It appeals to the idea of normative inertia —very roughly, to the idea that in practical decisions, changing course is harder to justify than staying on track. So, in a nutshell, the reason why we may not kill one person to sav…
Numbers without aggregation
Suppose we can save either a larger group of persons or a distinct, smaller group from some harm. Many people think that, all else equal, we ought to save the greater number. This article defends this view (with qualifications). But unlike earlier theories, it does not rely on the idea that several people's interests or claims receive greater aggregate weight. The argument starts from the idea that due to their stakes, the affected people have cl…
Die Zukunft der Menschheit – soll es uns weiter geben?
An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics
Commentary 2
This paper discusses a case vignette that captures an ethically challenging situation in qualitative research. The study was about families who had experienced a life-saving bone marrow transplantation between siblings, who were children at the time of transplantation. A difficult situation emerged during a joint family interview that took place a few years after the transplantation. Parents, donor and the recipient were present, both still child…
From a Rational Point of View
When we discuss normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, hypothetical imperatives (or “anankastic conditionals”), motivating reasons, or weakness and strength of will, we often use verbs like “believe” and “want” to capture a relevant subject’s perspective. According to the received view, what these verbs do is describe the subject’s mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental sta…
From a Rational Point of View
Tim Henning applies insights from the philosophy of language and formal semantics to problems in practical philosophy, and solves notorious puzzles about the reasons we have, what it is rational for us to do, and what we ought to do. He offers a more unified understanding of normative and practical discourse.
Grundbildung im Strafvollzug
Mit dieser aktuellen Bestandsaufnahme der Alphabetisierungs- und Grundbildungskurse im deutschen Strafvollzug schließen die Autoren eine Lücke in der Datenerhebung und -analyse. Bedarfe und Bedingungen wurden in qualitativen Interviews mit Experten, Lehrenden und Häftlingen festgestellt und in den rechtlichen Rahmen eingeordnet. Die Autoren betrachten qualitative und quantitative Indikatoren zur Alphabetisierungsarbeit mit Straffälligen und liefe…
From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries
Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction acc…
Normative Reasons Contextualism
This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context‐sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context‐sensitivity of the normative “ought” and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone no…
Why Be Yourself? Kantian Respect and Frankfurtian Identification
Harry Frankfurt has claimed that some of our desires are ‘internal’, i.e., our own in a special sense. I defend the idea that a desire's being internal matters in a normative, reasons-involving sense, and offer an explanation for this fact. The explanation is Kantian in spirit. We have reason to respect the desires of persons in so far as respecting them is a way to respect the persons who have them (in some cases, ourselves). But if desires matt…
From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries
Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction acc…
Normative Reasons Contextualism
This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context‐sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context‐sensitivity of the normative “ought” and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone no…
An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics
Why Be Yourself? Kantian Respect and Frankfurtian Identification
Harry Frankfurt has claimed that some of our desires are ‘internal’, i.e., our own in a special sense. I defend the idea that a desire's being internal matters in a normative, reasons-involving sense, and offer an explanation for this fact. The explanation is Kantian in spirit. We have reason to respect the desires of persons in so far as respecting them is a way to respect the persons who have them (in some cases, ourselves). But if desires matt…
Why Be Yourself? Kantian Respect and Frankfurtian Identification
Harry Frankfurt has claimed that some of our desires are ‘internal’, i.e., our own in a special sense. I defend the idea that a desire's being internal matters in a normative, reasons-involving sense, and offer an explanation for this fact. The explanation is Kantian in spirit. We have reason to respect the desires of persons in so far as respecting them is a way to respect the persons who have them (in some cases, ourselves). But if desires matt…
Normative Reasons Contextualism
This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context‐sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context‐sensitivity of the normative “ought” and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone no…
From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries
Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction acc…
Grundbildung im Strafvollzug
Mit dieser aktuellen Bestandsaufnahme der Alphabetisierungs- und Grundbildungskurse im deutschen Strafvollzug schließen die Autoren eine Lücke in der Datenerhebung und -analyse. Bedarfe und Bedingungen wurden in qualitativen Interviews mit Experten, Lehrenden und Häftlingen festgestellt und in den rechtlichen Rahmen eingeordnet. Die Autoren betrachten qualitative und quantitative Indikatoren zur Alphabetisierungsarbeit mit Straffälligen und liefe…
From a Rational Point of View
When we discuss normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, hypothetical imperatives (or “anankastic conditionals”), motivating reasons, or weakness and strength of will, we often use verbs like “believe” and “want” to capture a relevant subject’s perspective. According to the received view, what these verbs do is describe the subject’s mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental sta…
From a Rational Point of View
Tim Henning applies insights from the philosophy of language and formal semantics to problems in practical philosophy, and solves notorious puzzles about the reasons we have, what it is rational for us to do, and what we ought to do. He offers a more unified understanding of normative and practical discourse.
Commentary 2
This paper discusses a case vignette that captures an ethically challenging situation in qualitative research. The study was about families who had experienced a life-saving bone marrow transplantation between siblings, who were children at the time of transplantation. A difficult situation emerged during a joint family interview that took place a few years after the transplantation. Parents, donor and the recipient were present, both still child…
Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics
An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
Die Zukunft der Menschheit – soll es uns weiter geben?
Numbers without aggregation
Suppose we can save either a larger group of persons or a distinct, smaller group from some harm. Many people think that, all else equal, we ought to save the greater number. This article defends this view (with qualifications). But unlike earlier theories, it does not rely on the idea that several people's interests or claims receive greater aggregate weight. The argument starts from the idea that due to their stakes, the affected people have cl…
Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums
This article attempts to do justice to two conflicting positions in current public debates. On the one hand, it defends a strong version of scientific freedom, according to which science should be free, not only from external obstacles and pressures but also from criticism that is based on reasons “of the wrong kind.” The only admissible criterion in debates about scientific claims, I argue, is whether there is sufficient evidence for their truth…
Killing, letting die, and normative inertia
According to commonsense and deontological ethics, it is impermissible to kill a person in order to save the life of another person, all else being equal. But why? This article suggests a justification of this restriction. It appeals to the idea of normative inertia —very roughly, to the idea that in practical decisions, changing course is harder to justify than staying on track. So, in a nutshell, the reason why we may not kill one person to sav…
Epistemology (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Free Will and Agency (5 obras) · Normative (5 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (3 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 obras)