Kengo Miyazono
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1235633 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Kengo Miyazono |
| PRENOMES | Kengo |
| SOBRENOME | Miyazono |
| ASSINATURA | MIYAZONO K |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Hokkaido University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4093-6877 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 15 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2015 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Philosophical Significance of Artificial Intuitions
This paper explores the ways in which large language models (LLMs) can be used in experimental philosophy. LLMs can be used in different ways for different purposes in experimental philosophy. Among others, we focus on what we call “Non-Predictive Research”, in which LLMs’ “intuitive” responses to thought experiment cases are not expected to be predictive of, or analogous to, human subjects’ intuitive responses to them. In effect, Non-Predictive …
The Explanatory Burden of a Heterogeneous Account of Delusions
Is health philosophically distinctive
This commentary critically examines Barnes’ ameliorative skepticism about health, which is a distinctive form of skepticism. While we agree with Barnes that health is indeed messy, involving biological, normative, societal, and phenomenological factors in a complex manner that defies simplistic explanation, we do not think that health is messy in a distinctive way. We argue that health is in fact remarkably similar to another messy phenomenon tha…
Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism
Libertarian paternalism is a weak form of paternalism that recommends nudges rather than bans, restrictions, or other strong interventions. Nudges influence people’s choice by modifying contextual factors (the “choice architecture”). This paper explores the possibility of an epistemic analogue of l ibertarian paternalism. What I call “ epistemic libertarian p aternalism” is a weak form of epistemic paternalism that recommends “epistemic nudges” r…
Imagination as a generative source of justification
One of the most exciting debates in philosophy of imagination in recent years has been over the epistemic use of imagination where imagination epistemically contributes to justifying beliefs and acquiring knowledge. This paper defends “generationism about imagination” according to which imagination is a generative source, rather than a preservative source, of justification. In other words, imagination generates new justification above and beyond …
Special Issue on Covid-19 Collective Irrationalities
Hume and the Cognitive Phenomenology of Belief
This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from A Treatise of Human Nature as well as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In both…
A group identification account of collective epistemic vices
This paper offers an account of collective epistemic vices, which we call the “group identification account”. The group identification account attributes collective epistemic vices to the groups that are constituted by “group identification”, which is a primitive and non-doxastic self-understanding as a group member (Turner, 1982; Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Pacherie, 2013; Salice & Miyazono, 2020). The distinctive feature of the group …
Visual Experiences without Presentational Phenomenology
A number of philosophers claim that visual experiences have a peculiar phenomenal character that is “presentational”. According to what I call the “Visual Presentationality Thesis”, this peculiar phenomenal character, presentational phenomenology, is not merely a contingent feature but is a necessary feature of visual experiences. Necessarily, visual experiences have presentational phenomenology. The main aim of this paper is to argue against the…
Vividness as a natural kind
Imaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on t…
Social epistemological conception of delusion
The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic p…
Art and Belief
In this volume, the contributors discuss a variety of philosophical issues concerning art and belief. Very roughly, the issues can be divided into three groups: the issues in epistemology (e.g., ‘Can we acquire justified belief or knowledge through fiction?’) [Section I and II of the volume]; the issues in philosophy of mind (e.g., ‘What does the experience of fiction tell us about the nature of beliefs?’) [Section III]; and the issues in aesthet…
Does functionalism entail extended mind
Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs
Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by …
Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions
In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-eviden…
Does functionalism entail extended mind
Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions
In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-eviden…
Vividness as a natural kind
Imaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on t…
Social epistemological conception of delusion
The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic p…
Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs
Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by …
Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions
In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-eviden…
Does functionalism entail extended mind
Art and Belief
In this volume, the contributors discuss a variety of philosophical issues concerning art and belief. Very roughly, the issues can be divided into three groups: the issues in epistemology (e.g., ‘Can we acquire justified belief or knowledge through fiction?’) [Section I and II of the volume]; the issues in philosophy of mind (e.g., ‘What does the experience of fiction tell us about the nature of beliefs?’) [Section III]; and the issues in aesthet…
Visual Experiences without Presentational Phenomenology
A number of philosophers claim that visual experiences have a peculiar phenomenal character that is “presentational”. According to what I call the “Visual Presentationality Thesis”, this peculiar phenomenal character, presentational phenomenology, is not merely a contingent feature but is a necessary feature of visual experiences. Necessarily, visual experiences have presentational phenomenology. The main aim of this paper is to argue against the…
Vividness as a natural kind
Imaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on t…
Social epistemological conception of delusion
The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic p…
Special Issue on Covid-19 Collective Irrationalities
Hume and the Cognitive Phenomenology of Belief
This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from A Treatise of Human Nature as well as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In both…
A group identification account of collective epistemic vices
This paper offers an account of collective epistemic vices, which we call the “group identification account”. The group identification account attributes collective epistemic vices to the groups that are constituted by “group identification”, which is a primitive and non-doxastic self-understanding as a group member (Turner, 1982; Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Pacherie, 2013; Salice & Miyazono, 2020). The distinctive feature of the group …
Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism
Libertarian paternalism is a weak form of paternalism that recommends nudges rather than bans, restrictions, or other strong interventions. Nudges influence people’s choice by modifying contextual factors (the “choice architecture”). This paper explores the possibility of an epistemic analogue of l ibertarian paternalism. What I call “ epistemic libertarian p aternalism” is a weak form of epistemic paternalism that recommends “epistemic nudges” r…
Imagination as a generative source of justification
One of the most exciting debates in philosophy of imagination in recent years has been over the epistemic use of imagination where imagination epistemically contributes to justifying beliefs and acquiring knowledge. This paper defends “generationism about imagination” according to which imagination is a generative source, rather than a preservative source, of justification. In other words, imagination generates new justification above and beyond …
Is health philosophically distinctive
This commentary critically examines Barnes’ ameliorative skepticism about health, which is a distinctive form of skepticism. While we agree with Barnes that health is indeed messy, involving biological, normative, societal, and phenomenological factors in a complex manner that defies simplistic explanation, we do not think that health is messy in a distinctive way. We argue that health is in fact remarkably similar to another messy phenomenon tha…
Philosophical Significance of Artificial Intuitions
This paper explores the ways in which large language models (LLMs) can be used in experimental philosophy. LLMs can be used in different ways for different purposes in experimental philosophy. Among others, we focus on what we call “Non-Predictive Research”, in which LLMs’ “intuitive” responses to thought experiment cases are not expected to be predictive of, or analogous to, human subjects’ intuitive responses to them. In effect, Non-Predictive …
The Explanatory Burden of a Heterogeneous Account of Delusions
Epistemology (14 obras) · Philosophy (14 obras) · Psychology (13 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 obras) · Cognitive science (5 obras) · Mental Health and Psychiatry (5 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Aesthetics (4 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras)