Erica D Borghard
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1238641 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Erica D Borghard |
| PRENOMES | Erica D |
| SOBRENOME | Borghard |
| ASSINATURA | BORGHARD E D |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Columbia University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 179 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2011 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Deterrence by denial in cyberspace
Many scholars and practitioners are unconvinced that cyber deterrence is possible. This article aims to demonstrate why some of this skepticism is misplaced, as well as provide greater clarity and conceptual rigor to the proliferation of arguments within the United States about deterrence in cyberspace. Specifically, we argue that cyber deterrence frameworks that draw from the traditional nuclear deterrence literature and the logic of deterrence …
The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace
What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly comm…
Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber Proxies
Hizbullah and the Iranian Nuclear Programme
There are as many reasons for a nuclear-armed Tehran to become more circumspect with its proxies as there are for such groups to be emboldened
Allies and Airpower in Libya
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya was a success in several important respects: it helped topple Muammar Qaddafi's 42-year-old regime without the deployment of ground forces, with very low levels of collateral damage, and no NATO casualties. The successful overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, following a similar strategy (but with a greater emphasis on Special Operations Forces (SOF)), led a number of observers and analysts to…
The Cost of Empty Threats
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real-as oppo…
The Cost of Empty Threats
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real-as oppo…
The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace
What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly comm…
Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber Proxies
Deterrence by denial in cyberspace
Many scholars and practitioners are unconvinced that cyber deterrence is possible. This article aims to demonstrate why some of this skepticism is misplaced, as well as provide greater clarity and conceptual rigor to the proliferation of arguments within the United States about deterrence in cyberspace. Specifically, we argue that cyber deterrence frameworks that draw from the traditional nuclear deterrence literature and the logic of deterrence …
Hizbullah and the Iranian Nuclear Programme
There are as many reasons for a nuclear-armed Tehran to become more circumspect with its proxies as there are for such groups to be emboldened
The Cost of Empty Threats
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real-as oppo…
Allies and Airpower in Libya
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya was a success in several important respects: it helped topple Muammar Qaddafi's 42-year-old regime without the deployment of ground forces, with very low levels of collateral damage, and no NATO casualties. The successful overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, following a similar strategy (but with a greater emphasis on Special Operations Forces (SOF)), led a number of observers and analysts to…
Hizbullah and the Iranian Nuclear Programme
There are as many reasons for a nuclear-armed Tehran to become more circumspect with its proxies as there are for such groups to be emboldened
Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber Proxies
The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace
What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly comm…
Deterrence by denial in cyberspace
Many scholars and practitioners are unconvinced that cyber deterrence is possible. This article aims to demonstrate why some of this skepticism is misplaced, as well as provide greater clarity and conceptual rigor to the proliferation of arguments within the United States about deterrence in cyberspace. Specifically, we argue that cyber deterrence frameworks that draw from the traditional nuclear deterrence literature and the logic of deterrence …
Law (6 obras) · Political science (6 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Law and economics (4 obras) · Sociology (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Computer security (3 obras) · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (3 obras) · Political economy (3 obras) · Criminology (2 obras)