Samuel Kimpton‐nye
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1201922 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Samuel Kimpton‐nye |
| PRENOMES | Samuel |
| SOBRENOME | Kimpton‐nye |
| ASSINATURA | NYE S K |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Bristol |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9774-7247 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2019 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Relative modality and real modality
This paper discusses some issues for Leech’s ‘Modal Transcendentalism’. The first concerns what Modal Transcendentalism might say about nomological modality, the second concerns Modal Transcendentalism’s claim to provide an account of real modality. To this end, I draw some connections between the (failure of) duality of the modal operators, amodalism (the thesis that there are some propositions with no modal status), and realism and anti-realism…
The Possibility Bias is not Justified
Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias…
Debating powers
Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird disagree about which properties are powers and, correspondingly, about the extent of the philosophical work to which powers may be put. Unfortunately, there is an important respect in which these authors are talking past each other and so the reason for their disagreement remains obscured. I highlight what has gone wrong in their recent exchange, attempt to clear up the confusion and pinpoint the true source of …
On some objections to the powers-BSA
This paper responds to Friend's (2023) critique of the Powers-BSA, a view according to which laws of nature are efficient descriptions of how modally laden properties (powers) are possibly distributed in spacetime. In the course of this response, the paper discusses the nature of scientific and metaphysical explanation, the aim of science, and the structure of modal space
How to be a powers theorist about functional laws, conservation laws and symmetries
This paper defends an account of the laws of nature in terms of irreducibly modal properties (aka powers ) from the threat posed by functional laws, conservation laws and symmetries. It thus shows how powers theorists can avoid ad hoc explanations and resist an inflated ontology of powers and governing laws. The key is to understand laws not as flowing from the essences of powers , as per Bird (2007), but as features of a description of how power…
Pandispositionalism and the metaphysics of powers
Some philosophers maintain that physical properties are irreducibly modal: that properties are powers . Powers are then employed to provide explanations of other phenomena of philosophical interest such as laws of nature and modality. There is, however, a dispute among powers theorists about how far the powers ontology extends: are all manner of properties at all levels of fundamentality powers or are powers only to be found among the fundamental…
Laws of Nature
This paper shows how a niche account of the metaphysics of laws of nature and physical properties-the Powers-BSA-can underpin both a sense in which the laws are metaphysically necessary and a sense in which it is true that the laws could have been different. The ability to reconcile entrenched disagreement should count in favour of a philosophical theory, so this paper constitutes a novel argument for the Powers-BSA by showing how it can reconcil…
Reconsidering the Dispositional Essentialist Canon
Dispositional Essentialism is a unified anti-Humean account of the metaphysics of low-level physical properties and laws of nature. In this paper, I articulate the view that I label Canonical Dispositional Essentialism (CDE), which comprises a structuralist metaphysics of properties and an account of laws as relations in the property structure. I then present an alternative anti-Humean account of properties and laws (still somewhat in the disposi…
Necessary Laws and the Problem of Counterlegals
Substantive counterlegal discourse poses a problem for those according to whom the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I discern two types of necessitarianism about laws: dispositional essentialism and modal necessitarianism. I argue that Toby Handfield’s response to the problem of counterlegals cannot help the modal necessitarian, according to whom all possible worlds are identical with respect to the laws. I thus propose a fictionalist…
The Nature of Contingency
The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism. By Wilson Alastair. (Oxford: OUP, 2020. Pp. 219. Price £50.00.) Samuel Kimpton-Nye Samuel Kimpton-Nye University of Bristol, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 71, Issue 2, April 2021, Pages 444–447, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa043 Published: 02 Jun…
Can Hardcore Actualism Validate S5
Hardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world (see, e.g., Borghini and Williams (2008), Jacobs (2010), Vetter (2015)). I bolster HA, and elucidate the very nature of possibility (and necessity) according to HA, by considering if it can validate S5 modal logic. Interestingly, different considerations pull in different directions on this issue. To resolve the tension, we are forced to think hard a…
Necessary Laws and the Problem of Counterlegals
Substantive counterlegal discourse poses a problem for those according to whom the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I discern two types of necessitarianism about laws: dispositional essentialism and modal necessitarianism. I argue that Toby Handfield’s response to the problem of counterlegals cannot help the modal necessitarian, according to whom all possible worlds are identical with respect to the laws. I thus propose a fictionalist…
Laws of Nature
This paper shows how a niche account of the metaphysics of laws of nature and physical properties-the Powers-BSA-can underpin both a sense in which the laws are metaphysically necessary and a sense in which it is true that the laws could have been different. The ability to reconcile entrenched disagreement should count in favour of a philosophical theory, so this paper constitutes a novel argument for the Powers-BSA by showing how it can reconcil…
The Nature of Contingency
The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism. By Wilson Alastair. (Oxford: OUP, 2020. Pp. 219. Price £50.00.) Samuel Kimpton-Nye Samuel Kimpton-Nye University of Bristol, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 71, Issue 2, April 2021, Pages 444–447, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa043 Published: 02 Jun…
Can Hardcore Actualism Validate S5
Hardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world (see, e.g., Borghini and Williams (2008), Jacobs (2010), Vetter (2015)). I bolster HA, and elucidate the very nature of possibility (and necessity) according to HA, by considering if it can validate S5 modal logic. Interestingly, different considerations pull in different directions on this issue. To resolve the tension, we are forced to think hard a…
Can Hardcore Actualism Validate S5
Hardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world (see, e.g., Borghini and Williams (2008), Jacobs (2010), Vetter (2015)). I bolster HA, and elucidate the very nature of possibility (and necessity) according to HA, by considering if it can validate S5 modal logic. Interestingly, different considerations pull in different directions on this issue. To resolve the tension, we are forced to think hard a…
Necessary Laws and the Problem of Counterlegals
Substantive counterlegal discourse poses a problem for those according to whom the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I discern two types of necessitarianism about laws: dispositional essentialism and modal necessitarianism. I argue that Toby Handfield’s response to the problem of counterlegals cannot help the modal necessitarian, according to whom all possible worlds are identical with respect to the laws. I thus propose a fictionalist…
The Nature of Contingency
The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism. By Wilson Alastair. (Oxford: OUP, 2020. Pp. 219. Price £50.00.) Samuel Kimpton-Nye Samuel Kimpton-Nye University of Bristol, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 71, Issue 2, April 2021, Pages 444–447, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa043 Published: 02 Jun…
Reconsidering the Dispositional Essentialist Canon
Dispositional Essentialism is a unified anti-Humean account of the metaphysics of low-level physical properties and laws of nature. In this paper, I articulate the view that I label Canonical Dispositional Essentialism (CDE), which comprises a structuralist metaphysics of properties and an account of laws as relations in the property structure. I then present an alternative anti-Humean account of properties and laws (still somewhat in the disposi…
Pandispositionalism and the metaphysics of powers
Some philosophers maintain that physical properties are irreducibly modal: that properties are powers . Powers are then employed to provide explanations of other phenomena of philosophical interest such as laws of nature and modality. There is, however, a dispute among powers theorists about how far the powers ontology extends: are all manner of properties at all levels of fundamentality powers or are powers only to be found among the fundamental…
Laws of Nature
This paper shows how a niche account of the metaphysics of laws of nature and physical properties-the Powers-BSA-can underpin both a sense in which the laws are metaphysically necessary and a sense in which it is true that the laws could have been different. The ability to reconcile entrenched disagreement should count in favour of a philosophical theory, so this paper constitutes a novel argument for the Powers-BSA by showing how it can reconcil…
How to be a powers theorist about functional laws, conservation laws and symmetries
This paper defends an account of the laws of nature in terms of irreducibly modal properties (aka powers ) from the threat posed by functional laws, conservation laws and symmetries. It thus shows how powers theorists can avoid ad hoc explanations and resist an inflated ontology of powers and governing laws. The key is to understand laws not as flowing from the essences of powers , as per Bird (2007), but as features of a description of how power…
Debating powers
Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird disagree about which properties are powers and, correspondingly, about the extent of the philosophical work to which powers may be put. Unfortunately, there is an important respect in which these authors are talking past each other and so the reason for their disagreement remains obscured. I highlight what has gone wrong in their recent exchange, attempt to clear up the confusion and pinpoint the true source of …
On some objections to the powers-BSA
This paper responds to Friend's (2023) critique of the Powers-BSA, a view according to which laws of nature are efficient descriptions of how modally laden properties (powers) are possibly distributed in spacetime. In the course of this response, the paper discusses the nature of scientific and metaphysical explanation, the aim of science, and the structure of modal space
The Possibility Bias is not Justified
Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias…
Relative modality and real modality
This paper discusses some issues for Leech’s ‘Modal Transcendentalism’. The first concerns what Modal Transcendentalism might say about nomological modality, the second concerns Modal Transcendentalism’s claim to provide an account of real modality. To this end, I draw some connections between the (failure of) duality of the modal operators, amodalism (the thesis that there are some propositions with no modal status), and realism and anti-realism…
Epistemology (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 obras) · Metaphysics (7 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 obras) · Modal (5 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 obras)