Betty Lane
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 126558 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Betty Lane |
| PRENOMES | Betty |
| SOBRENOME | Lane |
| ASSINATURA | LANE B |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Exeter |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4764-8598 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1964 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Socially Disruptive Technologies, Moral Progress, and Rule Following
One of the most ethically significant features of new and emerging 21st century technologies is their potential to disrupt the social status quo, for better or worse. Correspondingly, one of the most pressing questions in the philosophy and ethics of technology is how to understand and respond to this potential for social disruption. A prominent account of social disruption is what I call the “epistemic account,” according to which socially disru…
Vindicating universalism
How do we justify the normative standards to which we appeal in support of our moral progress judgments, given their historical and cultural contingency? To answer this question in a noncircular way, Elizabeth Anderson and Philip Kitcher appeal exclusively to formal features of the methodology by which a moral change was brought about; some moral methodologies are systematically less prone to bias than others and are therefore less vulnerable to …
Deep disagreement across moral revolutions
Moral revolutions are rightly coming to be recognised as a philosophically interesting and historically important mode of moral change. What is less often acknowledged is that the very characteristics that make a moral change revolutionary pose a fundamental challenge to the possibility of moral progress. This is because moral revolutions are characterised by a diachronic form of deep moral disagreement: moral agents on either side of a moral rev…
Prospects for pure procedural moral progress
Issues of methodology are central to the philosophy of moral progress. However, the idea that effective moral methodology, as well as being instrumental to progress, might also constitute progress has not been adequately explored. This paper will critically assess the merits of this idea – what I call ‘pure proceduralism about moral progress’ – taking Philip Kitcher's recent theory of ‘democratic contractualism’ (2021) as a test case. An epistemo…
Robert Baker
Attitudes of Youth toward the Aged
Vindicating universalism
How do we justify the normative standards to which we appeal in support of our moral progress judgments, given their historical and cultural contingency? To answer this question in a noncircular way, Elizabeth Anderson and Philip Kitcher appeal exclusively to formal features of the methodology by which a moral change was brought about; some moral methodologies are systematically less prone to bias than others and are therefore less vulnerable to …
Deep disagreement across moral revolutions
Moral revolutions are rightly coming to be recognised as a philosophically interesting and historically important mode of moral change. What is less often acknowledged is that the very characteristics that make a moral change revolutionary pose a fundamental challenge to the possibility of moral progress. This is because moral revolutions are characterised by a diachronic form of deep moral disagreement: moral agents on either side of a moral rev…
Attitudes of Youth toward the Aged
Attitudes of Youth toward the Aged
Robert Baker
Prospects for pure procedural moral progress
Issues of methodology are central to the philosophy of moral progress. However, the idea that effective moral methodology, as well as being instrumental to progress, might also constitute progress has not been adequately explored. This paper will critically assess the merits of this idea – what I call ‘pure proceduralism about moral progress’ – taking Philip Kitcher's recent theory of ‘democratic contractualism’ (2021) as a test case. An epistemo…
Deep disagreement across moral revolutions
Moral revolutions are rightly coming to be recognised as a philosophically interesting and historically important mode of moral change. What is less often acknowledged is that the very characteristics that make a moral change revolutionary pose a fundamental challenge to the possibility of moral progress. This is because moral revolutions are characterised by a diachronic form of deep moral disagreement: moral agents on either side of a moral rev…
Socially Disruptive Technologies, Moral Progress, and Rule Following
One of the most ethically significant features of new and emerging 21st century technologies is their potential to disrupt the social status quo, for better or worse. Correspondingly, one of the most pressing questions in the philosophy and ethics of technology is how to understand and respond to this potential for social disruption. A prominent account of social disruption is what I call the “epistemic account,” according to which socially disru…
Vindicating universalism
How do we justify the normative standards to which we appeal in support of our moral progress judgments, given their historical and cultural contingency? To answer this question in a noncircular way, Elizabeth Anderson and Philip Kitcher appeal exclusively to formal features of the methodology by which a moral change was brought about; some moral methodologies are systematically less prone to bias than others and are therefore less vulnerable to …
Sociology (6 obras) · Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Environmental ethics (3 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 obras) · Politics (2 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 obras) · Abortion (1 obras)