Adam Bales
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1273142 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Adam Bales |
| PRENOMES | Adam |
| SOBRENOME | Bales |
| ASSINATURA | BALES A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9629-0318 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2015 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
A polycrisis threat model for AI
A catastrophic AI threat model is a rigorous exploration of some particular mechanisms by which AI could potentially lead to catastrophic outcomes. In this article, I explore a polycrisis threat model. According to this model, AI will lead to a series of harms like disinformation and increased concentration of wealth and power. Interactions between these different harms will make things worse than they would have been had each harm operated in is…
AI takeover and human disempowerment
Some take seriously the possibility of artificial intelligence (AI) takeover, where AI systems seize power in a way that leads to human disempowerment. Assessing the likelihood of takeover requires answering empirical questions about the future of AI technologies and the context in which AI will operate. In many cases, philosophers are poorly placed to answer these questions. However, some prior questions are more amenable to philosophical techni…
Against willing servitude
Some people believe that advanced artificial intelligence systems (AIs) might, in the future, come to have moral status. Further, humans might be tempted to design such AIs that they serve us, carrying out tasks that make our lives better. This raises the question of whether designing AIs with moral status to be willing servants would problematically violate their autonomy. In this paper, I argue that it would in fact do so
Will AI avoid exploitation? Artificial general intelligence and expected utility theory
A simple argument suggests that we can fruitfully model advanced AI systems using expected utility theory. According to this argument, an agent will need to act as if maximising expected utility if they’re to avoid exploitation. Insofar as we should expect advanced AI to avoid exploitation, it follows that we should expected advanced AI to act as if maximising expected utility. I spell out this argument more carefully and demonstrate that it fail…
Artificial Intelligence
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has drawn attention to the technology's transformative potential, including what some see as its prospects for causing large-scale harm. We review two influential arguments purporting to show how AI could pose catastrophic risks. The first argument - theProblem of Power-Seeking- claims that, under certain assumptions, advanced AI systems are likely to engage in dangerous power-seeking behavior in pu…
Bad Apples and Broken Ladders
While pragmatic arguments are traditionally seen as supporting decision theory, recent discussions suggest the possibility of pragmatic arguments against this theory. I respond to two such arguments, and clarify what it would take for arguments of this sort to succeed
Supererogation and sequence
Morally supererogatory acts are those that go above and beyond the call of duty. More specifically: they are acts that, on any individual occasion, are good to do and also both permissible to do and permissible to refrain from doing. We challenge the way in which discussions of supererogation typically consider our choices and actions in isolation. Instead we consider sequences of supererogatory acts and omissions and show that some such sequence…
Resolutions provide reasons or
Why should we typically act in accordance with our resolutions when faced with the temptation to do otherwise? A much-maligned view suggests that we should do so because resolutions themselves provide us with reasons for action. We defend a version of this view, on which resolutions provide second-order reasons. This account avoids the objections typically taken to be fatal for the view that resolutions are reasons, including the prominent bootst…
Richness and rationality
Causal decision theory (CDT) is one of our most prominent theories of rational choice and the “why ain’cha rich?” argument (WAR) is one of the most prominent objections to this theory. According to WAR, CDT is not an adequate theory of rational choice because it leads agents to make decisions that foreseeably leave them less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other…
Decision-Theoretic Pluralism
A prominent philosophical debate concerns whether we should accept causal decision theory (CDT) or evidential decision theory (EDT) as our best theory of rational choice. However, instead of accepting one of these theories at the expense of the other, an alternative would be to accept that both theories play a partial role in the true account of rational choice. In this paper, I defend a pluralist account of this sort. In particular, I argue that…
Swiping
Swiping
Artificial Intelligence
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has drawn attention to the technology's transformative potential, including what some see as its prospects for causing large-scale harm. We review two influential arguments purporting to show how AI could pose catastrophic risks. The first argument - theProblem of Power-Seeking- claims that, under certain assumptions, advanced AI systems are likely to engage in dangerous power-seeking behavior in pu…
Will AI avoid exploitation? Artificial general intelligence and expected utility theory
A simple argument suggests that we can fruitfully model advanced AI systems using expected utility theory. According to this argument, an agent will need to act as if maximising expected utility if they’re to avoid exploitation. Insofar as we should expect advanced AI to avoid exploitation, it follows that we should expected advanced AI to act as if maximising expected utility. I spell out this argument more carefully and demonstrate that it fail…
Resolutions provide reasons or
Why should we typically act in accordance with our resolutions when faced with the temptation to do otherwise? A much-maligned view suggests that we should do so because resolutions themselves provide us with reasons for action. We defend a version of this view, on which resolutions provide second-order reasons. This account avoids the objections typically taken to be fatal for the view that resolutions are reasons, including the prominent bootst…
Richness and rationality
Causal decision theory (CDT) is one of our most prominent theories of rational choice and the “why ain’cha rich?” argument (WAR) is one of the most prominent objections to this theory. According to WAR, CDT is not an adequate theory of rational choice because it leads agents to make decisions that foreseeably leave them less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other…
Decision-Theoretic Pluralism
A prominent philosophical debate concerns whether we should accept causal decision theory (CDT) or evidential decision theory (EDT) as our best theory of rational choice. However, instead of accepting one of these theories at the expense of the other, an alternative would be to accept that both theories play a partial role in the true account of rational choice. In this paper, I defend a pluralist account of this sort. In particular, I argue that…
Swiping
Swiping
Richness and rationality
Causal decision theory (CDT) is one of our most prominent theories of rational choice and the “why ain’cha rich?” argument (WAR) is one of the most prominent objections to this theory. According to WAR, CDT is not an adequate theory of rational choice because it leads agents to make decisions that foreseeably leave them less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other…
Decision-Theoretic Pluralism
A prominent philosophical debate concerns whether we should accept causal decision theory (CDT) or evidential decision theory (EDT) as our best theory of rational choice. However, instead of accepting one of these theories at the expense of the other, an alternative would be to accept that both theories play a partial role in the true account of rational choice. In this paper, I defend a pluralist account of this sort. In particular, I argue that…
Supererogation and sequence
Morally supererogatory acts are those that go above and beyond the call of duty. More specifically: they are acts that, on any individual occasion, are good to do and also both permissible to do and permissible to refrain from doing. We challenge the way in which discussions of supererogation typically consider our choices and actions in isolation. Instead we consider sequences of supererogatory acts and omissions and show that some such sequence…
Resolutions provide reasons or
Why should we typically act in accordance with our resolutions when faced with the temptation to do otherwise? A much-maligned view suggests that we should do so because resolutions themselves provide us with reasons for action. We defend a version of this view, on which resolutions provide second-order reasons. This account avoids the objections typically taken to be fatal for the view that resolutions are reasons, including the prominent bootst…
Bad Apples and Broken Ladders
While pragmatic arguments are traditionally seen as supporting decision theory, recent discussions suggest the possibility of pragmatic arguments against this theory. I respond to two such arguments, and clarify what it would take for arguments of this sort to succeed
Artificial Intelligence
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has drawn attention to the technology's transformative potential, including what some see as its prospects for causing large-scale harm. We review two influential arguments purporting to show how AI could pose catastrophic risks. The first argument - theProblem of Power-Seeking- claims that, under certain assumptions, advanced AI systems are likely to engage in dangerous power-seeking behavior in pu…
A polycrisis threat model for AI
A catastrophic AI threat model is a rigorous exploration of some particular mechanisms by which AI could potentially lead to catastrophic outcomes. In this article, I explore a polycrisis threat model. According to this model, AI will lead to a series of harms like disinformation and increased concentration of wealth and power. Interactions between these different harms will make things worse than they would have been had each harm operated in is…
AI takeover and human disempowerment
Some take seriously the possibility of artificial intelligence (AI) takeover, where AI systems seize power in a way that leads to human disempowerment. Assessing the likelihood of takeover requires answering empirical questions about the future of AI technologies and the context in which AI will operate. In many cases, philosophers are poorly placed to answer these questions. However, some prior questions are more amenable to philosophical techni…
Against willing servitude
Some people believe that advanced artificial intelligence systems (AIs) might, in the future, come to have moral status. Further, humans might be tempted to design such AIs that they serve us, carrying out tasks that make our lives better. This raises the question of whether designing AIs with moral status to be willing servants would problematically violate their autonomy. In this paper, I argue that it would in fact do so
Will AI avoid exploitation? Artificial general intelligence and expected utility theory
A simple argument suggests that we can fruitfully model advanced AI systems using expected utility theory. According to this argument, an agent will need to act as if maximising expected utility if they’re to avoid exploitation. Insofar as we should expect advanced AI to avoid exploitation, it follows that we should expected advanced AI to act as if maximising expected utility. I spell out this argument more carefully and demonstrate that it fail…
Epistemology (8 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Economics (5 obras) · Free Will and Agency (5 obras) · Art (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Mathematical economics (4 obras) · Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy of language (4 obras)