Jussi Suikkanen
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1290955 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jussi Suikkanen |
| PRENOMES | Jussi |
| SOBRENOME | Suikkanen |
| ASSINATURA | SUIKKANEN J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Birmingham |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2804-1280 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2004 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Shelly Kagan, Answering Moral Skepticism (New York
Nonnaturalism, the Supervenience Challenge, Higher-Order Properties, and Trope Theory
Nonnaturalist realism is the view that normative properties are unique kind of stance-independent properties. It has been argued that such views fail to explain why two actions that are exactly alike otherwise must also have the same normative properties. Mark Schroeder and Knut Olav Skarsaune have recently suggested that nonnaturalist realists can respond to this supervenience challenge by taking the primary bearers of normative properties to be…
Anti-luminosity and anti-realism in metaethics
This paper begins by applying a version of Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to normative properties. This argument suggests that there must be at least some unknowable normative facts in normative Sorites sequences, or otherwise we get a contradiction given certain plausible assumptions concerning safety requirements on knowledge and our doxastic dispositions. This paper then focuses on the question of how the defenders of different …
Hooker's rule‐consequentialism and Scanlon's contractualism—A re‐evaluation
Brad Hooker's rule‐consequentialism and T. M. Scanlon's contractualism have been some of the most debated ethical theories in normative ethics during the last twenty years or so. This article suggests that these theories can be compared at two levels. Firstly, what are the deep, structural differences between the rule‐consequentialist and contractualist frameworks in which Hooker and Scanlon formulate their views? Secondly, what are the more supe…
Methodology and Moral Philosophy
Methodology and Moral Philosophy
Non-Naturalism and Reference
Metaethical realists disagree about the nature of normative properties. Naturalists think that they are ordinary natural properties: causally efficacious, a posteriori knowable, and usable in the best explanations of natural and social sciences. Nonnaturalist realists, in contrast, argue that they are sui generis: causally inert, a priori knowable and not a part of the subject matter of sciences. It has been assumed so far that naturalists can ex…
Motivational Internalism
Moral thinking has two central features. Our judgements appear to be more or less accurate and they also seem action-guiding. This collection of new articles focuses on one of the most important metaethical debates about the second, practical aspect of moral thought. This debate has come to be known as the judgement internalism debate. At its heart is the question of how we should explain the process through which our moral judgements lead us to …
Consequentialist Options
According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are…
Reason-Statements As Non-Extensional Contexts
Many believe that, if true, reason‐statements of the form ‘that X is F is a reason to φ’ describe a ‘favouring‐relation’ between the fact that X is F and the act of φing. This favouring‐relation has been assumed to share many features of other, more concrete relations. This combination of views leads to immediate problems. Firstly, unlike statements about many other relations, reason‐statements can be true even when the relata do not exist, i.e.,…
Consequentialism, Constraints, and the Good-Relative-to
Recently, it has been a part of the so-called consequentializing project to attempt to construct versions of consequentialism that can support agent-relative moral constraints. Mark Schroeder has argued that such views are bound to fail because they cannot make sense of the agent relative value on which they need to rely. In this paper, I provide a fitting-attitude account of both agent-relative and agent-neutral values that can together be used …
Buck-Passing Accounts of Value
This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such asreasonsandoughtto explain evaluative notions, such asgoodnessandvalue. Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of th…
Contractualist Replies to the Redundancy Objections1
This paper is a defence of T.M. Scanlon's contractualism -the view that an action is wrong if it is forbidden by the principles which no one could reasonably reject.Such theories have been argued to be redundant in two ways.They are claimed to assume antecedent moral facts to explain which principles could not be reasonably rejected, and the reasons they provide to follow the non-rejectable principles are said to be unnecessary given that we alre…
Reasons and the Good ? Roger Crisp
In his new book, Roger Crisp takes two steps back and one step forwards. In order to answer certain fundamental questions in ethics, Reasons and the Good creates an original mix of provocative views which most others have abandoned long ago. Crisp defends these views bravely against the philosophical currents that have run against them. His case for them remains inconclusive, but he manages to make them serious contenders again in the main debate…
Unprincipled Virtue – Nomy Arpaly
Book reviewed: Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 208 pp., £10
What We Owe to Many
Buck-Passing Accounts of Value
This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such asreasonsandoughtto explain evaluative notions, such asgoodnessandvalue. Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of th…
Consequentialist Options
According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are…
Reason-Statements As Non-Extensional Contexts
Many believe that, if true, reason‐statements of the form ‘that X is F is a reason to φ’ describe a ‘favouring‐relation’ between the fact that X is F and the act of φing. This favouring‐relation has been assumed to share many features of other, more concrete relations. This combination of views leads to immediate problems. Firstly, unlike statements about many other relations, reason‐statements can be true even when the relata do not exist, i.e.,…
What We Owe to Many
Unprincipled Virtue – Nomy Arpaly
Book reviewed: Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 208 pp., £10
Reasons and the Good ? Roger Crisp
In his new book, Roger Crisp takes two steps back and one step forwards. In order to answer certain fundamental questions in ethics, Reasons and the Good creates an original mix of provocative views which most others have abandoned long ago. Crisp defends these views bravely against the philosophical currents that have run against them. His case for them remains inconclusive, but he manages to make them serious contenders again in the main debate…
Contractualist Replies to the Redundancy Objections1
This paper is a defence of T.M. Scanlon's contractualism -the view that an action is wrong if it is forbidden by the principles which no one could reasonably reject.Such theories have been argued to be redundant in two ways.They are claimed to assume antecedent moral facts to explain which principles could not be reasonably rejected, and the reasons they provide to follow the non-rejectable principles are said to be unnecessary given that we alre…
Consequentialism, Constraints, and the Good-Relative-to
Recently, it has been a part of the so-called consequentializing project to attempt to construct versions of consequentialism that can support agent-relative moral constraints. Mark Schroeder has argued that such views are bound to fail because they cannot make sense of the agent relative value on which they need to rely. In this paper, I provide a fitting-attitude account of both agent-relative and agent-neutral values that can together be used …
Buck-Passing Accounts of Value
This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such asreasonsandoughtto explain evaluative notions, such asgoodnessandvalue. Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of th…
Reason-Statements As Non-Extensional Contexts
Many believe that, if true, reason‐statements of the form ‘that X is F is a reason to φ’ describe a ‘favouring‐relation’ between the fact that X is F and the act of φing. This favouring‐relation has been assumed to share many features of other, more concrete relations. This combination of views leads to immediate problems. Firstly, unlike statements about many other relations, reason‐statements can be true even when the relata do not exist, i.e.,…
Consequentialist Options
According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are…
Motivational Internalism
Moral thinking has two central features. Our judgements appear to be more or less accurate and they also seem action-guiding. This collection of new articles focuses on one of the most important metaethical debates about the second, practical aspect of moral thought. This debate has come to be known as the judgement internalism debate. At its heart is the question of how we should explain the process through which our moral judgements lead us to …
Non-Naturalism and Reference
Metaethical realists disagree about the nature of normative properties. Naturalists think that they are ordinary natural properties: causally efficacious, a posteriori knowable, and usable in the best explanations of natural and social sciences. Nonnaturalist realists, in contrast, argue that they are sui generis: causally inert, a priori knowable and not a part of the subject matter of sciences. It has been assumed so far that naturalists can ex…
Methodology and Moral Philosophy
Methodology and Moral Philosophy
Hooker's rule‐consequentialism and Scanlon's contractualism—A re‐evaluation
Brad Hooker's rule‐consequentialism and T. M. Scanlon's contractualism have been some of the most debated ethical theories in normative ethics during the last twenty years or so. This article suggests that these theories can be compared at two levels. Firstly, what are the deep, structural differences between the rule‐consequentialist and contractualist frameworks in which Hooker and Scanlon formulate their views? Secondly, what are the more supe…
Nonnaturalism, the Supervenience Challenge, Higher-Order Properties, and Trope Theory
Nonnaturalist realism is the view that normative properties are unique kind of stance-independent properties. It has been argued that such views fail to explain why two actions that are exactly alike otherwise must also have the same normative properties. Mark Schroeder and Knut Olav Skarsaune have recently suggested that nonnaturalist realists can respond to this supervenience challenge by taking the primary bearers of normative properties to be…
Anti-luminosity and anti-realism in metaethics
This paper begins by applying a version of Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to normative properties. This argument suggests that there must be at least some unknowable normative facts in normative Sorites sequences, or otherwise we get a contradiction given certain plausible assumptions concerning safety requirements on knowledge and our doxastic dispositions. This paper then focuses on the question of how the defenders of different …
Shelly Kagan, Answering Moral Skepticism (New York
Epistemology (13 obras) · Philosophy (12 obras) · Sociology (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Economics (4 obras) · Free Will and Agency (4 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 obras) · Consequentialism (3 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras)